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ABSTRACT 
The history of the Australian sugar industry since 1945 has been 
characterised by a series of expansionary episodes which were followed 
by periods during which cane growers attempted to consolidate their 
positions in an economic environment that was frequently hostile. Within 
the general context of the Australian sugar industry, Bundaberg and its 
surrounding district is the focus of a study in which the influence of 
national and international events on the local industry are examined. 
Expansionary episodes occurred in the years 1950-1953, 1963-1964, 
1974-75 and 1980. The factors and events which precipitated these 
episodes, the ways which in they were implemented, and the 
consequences of expansion on the national industry, the local industry and 
the community of Bundaberg are discussed in Chapters Two, Four and Six. 
Because expansion of the industry could not have occurred in the way it did 
if not for the development of mechanical harvesting techniques. Chapter 
Three examines the transition from manual to mechanical harvesting and 
explores the role of Bundaberg in this process. The other essential 
ingredient for expansion was irrigation and for the Bundaberg district this 
primarily concerns the Bundaberg-lsis Irrigation Scheme, the subject of 
Chapter Five. 
The Australian sugar industry as a whole is one of the most highly 
regulated in the country and expansion has only been allowed at the 
discretion of the Government, however, despite intensive and extensive 
investigations before each expansionary episode. Committees of Inquiry 
have not been able to predict the consequences of such growth. After each 
episode Australia's export markets have tended to contract, at least in the 
short term, and downward movements in the price of sugar on world sugar 
market seem to have occurred whenever Australia was in the process of 
expanding production. 
In the Bundaberg district these problems have been compounded by a 
shorter than normal growing season and regular periods of drought. It is 
concluded, therefore, that as costs of production continue to rise 
Bundaberg cane growers will find It increasingly difficult to remain 
competitive. 
The work as presented in this thesis is, 
to the best of my knowledge and belief, 
original except as acknowledged in the 
text. I hereby declare that I have not 
submitted this material, either in 
whole or in part, for a degree at this or 
any other institution. 
Linda Hungerford 
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GLOSSARY 
Assignment: A particular area of land on which sugar cane may be grown for 
delivery to a particular mill. Assignments are granted and controlled by the 
Central Sugar Cane Prices Board. Sugar cane can be grown on unassigned land, 
but raw sugar produced from such cane is acquired by the Queensland 
Government at a penalty price. 
Cane Sugar. Chemical name sucrose. A carbohydrate. Sucrose can also be 
obtained from sugar beet and is present in fruits and other vegetables. 
Commercial Cane Sugar (cc.s.): A figure calculated from the analysis of cane. 
It is a measure of the quantity of pure sugar (sucrose) which may be extracted 
from cane at a given level of milling efficiency. 
Farm Peak: A delivery quota which represents a minimum access right to 
supply cane to a mill from a particular assignment. The aggregate of farm 
peaks allocated to land assigned to a particular mill corresponds to that 
mill's peak. 
London Dailu Price (LDP): This quotation, established daily on the London sugar 
market, represents a price at which it is judged willing buyers and sellers 
would trade bulk raw sugar for shipment in the current and succeeding month. 
The LDP is determined on a basis of US dollars per tonne bulk raw sugar, basis 
96 degrees pol c.i.f. United Kingdom; it is widely used as an indicator of the 
daily value of raw sugar on the world "free market". (See Spot Price) 
Massecuite: The mixture of crystals and syrup produced by crystallisation in a 
vacuum pan. The term is French for "cooked mass". 
Mill Peaks: A delivery quota which traditionally represents the access right of 
a mill to supply raw sugar to the domestic and export markets. The aggregate 
of mill peaks corresponds to the assessment of the quantity of sugar which 
will be required for home consumption and for sale to reasonably assured 
export markets. 
V 
Polarisation(Dol): A measure of the sucrose content of sugar. Broadly, a 
sugar of 98 pol (sometimes expressed as degrees pol) would contain about 98 
% sucrose. 
Raw Sugar: The sugar crystals separated from massecuite in a centrifugal in a 
raw sugar mill. Australian raw sugar is usually in two grades either about 
98.8% or 97.6% polarisation. Polarisation is varied to satisfy the 
requirements of customers. Raw sugar is produced and handled at two mills 
under special conditions for sale for direct consumption in Australia. 
Season: The crushing season in the Australian sugar industry normally refers 
to the period from June to December when mills are in operation. Thus, the 
1985 season refers to cane planted prior to 1985, harvested during 1985 and 
for which the final price and payment is not determined until mid-1986. This 
season is used for statistical purposes. Payment for sugar and cane during a 
particular season extends from the commencement of crushing to the end of 
June following the crushing. 
Spot Price: The notional price for raw sugar for prompt shipment. It is fixed 
each market day on international sugar markets. In theory, it is fixed at a 
price which the buyers wishing to buy sugar for immediate delivery would be 
prepared to buy, and a price at which sellers wishing to sell sugar for 
immediate shipment, would be prepared to sell. 
World Price: The spot prices determined for raw sugar on the two main 
markets, London and New York, are considered to be indicators of the world 
price. 
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PREFACE 
This Study examines the development of the Bundaberg sugar cane farming 
industry as i t occurs within the overall growth of the Australian sugar 
Industry between the years from 1945 to 1985. 
As Diana Shogren points out in her study "The politics and administration 
of the Queensland sugar industry to 1930"^ considerable research has been 
conducted on the early years of the industry, especially v^ith regard to the 
importation of Pacific Islanders labour. Kay Saunders has been 
particularly active in this area and articles published by her include "'The 
middle passage?'. Conditions on the Labour Vessels from Queensland to 
Melanesia, 1863-1907";2 ""Troublesome servants': the strategies of 
resistance employed by Melanesian indentured labourers on plantations in 
colonial Queensland",^ and, "Melanesian Women in Queensland 1863-1907".'* 
While examining race relations and the labour trade in colonial Queensland 
Saunders concentrates on Melanesian participation in the sugar industry in 
'The Black Scourge' which is to be found in R. L. Evans, Race ReMJons in 
Cofoma! Queensldnd ^ Issues relating to racism, unionism and the 
Melanesians are also discussed at length by Saunders in Workers m 
Bonddge, ^ while Who are our SfWmws?^ contains two articles pertaining 
to racism and unionism; one is by Saunders and the other by Douglas Hunt. 
i D Sh&gr*n, Th* poHlics srid ddminlstratioft 6f thi? Ouee'risland sugar Vidustry to 
1930, (PhD Thesis, Lhiv^rsltu of Qu^^nsUnd, 1975), ^s\\\ 
^ K Siund^Ks, "Th& middle fvsssage?", Conditi<>n? on *he Lsbour V*s5e-l5 from OuS'ensland to 
r^Tsn&sia, 1863 - 1907, J^-rMl ^f AiJTtr^Ii^ Sia^T^>, No 5, (1979), |:.p.38-49 
B K S5urfd«'S, 'Tfoiibkswfte s^varits:': the strategies &f resist-anw- eri"iploy*d by 
Mel5r*5lan inde-ntured l-sboiwe-rs 6n pbrit^ticns in colonial Ou^wsland. J-^i/fv^l^fPj'jffK 
Hf^t^yy, Vol 14, No 3-4,(1979), pp. 168-192 
* K Saunders, Melane-slari v/omen \u Queensland, 1863 - 1907, P^offh! Jj'AA/fc'i-,Vol 4, No 1, 
(1990),pp.26-44 
9 IC Saundef 5, Th* Black So ou rge, R L Evans, XIA?*? f^latm^ M CO ^ M/<^-WMi-/ay^' 
(Brisbane, Uriiversity of Ou*enslarid Pre-ss, 1975) 
fi K Saunders, ¥^f^wv m ^ v ^ v : J7f<?J^'^i'isjfl^&ij^sf}fL'hf?'^ IJSM?- .n i^w^.v.l}/7<f 
^S24- ?9W, (Bris bane, Uftiversi ty o f Qu ee nsia nd P ress, 1982) 
y IC Saunders, Masters arid Servants, AND, D Hunt, Eylusivisivi arid Unionisrft, in A Curt^ roys 
and A Marljus, (Eds) SK^ ?^ j.'v-:?i-r^ 'W-7?.cJj-.^  (Sydney, Hale arkd Ir^ ernonger, 1978) 
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In her paper'Racial attitudes towards Melanesians in Colonial Queensland's 
Patricia Mercer takes a more theoretical look at the questions of race and 
racism by isolating broad groups of attitudes towards Melanesians. The 
repatriation or Pacific Islanders after 1906 Is studied by Peter Corrls,^ 
while A ForgottenFeopJe^^ traces the history of the Pacific Islanders in 
Australia from their initial recruitment in the nineteenth century through 
to their situation in the 1970s. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century and with the abolition of the 
Melanesian labour trade imminent, the sugar industry began to move away 
from plantation modes of production by establishing the central mill 
system. This was accompanied by the creation of small family farms, 
owned and worked by Europeans. Articles by Ralph Shiomowitz examine the 
transitional process with the emphasis falling on its economic aspects.ii 
Peter Griggs' study^^ of the sugar industry in the Lower Burdekin also 
traces the transitional process and provides invaluable regional insights 
into the early years of development but like Shogren's work it concludes in 
1930. Yet another regional study is D. K. Dignan's thesis, 'Economic and 
social development in the Lower Burnett 1840-1960".^^ The inter-war 
period is well covered by economic historian Adrian Graves, in his article 
"Crisis and change in the Australian sugar industry, 1914-1939' which is to 
S p Mercer, Racial attrtu^s towards Melanesians in colonial Queensland, H Reynolds, (Ed) 
R^o^ /vlffkjflj' m fibr&i ^ u^'^^f^nd, (Tovnsville, Ja iws C*o k Uhiversi ty, 1978) 
* P Corns, Vhite Australia ift Actioin: the repatriatiori of Pacific Islanders from 
OueeiBlard, Afe-Avw /^J.^ A«rti>.?, Vol 15, No 58, (1972), pp. 237-250 
^ 0 A fo^r^ttM P^^h, (Sy dftey, The Aus tr alian Broadc asting C ommissi on, 1978) 
I ^ R Shlonnowitz, The search for iTiStitutlorial *qui1*riu!V\ in Queensland"s sugar Industry 
1884-1913, <.fe-/^ y/«wil-4VMW?&'Afe-Avy/ft«i-wii-; V«1 19, No 2, (1979), pp. 91 -122; 
R Shterriovitr, Markets iw indentured and time-expired Mebnesian labour in Ou^ -eftslarid 
1865-1906, ;?5y JkffTt^I^fPjeffK' Afe-Avy, V l^ 16, (1981), p 70-91; 
R Shlomovitr, Melanesian labeur and *he developent of the Oue-er«land sugaf* industry, 
1863-1906, ^^awra^ CTFAMWWJA? MirAv^, Vel 7, (1982), pp .327-361 
^ P Griggs, Plantation to small fam^s: a historical geography of the Lower Burdekin 
su^ar industry, 1880 - 1930, (PhD Thesis, University of Queensland, 1989) 
I I [> IC Oigrvan, Ewn&mic and social development in the Lower Burne-tt 1840-1960: A re-gioftal 
study with special reference to Kolan Shire arid the Gin Gin district, (MA Thesis, 
tfniversity of Queensland, 1962) 
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be found in The world sugar economy in war and depression, iQ}4-l940. i^ 
This work compliments and expands upon ideas and themes developed in an 
earlier article, 'Crisis and change in the Queensland sugar industry, 1863-
1906".'5 More general histories have been written by industry historians 
like Easterby,i6 Woods "^' and Lowndes^s all of which cover only small 
portions of the post World War Two period. In their v/ork The 
CanecuttersP Burrows and Morton do go beyond this period but their 
Interest Is confined to cane cutters and their successors, cane harvesting 
machines. 
The post-war period has been extensively studied by scholars who have 
produced numerous books, articles and reports covering an array of 
specific aspects of the sugar industry. For example, the mechanisation 
process and other technoglocal developments are discussed in monographs 
and articles by 6. Burrows in Economic conseduences of technological 
development in the sugar industry^ 6. A. Willis in Harvesting and 
transport of sugar cane in Australia^ and E. C. Chapman's article, 
'Queensland ports and the bulk shipment of Australian raw sugar".22 The 
economy of the sugar industry, and in particular its ecomonic impact on 
the State's economy, is thoroughly examined by Powell and McGovern in The 
H A Graves, Crisis aftd change in the Australian sugar industry, 1914-1939, in B Albert and 
A Graves, CEds), 77i^ wwld^u^iriM^fftrnti; m wjf-ifui^^"v^m i9t4- f940, 
(London, Roulledge, 1988) 
15 Graves, A, Crisis and change in the Queensland su^ar industry, 1863-1906, i^ B Albert 
arid A Graves, O'irj^j/ufaAj/i^ ffj rtM ff^iWvvui'WAj/jXfyyfrA'JWW/?:^,. f8i>il-f9f4^ 
(Edinburgh, ISC Press, 1984) 
1 ^  H T E asterby, 7h^ ikAAMJ-luft^j^tj^ • Muferii'y, (Burea u ef Sugar Exp er indent 
Stations,Queensland Governnnent Printer, 1932) 
*^ C T Vood (£i), Jjiiyo'' CiKfy^ y: A j^'t fiij(^?fy offh^ yj w J^U^^JT ff3dbt>'£f^ }S64-
If^-f, (9ri5bane, Ouee-nsland Canegrowers Council, 1965) 
"® A G Lowndes, i3^^l/(A PjjrfKf Dif^yffh'v^ CSydney, Angus arid Robertsen, 1956) 
15 G Burrovs and C Morton, 7h^ CjfVMuft^'^, (Melbeurne, Melbourne University 
Press, 1986) 
^ G Burrews, ft'JWeW JA? c^vt^^tfMO^j- off^^fW^Kfj/^ i- '^fyjMi^f JH fhj? ja^w Weferdy, 
(Deakin Unive-rsity, School ef Mariagernent, 1982) 
i1 G A Villis, f-i3if\-v^fm^jn^^:injpoi''tofiy^ir^Jt^ in /tor^y/jy^(Tovnsville, James Cook 
University, 1972) 
^ EC Chapman, Queeftsland ports and the hulk shipment of Australian raw sugar, iiwyx'^a^^ 
Mo 47 C1%2), pp.310-313 
I 
economic impact of the sugar industry an the Queensland State ecanamy^^ 
while more general studies about the overall state of the sugar industry at 
various points in times were compiled by Lance Jones and Company in 
1975,24 and the Sugar Industry Working Party In 1985.25 A number of 
regional studies covering portions of the post-war period have also been 
conducted in recent years. They include theses by K. Bardsley26 and J. M. 
Towsen "^? and an article by D. S. Simonett.^s items specific to the 
Bundaberg district have frequently concentrated on irrigation, such as The 
development and management of the water resources of the Burnett/Kolan 
River Basins',29 The future of irrigated sugar cane in Bundaberg',50 and 
'Bundaberg Irrigation Scheme, Queensland".^ ^ 
Despite this proliferation of information, however, there does not appear 
to be an overall historical study of the post-war development of the 
Australian sugar industry. While this study does not purport to be such a 
history since it is primarily concerned with only one section of the 
industry, namely, cane farming, it does seek to identify the industry's 
major issues, problems and highlights by focussing on the cane growers of 
Bundaberg. 
23 R P 0we 11, M MoGovem, 7h<? A,'JW«WJ ?A? jw?flju&- ^ .3^ 'JJfe» ^ ayw ifu^tfy on fh<? ihiW^y'lmJ 
iJ /^jAaAwwjw!flij/^ Arpnidale, (Armidale, University of Hev Eriglaiwi, 1987) 
2"* TSe" Ai/^tf'^iixi Su^' kuk^ffy, (Brisbane, Lanoe Jorws and Company, 1975) 
25 Su^ir hi^try ¥df'kmg P-irti; P^pi^'t, (Gove rwnen t Printer, 198 5) 
26 K Bardsley, The Maroochy Sugar Region: A Geographical Analysis, (BA Horks Thesis, 
University of Queensland, 1959) 
27 J M Tovser, Ari investigation of nev settlement in the sugar iridustry as a result of 
post-var exjvansion: a oase study on the Herbert FJiver district, (B Eo Hens Thesis, James 
Cook University, 1979) 
28 [> S Simonett, Su^ar production in north Queensland, £iOMfi>k G<^o^'^^, No 30, 
(1954), pp.223-255 
29 V R Beattie, Commissioner of Vater Resources, Old^ The development and managennent 
of the water resources of the Burnett/Kolan River Basins ^  paper presented to the ^>Av 
Pi?:^:Mfvfy FoLSkiifi^ /fe&-*'j/wJ^/?^:r^j, Queensland State Comnnittee, 1983 
^0 G C Bieske, G Kingston, K F Pharr, TKe future of irrigated sugar cane in Bundaberg, 
Wjt^' j^WjWVA- j^f'tfSt? Sufyi^tf j^/iV7 /967 to t9^jfid^^^, (Brisbane, Water 
Research Foundation of Australia, 1983) 
?i Bureau of Agricultural Ec onomies, Bu ndaberg Ir riga tion Seh erv», Qu eensla nd, fL'^ Aiuwjjyj-
o^f ¥jt?f'f^^wifv^ J^^vvk^i^t, (Canberra, Australian Government Publishirig Service, 
1975) 
XI 
The Bundaberg sugar cane farming industry was selected as the focus for 
this study because, as well as being subject the same problems as the 
Australian sugar industry as a whole (marketing difficulties, price 
fluctuations, etc.) it has the added disadvantage of being located in an 
area in which climatic conditions are not particularly suitable for cane 
growing. The study's purpose is to show how the Bundaberg district's cane 
farmers attempted to maintain viability in a highy regulated industry and 
determine whether or not they succeeded. 
The study as a whole is conducted at three levels; the international, the 
national and the local. The extent of the investigation, however, is limited 
to those aspects of the industry which vv'ere perceived to be of major 
significance by cane growers. This is because the foundation of the study 
is a series of interviews with cane growers, during which they were 
questioned about their views on the development of the sugar cane 
growing Industry since 1945. Out of approximately 850^2 growers 
supplying the Bingera, Fairymead and Millaquin mills, a quota sarnple^^ of 
4^ (thirty-four growers) was selected. Of these eleven finally agreed to 
be interviewed. 
The other major sources of information for this thesis were derived from 
the archives of the Canegrowers - Bundaberg District.34 The material 
includes journals, government reports and gazettes, industry submissions. 
Association minutes, minutes of the mill suppliers' committee meetings, 
general correspondence files, statistics and newspaper clippings books. 
The clippings books were used primarily to determine the affects of 
fluctuations in the sugar industry on the local community. Information 
was also obtained from Commonwealth and Queensland Parliamentary 
^2 The fkrecise number of grewers in the district is difficult to determine since sonw have 
more than one holding and are listed under company names as veil as their own. 
33 Quota sannpling refers to the pr ooess of selecting sampling elements on the basis of 
categories assumed to exist within the population. In this case the eate^ories were 
defined as the tftree mills in the Buwlaberg district; nafViely, B^era, Millaquin and 
Fairymead. To ensure that all mills were appropriateki represented the size of the 
sannple selected from a given mill was determined l>y its total number of suppliers. 
* • Previously known as the Bundaberg District Cane Growers Executive, the name was 
changed to Canegrowers - Bundaberg District in May 1991 
Xl1 
debates and papers, the Queensland Cane Farmers' library, and a range of 
other published and unpublished material. 
As well as introductory and concluding chapters the work has five 
substantive chapters. Chapter Two examines the period from 1945 to 
1969. The year 1945 was chosen because it marked the beginning of post-
war reconstruction within the industry. The terminating point, 1969, was 
a year during which several disturbing events took place. The year began 
on an optimistic note as a result of the negotiation of the 1968 
International Sugar Agreement, which promised renewed stability for the 
industry, and the announcement of government approval for the 
Bundaberg-lsis irrigation Scheme. As the year progressed, however, 
optimism was replaced by pessimism as drought overtook the country and 
Fiji disease was discovered in Bundaberg. 
Chapter Three looks at the transition from manual to mechanical cane 
harvesting with particular reference to Bundaberg's role in the process. 
Chapter Four covers the period from 1970 to 1977 which was 
characterised by rapidly escalating production costs and changing market 
conditions. By 1977 there were clear signs of strain within the Industry 
as a whole and especially in the Bundaberg district. 
The next chapter. Chapter Five, provides a brief overview of the very 
Important Issue of irrigation In the district, it traces the construction of 
the Bundaberg-lsis irrigation Scheme and discusses some of the major 
elements in its development including the Bundaberg District Irrigation 
Committee, funding arrangements and government policy. Chapter Six 
considers the events which occurred between 1978 and 1985. In 1978 cane 
growers were again looking forward to a period of stabilisation following 
the latest International Sugar Agreement concluded during that year, and 
initially it looked as though their optimism was justified. By 1980, 
however, the industry was in the grip of a severe economic down-turn. 
Despite ever increasing productivity the economy of the industry in the 
ensuing years until 1985 proved to be so depressed that some growers 
were forced into bankruptcy and out of the industry . By the end of that 
year Industry leaders, politicians and growers alike, were agreeing that 
xni 
while for many growQrs 1985 was indeed the "end of the road', for those 
who remained it must be a 'turning point in efforts to restore confidence 
and economic viability for one of the most important primary industries in 
the country.'35 
In the concluding chapter. Chapter Seven, it wil l be argued that despite the 
high level of efficiency and tight government regulation the Australian 
sugar industry is subject to severe economic fluctuations. Further, with 
regard to the Bundaberg district, the thesis wil l suggest that sugar cane is 
not a suitable crop for the area and that perhaps growers should consider 
alternative agricultural pursuits. 
55 Ai&-^-j/iifl Si/^- y^' .ftwtf:, Vol 45, (1986), p.97 (Hereafter AS)'B 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW TO 1945 
The Australian sugar Industry Is a very tightly controlled 
and regulated industry and has evolved as a model of co-
operation between Governn i^ent and Private Enterprise. The 
reason behind the strict regulation is to enable the industry 
to run In a stable and orderly manner, and to Insulate as 
much as possible, all those dependent upon sugar for their 
livelihood, from the price fluctuations which can occur in a 
freely produced and uncontrolled commodity.^ 
These words introduced a report written in 1975 by Lance Jones and 
Company, members of the Brisbane Stock Exchange. They were written when 
the industry was enjoying a period of prosperity and relative stability, and 
perhaps at that time they seemed accurate. An examination of the Industry 
from 1945 to 1985, however, clearly shows that stability and order have 
not always been a feature of the industry, nor has it been insulated from 
price fluctuations. 
The purpose of this thesis is to consider the Bundaberg sugar cane farming 
industry as a case study set within the general framework of the Australian 
sugar industry, in order to support the contention that despite the best 
Intentions of the regulating authorities they have not been able to achieve 
the kind of stability essential to ensure the livelihoods of those involved in 
the production of sugar cane, and those other members of the community 
whose employment is either directly or indirectly dependent on the 
industry. In other words, while this study is primarily concerned with cane 
growers it also takes into consideration the effects of the industry's 
fluctuating fortunes on the social and economic welfare of sugar towns 
such as Bundaberg. 
The study also raises questions about the continued viability of cane 
growing in the Bundaberg district. The Bundaberg district is generally 
The Australian Sugar Industry, (9ri5b-an*, L^** J w « and Co., 1975), p.9 
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definQd as an arga which strQtchQs north to Baffle Creek, west to around 
Mount Perry and south to Childers, however, for the purposes of this study 
the district is defined as the area which services the Bingera, Fairymead 
and nniaquln sugar mills. While the Isis mil l , which is located in Childers, 
is not considered in this study the Isis region is discussed briefly in 
relation to the development of the Bundaberg-lsis Irrigation Scheme. 
The questions about Bundaberg's long-term viability stem from the 
district's geographic location. The climate in the district is considered to 
be sub-tropical and sugar is essentially a tropical crop. Long-term rainfall 
data for Bundaberg indicates that the average annual amount of 
precipitation Is around 1153mm which Is amongst the lowest of any cane 
producing area. The data also point to a steady decline in precipitation 
rates such that the average from 1965 to1986 was 1108mm while the 
average from 1976 to 1986 was 948mm.2 The problem of overall 
adequacy of average rainfall Is aggravated by relatively poor distribution 
throughout the growing season and high variability of annual rainfall from 
average. Irrigation has ameliorated these problems to a degree; it is, 
however, by no means a complete or entirely satisfactory solution. 
Temperature is also an important consideration in cane growing and here too 
Bundaberg's sub-tropical location is a disadvantage. Because cane growth 
rates are severely inhibited when temperatures fall below 21 degrees 
Celsius the main growing season in the Bundaberg region is confined to the 
seven months from October to April inclusive. This compares with the 
eight, nine and ten months respectively for Mackay, Burdekin and Cairns 
regions.^ When these problems are added to uncertain market conditions and 
increasingly high production costs, the district's continuance as a cane 
growing area must be seriously questioned. 
The over-riding structure of the study is chronological in that i t is divided 
Into specific time spans. Within these divisions, however, a number of 
2 B. Dft mini a*, (B ur^au of S ugar Exp*Kirrt«-nt Station, unda-t* J manuscript), p .9 
8 G C Bi?5ke, G Kin^stori, K F Pharr, Th* futuKt of irrigated sugar tan* in 
Buftdaberg, YjtwPi^fM^wj'o/ftf^Sli/fni^ftPA;^ /i^'7 to 198Jjn^S^i^ond, 
(Brisbane, Vater R*5farch Fftundationof Australia, 1983), p. 152 
themes and issues are analysed. The major ones are expansion, government 
intervention, marketing arrangements, mechanisation, irrigation, the 
cost/price squeeze and climate. Of these expansion is deemed to be the 
most important since all the others are in one way or another affected by it. 
Since 1945 there have been several expansionary periods, but unlike most 
other industries wherein expansion has been at the discretion of the 
individuals Involved, expansion vv'ithin the sugar Industry could only occur 
with the approval of the government. Expansions were generally preceded 
by the appointment of a Committee of Inquiry and all interested parties 
were invited to make submissions. The final decision as to the size and 
timing of such expansions, however, lay with the government. 
This was by no means the only way in which government was involved in the 
industry. Indeed, the sugar industry at the time of writing is, as Lance 
Jones and Company indicated, subject to very tight control and regulation. 
Dating back to the turn of the century legislation covering practically every 
facet of sugar production and sale has been enacted by either or both the 
Commonwealth and State Governments. Acts applying to the sugar industry 
Include: 
* Sugar Agreement Act 1915 
* Sugar Acquisition Act 1915-1984 
* Regulation of Sugar Cane Prices Act 1962-1981 
* Sugar Experiment Stations Act 1900-1983 
* Sugar Board Act 1966-1982 
* Harbours Act 1955-19824 
The question of government involvement is raised throughout the thesis in a 
variety of contexts including the mechanisation process and the delivery of 
irrigation water, but especially with regard to marketing arrangements. 
Because all sugar produced in Australia is automatically acquired by the 
government, via the Sugar Acquisition Act 1915-1984, the negotiation of 
contracts for sale of the sugar is ostensibly at a government level. In 
Sugar IrdL'stry Vcrking Party Report, (Gov^ rnnient Pi-intw, 1985), p.8 
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reality such negotiations are undertaken by the Colonial Sugar Refining 
Company, which is the government's sugar marketing arm. At the end of 
World War Two most of Australia's export sugar was being sold to the 
British Commonwealth. Since that time there has been a major shift in the 
destinations of our sugar exports away from Britain and towards Asia.^ 
These changes have had a significant effect on the development of the 
Australian sugar industry. 
Since the advent of commercial cane grovv'ing in Australia shortages of 
labour, particularly for the arduous harvesting operation, have been a 
chronic problem. In the early days, these shortages were satisfied by the 
importation of Pacific Islanders (Kanakas). After such importations vv'ere 
abandoned, when Queensland entered the Australian Federation in 1901, 
labour requirements were met by successive waves of immigrants primarily 
from Southern Europe. Despite the introduction of immigrant labour, 
however, shortages continued to be a problem. Spurred on by this problem, 
mechanical harvesting equipment was developed and f i rs t used 
commercially in the Bundaberg distr ict, and Bundaberg subsequently became 
reknowned as a major producer of cane harvesting machinery. 
Another issue which has been of on-going concern to the Bundaberg region is 
irrigation. Without substantial Irrigation i t is doubtful that cane growing 
in the distr ict could have been maintained as a viable industry. Even with 
irrigation, which presents problems both in terms of rising costs and 
increasing salinity, the industry is by no means secure and Bundaberg's 
growers are s t i l l at a distinct disadvantage v^hen compared with other cane 
growing areas. 
The cost of irrigation is only one component of the ever present conflict 
between the value of the income received by growers and the amount of 
their production costs. The cost/price squeeze seemed to be contained, at 
least until the mid to late 1960s, but from that time onwards i t has become 
an increasingly diff icult struggle. In the Bundaberg distr ict , the problem 
appears to have increased significantly since the phasing out of the very 
Australia n Sugar Pro^ ju c^  r '-i A-sociatio n, Anmjl R^^orf, (1977), p. .3 
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productive variety of cane NCo310, which vv'as necessitated by the 
reappearance of Fiji disease in 1969. Last, but not least, of the issues to be 
considered is the climate. Climate is a major concern for practically all 
agricultural industries but in Bundaberg it is especially important because 
droughts are a fairly regular occurrence and sugar cane needs plenty of 
water if it is to flourish. 
These then, are the Issues which permeate the thoughts of cane grov-/ers, 
and hence this study. Before they are examined in ful l , however, a brief 
history of the development of the cane growing industry in Australia and in 
Bundaberg is presented in order to establish a context for the ensuing 
discussion. 
By the time of Federation the sugar industry was well established in 
northern New South Wales and Queensland. Until the mid 1880's it was 
generally grown on plantations, the legislative genisis of which had been 
the Sugar and Coffee Regulations of 1864^, however, Vv'hen the nineteenth 
century ended the plantation system had almost entirely been superseded by 
the central mill system.''' A full description of the central mill system and 
Its origins in the Bundaberg area may be found In John Kerr's Southern Sugar 
Sag^ 
The Sugar and Coffee Regulations not only provided the incentive for the 
development of Australia's sugar industry, i t also marked the beginning of 
long-term government interest in the industry.^ The Commonwealth 
Government became involved from 1901 onvv'ards but as a consequence of 
the bitter sugar strike of 1911, the Federal Government ordered a Royal 
Commission and the level of intervention increased markedly. V^ hen war 
broke out in 1914 the price of sugar slumped dramatically and the response 
by both the Federal and Queensland governments was to take full control of 
^ G Burrovs^ C Mortori, Jh'^ dnoiiuit^i':;, (M*lbourn&, Me-lb*uriw Umv&rsity Press, 
1986.), p.6 
7 A^K y^l ><LIII, (Aug 1952), p.3b4 
S J K *rr , S^th^^ Sug-^r i ^ ^ CBrisban*, Bun dabwg Sugar Co Ltd., 19S5). 
^ IM Atufi'jhin Su^r tJiffy's/: 517 ^ AJ /V ^ fjtjAfi? i-wJWflJ* ifff2J-197^, (Brisbane, 
The-Sugar Board, 1973) 
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the industry. An agreement was reached Y-/hereby the Queensland 
government undertook to acquire all sugar produced in the state and the 
Commonwealth government undertook to control all exports and imports.^o 
In August 1915 the Sugar Acquisition Act was passed.ii This short statute 
of fourteen sections and a schedule has continued to be the keystone of the 
marketing structure of the industry. It, together with the Regulations of 
Cane Sugar Prices Act, became the basis of rationalisation within the 
industry and paved the way for its subsequent development. Between 1915 
and 1922 the Queensland government enacted a series of Acts v-zhich 
attempted to regulate and control prices and conditions governing the 
delivery of cane to mills, beginning with the creation of cane assignments, 
a system through which individual cane grovv'ers' land vv'as assigned to 
supply cane to specific mills.12 
In 1922 the first formal Australian Sugar Agreement was arrived at and put 
into operation through the Cornmunv'/edlth Sugar Act of 1923. This Act 
provided for a guaranteed price for sugar and it also prohibited the 
importation of black-grovyn sugar except under special circumstances. 
Overproduction during the 1920s resulted in a further refinement of the 
system v-zhereby assignments vv'ere dedicated to specified acreages of land, 
but even with this provision it continued to be a problem, and in 1929 the 
Peak year Scheme was introduced in order to control the amount of sugar 
that was produced. This scheme meant that the highest annual output of 
each mill between 1915 and 1929 was to be the limit of any future year's 
production. Farm peaks, a similar scheme applying directly to individual 
farms, were introduced in 1939. The Sugar Board set up by the Queensland 
government in 1923 was the authority which determined peaks and it 
retained its jurisdiction over peaks until the Regulation of Sugar Prices Act 
was amended in 1939. Control then passed to the Central Sugar Cane 
Prices Board.^ ^ 
^0 A Gr4ives, Crisis and chan^* in th* Australian sugar industry 1914-1939, In B Albert 
and A Graves, 7?}^ ii-i:v^j^/yii''^o'onon}f/ M ii-af"-Jw</i*5ii?/ViV;>>7 ?'9f4-4^ (London. 
Routl*d ge., 1988), f^ p 142-156 
11 Ibid, p. 144 
12 (Jue&nsland Gov*r nrr.^  nt Caz *t te, Vol CV, (1915), p. 1971 
12 A Graves, Op Cit, pp. 152-54 
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During the period v\'hen government was staking its claim on the control of 
the sugar industry growers' organisations also began to take shape. The 
Queensland Cane Growers' Association was established under the Primary 
Producers' Organisation and Marketing Act of 1926. This in turn led to the 
creation of Mill Suppliers' Committees and District Cane Grovv'ers' 
Executives which provided for an annual conference and compulsory levies 
to finance the organisations. 
The onset of the Great Depression brought about further changes vv'ithin 
the Australian industry as world-wide over-production led to the first 
attempt at organising world markets. In 1937 twenty-four countries 
concluded the first International Sugar Agreement under v-zhich an export 
quota of 400,000 tons (406,000 tonnes) Vv'as allotted to Australia.i'* 
During World Vv'ar Two the International Sugar Agreement was in abeyance 
and the world price of sugar fell. Sugar production also fell from an 
average of 829,000 tons (845,580 tonnes) in the five years before the vv'ar, 
to an average of 650,000 tons (663,000 tonnes) in the war years.^^ 
In Bundaberg the growth of the sugar industry proceeded along similar lines 
as other regional developments, beginning in 1867 vv'hen the Steuart 
Brothers, Gavin and John, took up their selection under the terms of the 
Coffee and Sugar Regulations. It was timber, however, rather than sugar or 
coffee that was the initial focus of their interest. Hearing that ash and 
cedar and other timbers were to be found in abundance around the mouth of 
the Burnett River, the brothers selected 320 acres (130 ha.) there which 
they named Woondooma.i^  
The Steuart brothers were quickly followed by other settlers vv'ho were also 
attracted by the extensive stands of valuable timber and in the early 1870s 
Samuel Johnston established the regions first sawmill at 
14 Ibid, p. 153 
1 ^  C T Vood.. (*d), Si^jj'Comffy: A >TJwi'/rh'fOi>y offfh? rji!•• j'ij^r mdu^hiy in Ai/^f/fj/« 
/ ^ V - /i^^jf^CBrisban*, OuA^nsUndCane-grow -^r'sCouricil, 1973), p.25 
1^ AS^^f, Vol XL III, (Nov 1950, p.564 
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Waterview.l"? As the land was cleared of t imber i t s value far agricultural 
purposes became evident. In the beginning the primary crop was maize but 
sugar was also cultivated from the start and by 1872 two sugar mills were 
operating In the Bundaberg area. The first was built by Richard Palmer of 
Millbank and the second by John Steuart.^^ 
By the mid 1870s Bundaberg was a small but thriving community and many 
earnest selectors had begun to turn their properties into productive farms. 
In 1875, however, disaster struck in the form of a massive flood. Hundreds 
of pounds worth of timber, maize and sugar vv'ere lost together with sugar 
manufacturing and timber milling equipment, a river ferry and many 
homes.1^ 
To add insult to injury the sugar crop was then attacked by "rust" disease. 
Disappointed but undaunted, a sufficient number of people persisted with 
the industry and by 1880 Bundaberg had six sugar mills - Millbank, 
Woondooma, Sharon, Waterview, Branyan and Cuba.20 The ability of 
Bundaberg sugar growers to bounce back after such problems was to be a re-
occurring theme which continues to the present day. 
Despite its problems the industry continued to expand and by 1888 thirty-
six mills (fourteen of which were juice mills) were operating in the 
Bundaberg district. In 1985 only three, Bingera, Fairymead and Millaquin, 
remained. Two others, Qunaba and Gin Gin continued to operate until well 
into the twentieth century. Eventually, however, changing economic 
conditions and declining efficiency resulted in the closure of these two 
mills and through a process of rezoning growers assigned to those mills 
were reassigned to either Bingera, Fairymead or Millaquin. 
The Millaquin refinery was built by R. Cran and Sons in 1882. As well as 
crushing sugar from its own plantation it also treated juices from about 
1"? Ibid, p.565 
IS V R Johnstoft, A AwiWfcw/'jyy Mirfojy ^^ "^^ iAWiw/Awf (Brisbano, Unive r^sity 6f 
l3u«-*nsUftd Pr«s^ 1988), p.218 
19 JK«-r,0pCit,p.9 
20 Ibid, p.11 
fifteen independently owned juice mills. Juice mills were relatively 
unsophisticated crushing plants. Each plant consisted of a set of rollers 
which squeezed the juice from the cane, a mixer to add 
lirne to prevent deterioration of the juice, a tank to hold i t , and a pump to 
force the juice through pipes to the refinery.21 gy 1900 nearly all of the 
juice mills had closed down.22 
The original Fairymead was purchased in 1880 by brothers Arthur, Horace 
and Ernest Voung. Within two years they had a small area of land under cane 
and they had constructed a juice mill. Until they upgraded the Fairymead 
mill to produce raw sugar in October 1885, juice was barged across the 
Burnett River to Bundaberg for crystallising at Millaquin refinery.23 
The Bingera mill got underway when the Gibson family - William and his 
four sons - decided to transfer their activities from Hemmant near Brisbane 
to Bundaberg. Once in Bundaberg they purchased land in conjunction vv'ith 
the Howe brothers, Nathaniel, John and Harold and together they established 
the Bingera plantation and mill.24 
The establishment of sugar mills In Bundaberg and the construction of a 
rum distillery ensured the city's surs'ival and growth, and in turn gave rise 
to substantial manufacturing enterprises such as ironmongers Wooley, 
Bergin and Company, and Wyper Brothers.25 While evidence given at the 
1912 Royal Commission clearly indicated that sugar was the district's 
principal industry other agricultural and associated activities, such as 
dairying, were also being successfully undertaken. By 1915, Bundaberg's 
economic base and condition was far removed from that of 1870 and 
patterns for future development were firmly established. The sugar industry 
was expanding and those people who were not directly involved in the 
21 bid, p.14 
22 4SJ, Vol 50.111, (DM 1951), p.658 
23 G Burrows and C Mortoft, 0|> Cit, p.23 
24 JHoUn,OpCit, pJ05 
25 ibid, p. 159 
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industry were generally occupied in supplying the public and private 
services needed to cater for a growing population.26 
The rapid growth that had occurred prior to 1915, however, could not be 
sustained indefinitely, especially after World War One. The inter-war 
period was to be one of slow and steady growth, however, the problems 
that were to plague the local cane growing industry in the post World War 
Two era, became increasingly evident. In particular, diseases such as 
gumming and Fij i , were making their presence felt. Another matter of great 
concern to local growers was erratic rainfall. Not only was the rainfall 
unreliable, studies had shown that the area was significantly drier than 
most of the other Australian sugar producing regions and that irrigation 
Vv'as essential for continued viability. 
Despite the obstacles pitted against It, the Bundaberg sugar industry, both 
grovying and milling sectors, combined to make it as efficient as possible. 
In the area of mechanisation Bundaberg lead the vv'orld when Fairymead 
began to use a modified Hovv'ard Cane Harvester on unburnt cane as early as 
1934.2"? By the beginning of World War Two the implementation of several 
small irrigation schemes, improved disease controls and technical 
developments appeared to ensure that there was a good future for 
Bundaberg's cane farming community. 
Against this brief history of and background to the sugar industry in 
Australia and Bundaberg, this study wil l now turn its attention to an 
examination of the sugar industry from 1945 to 1985. 
26 Ibid, p. 171 
2"? Ibid, p.205 
Chapter 2 1945 to 1969. GROWTH AND CONSOLIDATION 
This chapter examines the development of the sugar Industry from 1945 to 
1969. The pattern of development was characterised by a series of 
expansionary episodes followed by periods in which growers attempted to 
consolidate their positions. During the time under discussion there were 
three episodes, one minor and two major, namely: the relatively small 
increase instigated by the Hutcheon Committee of Inquiry which resulted 
in the so-called "Soldier Settlement Scheme'; the 1951 -53 expansion which 
followed the 1950 Mansfield Inquiry; and the much larger expansion of 
1963-64 after the Gibbs Committee of Inquiry. Even though each of these 
expansionary periods vv'as preceded by a governmental inquiry which vv'as 
supposed to take into consideration all conceivable contingencies, time 
after time they were found to be in error, at least, as far as canegrowers 
were concerned. In the Bundaberg district it Is a commonly held belief that 
expansion seems to have favoured the mills, and while growers received 
short-term benefits, they feel that in the long-term they have been 
disadvantaged.^  This is, of course, a generalisation and certainly some 
growers prospered as a result of expansion. The cost for many, however, 
Vv'as increased debt and declining profitability. For Bundaberg district 
growers these problems were exacerbated by climatic conditions. Not only 
is the grovying season in this sub-tropical region significantly shorter than 
in the sugar growing areas to the north, the amount OT precipitation it 
receives is also less and far more unreliable. The purpose of this chapter, 
therefore, is to suggest that even during the most buoyant of times (and 
despite its problems the period under discussion was generally one of 
prosperity and optimism), the Bundaberg sugar Industry had to battle just 
that much harder. 
The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first looks at the 
events which preceded and precipitated each of the periods of expansion, 
the nature and extent of each expansion and the ways in which it was 
This vi«w was *!<pr«s«d by mos't of th* ean^ gpov/«rs vith wh*fin oral historii 
inter\/ievs v*r^ «ondufrt«-d. 
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effected. The second section examines the effects of expansion on 
Bundaberg growers and the domestic problems with which they had to 
contend. The chapter begins with events immediately after World War Two 
and the State and Federal governments' attempts to re-vitalise the 
Australian sugar Industry. 
1945 not only marked the end of World War Two, it also marked the 
beginning of a new era in the sugar industry. The v/ar years had taken a 
serious toll on industry in general and the sugar industry had suffered its 
share of problems, not the least of which was the disruption brought about 
by shortages of labour. The war also caused a shortfall in the availability 
of fertilizers and machinery and significant problems for the storage and 
shipping of sugar.2 The sugar industry was, however, recognised as an 
important one even during the war years, so much so, that in 1942 the 
Queensland State government appointed a Royal Commission under the 
chairmanship of Justice Mansfield,^ the purpose of which was to ascertain 
how the industry was being affected by the war and how it could best 
cope with wartime conditions. 
Consideration was given to the closure of some mills in order to save 
manpower. The consequences of closing the Qunaba and Gin Gin mills were 
examined but rejected on the grounds that such a move would have 
required additional rail transport to carry the cane destined for those 
mills to other mills, further exacerbating the problems already being 
experienced by the railv^ays as a result of military traffic. It did, 
however, recommend that sufficient labour be allocated during the harvest 
to ensure that crushing rates of 75% of maximum average seasonal weekly 
crushing rates were maintained."* While production fell during the war 
years, this decision ensured the survival of the industry and as soon as 
war ended it began the process of reorganisation, reconstruction and 
expansion. 
2 C T Vood, (Ed), Sa^ir £^mf* y: A ^ ^uof-t hi^k^y ofth^ y v h-' ^ u^' ndashy jw 
Aii^trjlisfi iiX4-f9&4X Brisbane, Qu^^nslard Caft*grov*r"s Council, 1973), p.28 
' C H O'Brien. Th* hist&ru df "th* Australian sugar industry, Au^^frjJi^ Si^-}f<.Mafml 
Vol XLIX,( May 1953), p28 (H«-&after ASJ^ 
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One of the first restructuring programmes to be introduced vv'as the soldier 
settlement scheme. Early in February 1946, another Royal Commission 
was Issued appointing J. S. Hutcheon as chairman, to Inquire into and 
report on the settlement of ex-servicemen on sugar land. The commission 
began its sittings in Brisbane, subsequently taking evidence in all of the 
major sugar producing districts including Bundaberg. Its final report was 
delivered in June and resulted In The War Service (Sugar Industry) Land 
Settlement Bill.s 
This Act provided for a limited number of new assignments, up to 3% of 
mill peaks, and a limited number of other assignments within the existing 
peaks in specified areas for settlement by ex-service personnel.^ 
According to the Commission's report, the increase of 3^ would be 
sufficient to rehabilitate approximately 400 ex-servicemen. The Bill also 
gave ex-servicemen priority in the purchase of existing cane farms, a 
mechanism that was expected to offer at least another 400 opportunities 
per year for the entry of ex-servicemen into the industry."? The process of 
application by eligible persons and their assessment by the classification 
committees vv'as a lengthy one. By 1950, however, 538 applicants had been 
approved as being suitable for settlement in the sugar industry.^ 
Bundaberg appears to have been a popular choice for ex-service personnel 
wishing to avail themselves of the provisions of the Bill:* During a debate 
at the Annual Conference of the Queensland Canegrowers Council held in 
1948, A. B. C. (Ben) Anderson of the Millaquin Mill Suppliers Committee 
proposed the following motion: 
That this Conference is of the opinion that Section 13 (2) 
of the V^ ar Service (Sugar Industry) Land Settlement 
^ (Jueensland Cane Grcwer's Association, :^(/j -^flVMy/A-iW^VMy^ i'^ ftJfiA/" f-&v:5i^ f.Mj 
^ i^^ ftv^^CToovoofViba., Producer's Publis:hing Connpafty J 947), p.29 (He-reafte-r 
& CT Void,Op Cit,p.29 
^ Ai/^-fy'j/i^n SCJI^- J'iw-flw^j Vol 7,(1947-48), p.71 (Hereafte-r AS)^ 
« 4^)'B, Vol9,(1950),p.93 
Act of 1946 should be amended to make provision for 
the granting of additional assignments in mill areas 
where suitable land is available in order to absorb 
any deficiencies in other mill areas where such 
land is not available, or the required number of 
applications has not been lodged with the Land 
Administration Board. 
Anderson went on to explain that the number of applications for 
assignments in the Bingera and Millaquin areas far exceeded the 
availability of assignments in those areas. He added that he understood 
that in the Isis and Gin Gin areas, however, i t seemed likely that the entire 
allocation may not be taken up. The motion was carried. By 1953, thirty-
nine new farms had been established in the Bundaberg district under the 
War Service Scheme.^  
The settlement of ex-servicemen on sugar growing properties was a small 
but important part of the eventual overall expansion of the sugar industry. 
But, before any major expansion could occur new markets had to be located. 
In 1949 negotiations began between the government of the United Kingdom 
and the sugar exporting countries of the Commonwealth the purpose of 
which was to establish the British Commonwealth Agreement. The 
Agreement was to guarantee a market for the production of sugar from the 
Commonwealth countries at a price which was to be fixed annually at 
discussions held in London. While the price could fluctuate it was designed 
to be acceptable to both producers and consumers. 
The parties to the agreement held two conferences to discuss its contents, 
the first in July 1949 and the second in November/December of the same 
year. When the Agreement was signed in 1951 Australian producers were 
pleased to discover that i t provided an assured outlet of 600,000 tons 
(612,000 tonnes) of export sugar for eight years until the end of 1957, 
with an option to extend the contract beyond that time.^o This agreement 
^ J Kerr, Soi/f/iATf} Si^rS-j^^ (Bundaberg, Bundaberg Sugar Co Ltd, 1983), p.117 
^0 OCGA, J'/jrJ'-4flWi«7i-^/!^^wtv,Cl948),P-15 
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Which guaranteed a long-term market for Australian sugar was an 
essential ingredient in the industry's expansion plans. Even before the 
Agreement had been concluded, however, the Australian sugar industry had 
begun to increase its production In response to earlier requests by the 
United Kingdom. The signing of the British Commonwealth Agreement 
merely gave further impetus to the expansion programme. 
At the twenty-third Annual Conference of the Queensland Canegrowers' 
Council a combined meeting of the various sugar organisations was called 
to discuss the implications of the Agreement. A statement of policy was 
formulated and unanimously agreed upon by the joint meeting and a sub-
committee of representatives from the canegrower's organisations 
subsequently presented the views of the industry to the Premier and the 
Chairman of the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board.ii 
The policy statement made note of the fact that there was sufficient 
suitable land available for expansion, that mills were already extending 
their plant in order to cope with increased production and as such it 
anticipated that the construction of new mills would not be necessary. 
Furthermore, It suggested that while priority should be given to existing 
growers to expand, the allocation of increased peaks and new assignments 
should not proceed faster than the capacity of the mills to process the 
extra cane. The document also warned that over-production could become a 
problem in later years and that careful control of the industry should 
continue.i2 Despite the fact that the committee recognised the need for 
long term planning of the industry no mention was made for the need to 
expand shipping, storage and other ancillary facilities in order to cope 
with the extra production. 
The response of the Queensland government to this statement was the 
appointment of yet another Royal Commission and in March 1950 and the 
Hon. A. J. Mansfield, Senior Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court of 
Queensland was appointed to chair i t . i^ The Commission subsequently took 
11 Ibid, p.17 
12 told, p.17 
1 - QCGA, J4m Amnf€a/}f^-^T^, Cl 9 5 0 , p i 4 
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evidence at all of the Queensland sugar towns. Its mission was to inquire 
into the practicality of establishing new mills (even though the industry 
had already stated that it did not believe any were needed) and to devise a 
plan for the orderly development of the industry in the succeeding twenty-
five years.i4 
The findings and recommendations of the Royal Commission were 
presented to Parliament in September 1951. Essentially i t found that 
conditions were ripe for a second expansion. It recommended that no new 
mills should be constructed in the period 1951 to 1960 but that where 
possible small mills should be enlarged to a reasonable capacity. It also 
recognised that there were many small farms which vv'ould find ecomonic 
viability increasingly difficult to maintain and accordingly recommended 
that no expansion of the area of larger assignments should be made until 
after assignments of below 15 acres (6.075 ha) had been uplifted. It went 
on to suggest that the Central Sugar Price Board's assessment of the 
minimum area (or tonnage) sufficient to provide a reasonable living should 
also be upwardly revised.is The 1946 Royal Commission had recommended 
that a farm assigned to a new settler should be large enough to produce a 
"living tonnage" of 500 - 750 tons of cane. Acting on the recommendations 
of the 1950 Commission the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board increased its 
scale of tonnages regarded as sufficient to provide a 'reasonable living' by 
the addition of 250 tons.i^ Above all, however, the 1950 Commission 
seemed to be warning against a too rapid expansion of the sugar Industry. 
Expansion of the sugar industry, vv'hatever the cause and whenever it 
occurs is generally effected through the granting of new assignments. New 
assignments could only be granted under Section 12A of the Regulation of 
Sugar Cane Prices Act and Bundaberg district growers like their 
counterparts elsewhere were required to submit their cases for additional 
new or increased assignments to the Central Sugar Prices Board. 
14 /4jr}^ Vol 10,(1951), p.77 
15 .^JPJ«, Vol 11,(1952), p J65 
AiJ^iifj/ijfl jsj^'^iJiirtfyX^^^^^^, Government Printer, 1965) p2\ (Hereafter 
i M 
Appearances before the Board were not for the faint-hearted. 
Representatives from both the mills and grovv'ers' organisations needed to 
be exceptionally well-prepared and to have razor-sharp wits, in order to 
argue their cases effectively. Sometimes, but not always, members of 
the legal profession were engaged to present cases to the Board. For 
example, Fairymead Mill employed J. S. Hutcheon, K.C., to act on its behalf 
at the hearing held in Brisbane on 1 May 1951. On the other hand L. G. 
Scotney, a cane farmer and secretary of the Cane Growers' Association 
Executive in Bundaberg, represented the Bingera Mill Suppliers' 
Committee. Scotneys submission was a claim for an increase from the 
31,000 tons (31,620 tonnes) granted to the Bingera Mill for the 1950 
season,i"'' to 33,600 tons (34,272 tonnes) of sugar for the 1951 season. In 
making his claim Scotney pointed to the increased efficiency of the mill 
district growers over the previous fevv' years, with particular reference to 
the elimination of horses in favour of tractors as well as the introduction 
of other forms of mechanisation, irrigation installations, the introduction 
of more suitable varieties of cane and the elimination of major cane 
diseases, all of which he believed had taken Bingera growers out of the 
category of inconsistent producers.i^ While Scotney was not a K.C. he 
nevertheless argued his case in a style that would have done justice to 
Perry Mason. 
Despite the differences of opinion which occurred from time to time 
between the millers' representatives and the mill supplier's 
representatives, there have been many occasions when the two groups have 
vv'orked in concert with each other, particularly with regard to the Central 
Sugar Prices Board. For example, during the May 1951 sittings when the 
Qunaba mill and growers were called to give evidence, they presented a 
joint claim for increased assignments. Both representatives - R. L. 
Lehfeldt for the Qunaba mill and R. J. Mittelhauser for the Mill Supplier's 
Committee - made the point that small mills such as theirs were at a 
disadvantage when compared to the larger mills. This sentiment was later 
echoed by the Gin Gin mill's representative. In due course the Gin Gin and 
1 "^  Central Sugar uane Prices Bo.ard, Setti^n 12A He^ings, CBrisb^n*, 1 /5/51), p .48 
(Hereafter CSCPB) 
1S C9CPB, Section 12 A Hearings, (1 /5/51), p.51 
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Qunaba mills were considered to be no longer viable and were closed down. 
In the meantime, however, they had to battle the Board and try to maintain 
economic quotas.i-
As well as an expansion of the industry through the granting of new 
assignments, other structural changes were occurring in the Bundaberg 
sugar industry in the first half of the 1950s Beginning in 1954 a series of 
rezonings took place in which the assignment of particular farms or 
plantations were transferred from one mill to another. During 1954 the 
most important of these, because of the large area involved, was the 
transfer of the Hapsburg and Lynwood plantations from the Fairymead mill 
in Bundaberg to the Isis Central mill which is located just outside 
Childers. These two plantations constituted a total area of 484 acres 
(196.02 ha) returning at the rate of 27 ton/acre (68 tonnes/ha), or 13,088 
tons (13,350 tonnes) of cane annually.20 The rezoning of these 
assignments from Fairymead to Isis Central was deemed necessary 
because of the difficulties involved in transporting cane from them to the 
Fairymead mill. In order to counter the loss of assignment Fairymead 
initiated the development of new cane farms in the Fairydale and Moore 
Park areas to the north of Bundaberg. 
By 1956 the ovv'ners of the Fairymead mill had gained nationwide 
recognition for its Moore Park farm development scheme. The scheme 
meant an outlay of £50,000 ($100,000) and resulted In the creation of 
f i fty nevv' 60 acre (24.3 ha) assignments which were expected to produce 
some 50,000 tons (51,000 tonnes) of cane. The farms were sold as 
complete units with some cane already planted, each with a new house 
with all amenities constructed on site, and roads and tramline in place.21 
Despite the praise heaped on it the development was not without its 
problems. Much of the land had originally been forest and ti-tree swamp, 
and when cleared, extensive drainage works had to be undertaken to carry 
excess water away from producing areas. A large drainage canal was 
19 CSCPB, Section 12 A Hearings, (1 /5/51), p.62 
20 CSCPB, Section 12A Hearings, (24/2/54), p.38 
21 ^fJ^?, VollS, (1956),f>.55 
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constructed to link the Moore Park and Fairydale areas. It was officially 
opened by the Governor-General, Sir William Slim, and subsequently 
became known locally as 'the Governor General's drain'.22 Even with the 
large Investment of capital In drainage mitigation, some farms proved to 
have what was called 'unsweet soil'23 Nevertheless, most owners 
persevered with their properties and today the Moore Park/Fairydale farms 
are noted as showplaces for production. As early as 1961 cane from the 
Fairydale area was winning awards. At the Bundaberg Show In June 1961 
the champion stool from cane under twelve months old was exhibited by M. 
J. Firth, one of the Fairydale canegrowers.24 
A small number of growers were very dissatisfied with their purchases, 
however, and they applied to the company for restitution.25 Four farmis 
were so seriously afflicted with salt problems resulting from poor 
drainage that they were subsequently resumed by the company and Chris 
Young of the Fairymead mill was given the task of rehabilitating them. The 
original purchasers of the farms vv'ere compensated for their trouble.26 
From 1957 onwards further rezonings were proposed and undertaken. 
Frequently at the centre of such discussions was E. H. Churchward who 
was a member of the Fairymead Mill Supplier's Committee. Churchward 
later became the secretary of the committee in August 1958. The 
rezonings were undertaken in order to rationalise the industry and to make 
it more cost-effective. To achieve this various farm assignments were 
transferred from one mill to another in order to effect greater efficiency 
in the transport of cane to the mills and thereby reduce production costs. 
The location of railway lines did not always coincide with the needs of 
growers and the gaps had to be filled by less efficient road transport. 
Further, escalation in the cost of rail transport made it increasingly more 
economically sound (and indeed essential) for farms to be allocated to 
mills that were more accessible by tramlines, and to discontinue wherever 
22 EH Churthvard, Jnttrs'wv, 16/5/90 
25 E H Chur6hward, Interview J 6/3 /90 
24 SiA'kf3£wyJ!^h-^y7ifil2/U(>] 
25 Fairy mead Mill Supplier's Cornmittee, Minutes, 23/9/58 (Hereafter FMSC) 
26 FMSC, Minutes J 2/8/59 
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possible transport by railv/ay trains.2"? Rezonings were, however, not 
always automatic or unanimously accepted. While both millers and 
growers understood the logic of rationalisation, agreement was sometime 
hard to achieve because someone always felt disadvantaged by any scheme. 
Debates about the relative merits of such proposals occupied a 
considerable length of time at the meetings of the various mill supplier's 
committee meetings during the years in which rezonings were taking place. 
When agreement was finally reached at the supplier's committee level, 
submissions had to be approved by the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board. 
The major rezonings which eventuated during this period involved the 
Moorland and Gooburrum areas. Both areas which had previously been 
attached to Millaquin mill were transferred to Fairymead mill. Fairymead 
in turn lost Springhill to Qunaba mill and the Goodwood area was allocated 
to the Isis Central Mill.28 
By 1957 substantial expansion had occurred in the Bundaberg sugar 
industry, as it had in the rest of State. The progressive State increase in 
assignments was as follows: 
27 E H ChurcKvard, Interview, 16/3 /90 
Wf I I'^Aii-i. Ctr. Ci4 D 1 1 0 
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Table 2.1: Assignnnent Increases In Queensland 1950 - 1956 
Original Gross Assignments: 427,876 acres (173,290 ha) 
War Service Grants -
New Assignments 16,896 acres (6,843 ha) 
Increased Assignments 2,867 acres (1,161 ha) 
Resulting from 1950-52 Expansion -
New Assignments 48,778 acres (19,755 ha) 
Increased Assignments 95,702 acres (38,759 ha) 
164,243 acres (66,518 ha) 
Total Gross Assignments Granted as 
at 30/6/56 592,119 acres (239,808 ha) 29 
While separate figures for the Bundaberg district are not available the 
size of local expansion is indicated by the tonnages of cane crushed at the 
five mills between 1951 and 1955. 
Table 2 2: Tons of cane crushed in Bundaberg District 
1951 -1955^0 
Mill 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
89,009 137,535 143,468 145,940 
214,422 300,975 316,786 283,429 
197,734 308,622 328,989 315,210 
199,095 285,950 304,460 271,627 
37,037 91,236 89,297 104,364 
Qunaba 
Millaquin 
Bingera 
Fairymead 
Gin Gin 
71,151 
174,042 
190,881 
141,648 
43,361 
29 ^JS?, Vol 16, (1957),p.&5 
^ Ibid, p.51 
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The figures given are actual crushings. Owing to transport difficulties, a 
variable quantity of cane was diverted to the nearest mill with the result 
that actual crushings were, in the case of some mills, somewhat above or 
below the tonnage harvested from lands assigned to those mills. The 
overall increase in productivity is, however, clearly demonstrated. In 
terms of the number of nevv' growers in Bundaberg district, by 1953, one 
hundred and fifty-one new farms had been established including the 
thirty-nine farms established under the war service scheme.^ i The ways 
in which this expansion affected Bundaberg growers wil l be discussed 
later. 
Development throughout the State during the late 1950s and early 1960s 
continued but not at the frenetic pace of the early 1950s. At the 
Queensland Cane Growers Association conference in 1959 the Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister for Trade, the Hon J. McEwen, commented in his 
address that the sugar Industry vv'as then the major source of Income for 
350,000 people and that while Australia's cane farms represented only 4% 
of all Australian farms, the value of sugar produced was f i f th among all 
rural industries. At the same conference the delegates were told by the 
Minister for Primary Industry that sugar was the most efficient Australian 
industry.^2 one suspects that the cane growers already knew that. 
The cane industry was indeed efficient, so much so that the potential for 
overproduction that had been alluded to in the early 1950s, had become a 
reality by 1959. During the intervening years a number of changes had 
taken place. Many crop-destroying pests had been controlled and new 
advances in crop-breeding had been so rapid that new, higher yielding 
varieties of cane were being continually developed and introduced. Canes 
that could withstand the ravages of cyclones and flood as well as more 
drought resistant varieties had been developed. Added to these 
improvements were the benefits of increasing levels of mechanisation, 
fertilisation and irrigation.33 it should not have been a surprise when 
31 JKerr,OpCit, p.117 
22 AS^'S, Vol 19, (1 960), p.Z ^. p.41 
53 Ibid, p.43 
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overproduction became apparent, but for some reason it was.54 in 1959 the 
amount of overproduction was in the vicinity of 100,000 tons (102,000 
tonnes) of sugar.^ s 
The exact amount of overproduction in the Bundaberg district is unknovv'n 
but an item in the local newspaper in October I960 reported that from 
the latest estimates of sugar cane crops from the six 
Bundaberg district mill areas this year, it is expected 
that almost half a million tons (510,000 tonnes) will 
be left in the field when the season finished.^^ 
As well as being a financial concern for the growers, they were also faced 
with the problem of how to dispose of the unharvested cane. Following the 
lead of their forefathers during the 1936 drought the Qunaba Mill 
Suppliers' Committee decided to offer its excess cane to the Queensland 
Dairyman's Organisation, to be used as fodder for cattle which were 
starving in drought affected areas.^ "? It is not knovv'n how other suppliers 
committee's disposed of their unwanted cane. 
As things eventuated, however, over-production did not become a 
recurhnq problem in the way many expected it to. There were two major 
reasons for this; the weather and changes in Australia's export markets. 
Firstly, after nearly a decade of good growing seasons, the weather during 
most of the 1960s was decidedly unkind to cane growers. In 1961 and 
1963 cane yields in the Bundaberg district were reduced by drought and 
frost, and by the middle of the decade the weather was causing serious 
problems for all rural Industry as the whole country began to be affected 
by severe drought.^s By the beginning of 1966, much of Queensland had 
been in the grip of drought for over two years^^ and in Bundaberg it was 
^ Ibid, p.43 
35 bid, p.43 
56 £5MTW(j^y/^i,.yyjw/7, 5 /10 /60 
^ a « w & ^ y ^u-^yiyji7, 15/10/6.0 
38 A nnore d«t^iled de5crif>ti<>n of the weather during this period is given in Ctiapt«r 5 
5^ .4i&-t^-j/ix} fMjjk''i}/R^t''kPU-: 28/6/66 
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estimated to have cost the district approximately £6,000,000 
($1,200,000) in lost sugar revenue.40 Throughout 1966 local newspaper 
reports attested to the growing severity of the problem and as the 
financial condition of growers deteriorated the Bundaberg Cane Growers' 
Executive was moved to seek government assistance on behalf of its 
members. In March a telegram was sent to the Prime Minister, Harold Holt, 
and to the Deputy Prime Minister Jack McEwen, as follows: 
Bundaberg Cane Grower's Executive appreciates Federal 
Government's action relative to providing finance for 
primary producers who have suffered severely through 
drought. Disastrous drop in export sugar prices 
has rendered many canegrowers' financially 
embarrassed, and with short crops for 1965 their 
future is rendered hazardous. 
Further long-term credit at moderate interest rates is 
urged by this executive, and we commend further action 
by your Government to safe-guard the sugar production 
and economies of Queensland sugar producers4i 
Various kinds of drought relief had already been made available but as it 
became more prolonged, additional assistance was sought. In July 1966, S. 
J. McCluskey, secretary of the Bundaberg Cane Grower's Executive, received 
advice that the State government was extending its drought relief 
scheme.42 The drought coincided with a decline in sugar prices and as 
conditions worsened in sugar growing regions there were calls for other 
kinds of assistance. Dr. R. Patterson, (MHR Dawson) for example, asserted 
"that there was an urgent need for the Federal government to provide a 
temporary financial bounty or grant, to raise the average price of 
sugarcane to at least the level of last seasons returns".43 Patterson's 
suggestion was later picked up and supported by E. H. (Ned) Churchward, 
40 a«w(idwv^ipOT?j;/^ 24/1 /66 
41 £fe™Gii*d'y^i,.ywu/7,23/3/66 
42 ASi19, Vol 30, (1971), passim 
43 ri^jn-^iVsn* JKIC»I..(.^^%rf of~i fee 
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secretary of the Fairymead Supplier's Committee. He claimed that a £19 
million loan assistance package offered by Commonwealth was totally 
inadequate and that more wide ranging measures were required.44 
The severity of the drought also gave nevv' impetus to the calls for an 
irrigation scheme to deliver water to the Bundaberg district and 
throughout 1966, item after item referring to the need for irrigation and 
various proposals to provide water were discussed in the printed media. 
Paradoxically, while canegrowers were enduring reduced returns for their 
efforts, by the end of the season some mills vv'ere reporting that they had 
broken existing crushing records. 
Poor growing conditions then, meant that overproduction did not threaten 
the industry. The second reason why overproduction ceased to be a 
problem was that in the 1960s major changes in Australia's export 
markets required the industry to embark on a new period of expansion. The 
catalyst for these changes, and the subsequent expansion, was the collapse 
of the quota provisions of the International Sugar Agreement in 1961.45 
The sugar market was essentially governed by three marketing 
mechanisms: the so-called free market which at that time carried only a 
relatively small proportion of the world's production; the British 
Commonwealth Agreement; and the International Sugar Agreement. The 
signatories to the Commonwealth Agreement automatically became 
signatories to the International Sugar Agreement which included all of the 
sugar producing countries of the world who wished to join. Its primary 
mission was to assure supplies to importers and markets to exporters, and 
under its terms the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement agreed to limit their 
combined exports to all destinations to 2.575 million tons (2,626,500 
tonnes). Three International Sugar Agreements were negotiated in the 
period to 1969; these were in the years 1953, 19584^ and again in 
1968.4"? 
44 £i#wGiiuvy ,^iryy?jj/7^ 19/9 /66 
45 CTVo*d,OpCit,p.52 
46 ^tlS?, Vol21,(1962),p.95 
47 ASW, Vol 28,(1969), p. ^ ;v i^ 
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For Australia, the British Commonwealth Agreement assured firm prices 
for about half of its sugar exports. The remainder had to be sold on the 
basis of the ruling world market price, with the benefit of tariff 
preferences provided by the United Kingdom and Canada. The world market 
price was generally a low one and subject to fluctuation and while the size 
of this market was only a small proportion of the total world outlet, the 
price at which sugar was sold on the free market had an influence far 
beyond the market Itself. The International Sugar Agreements attempted 
to stabilise and control the world price over specified periods of time. 
Overall, roughly three-quarters of Australian sugar was taken up by home 
consumption and British purchases, while the balance went to countries 
such as Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Hong Kong under the provisions of 
the International Sugar Agreement.48 The term of the 1958 agreement was 
1959 to 1963 with the opportunity for review in 1961. In 1961, however, 
the sugar talks in Geneva failed to reach an agreement when the Cuban 
delegation made what were described as "Insatiable and ridiculous 
demands".49 
In January 1959 Fidel Castro had overthrown the Cuban dictator Batista, 
and set up a revolutionary government. As the result of sweeping financial 
reforms, by the time of the 1961 Sugar Talks the Cuban economy was in 
financially dire straits.50 it was able to secure substantial contracts to 
supply sugar to Russia and China and in order to meet those contracts Cuba 
demanded that its quota be increased dramatically. Delegates from other 
sugar producing countries believed that if such increases were allowed 
the entire International Sugar Agreement would be rendered unworkable, 
and the conference, therefore, could not accede to the Cuban demands. 
Lamborn and Company, Nevv' York sugar brokers, summed up the feeling of 
the conference with these vv'ords: 
Many delegates to the International Sugar Conference felt 
that, rather that make a mockery of the agreement, it 
would be better to permit the International Sugar Council 
4fi ASTS, Vol21i1962),p.33 
« lbid,p.33 
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to become, temporarily, a purely statistical organisation 
without attempting to influence prices by quota 
arrangements, especially since, under the suggested Cuban 
formulae, there would be no leverage for the Influencing of 
prices.5' 
The talks concluded with no agreement having been reached. Initially it 
appeared that the collapse of the sugar talks could not have come at a 
worse time for Australian producers, occurring as it did when vv'orld sugar 
prices were at their lowest level for many years. The expected problems, 
however, did not materialise. Instead, the prospects for Australian sugar 
producers Improved dramatically as relations between Cuba and the United 
States further deteriorated. The United States ceased to trade with Cuba 
and opened its domestic sugar market to Australia and other exporters.52 
The opening of the United States domestic market to Australian sugar 
exports was an event of great significance to the industry's decision to 
expand. The initial Australian quota in 1962 was only 14,760 tons 
(15,055 tonnes), but in addition to that Australia was able to supply 
another 110,000 tons (112,200 tonnes) under a global quota arrangement. 
More importantly, however, the Australian sugar industry had an entree 
into a hitherto closed market. Another notable change was an extension of 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement to 1970 and changes to its terms 
whereby Australia received a quota l i f t from 313,500 (319,770 tonnes) to 
315,000 tons (321,300 tonnes) and a price rise of almost seven shillings 
sterling ($A1.40) per ton. The extension of the Agreement was of 
particular importance since it carried over the 1969 period when the 
European Common Market was due to commence. This meant that the 
industry could make firm plans for a significant portion of its production 
for another eight years ahead.53 
As exciting as all of these new marketing arrangements were, the icing 
(sugar) on the cake came late in 1962 when Dr. J. Vernon, general manager 
51 Ibid, p.33 
52 JKerr^OpCit, p.129 
53 ^i-J^?, Vol22,(1963),p.53 
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of the Colonial Sugar Refining Co Ltd, announced that an order for 300,000 
tons (306,000 tonnes) of Australian ravv' sugar had been received from 
Japan. Negotiations in Tokyo had been conducted by the company's sugar 
marketing chief manager, R. G. Jackson, on behalf of the Queensland Sugar 
Board and the Australian sugar industry and shipment of the sugar was to 
due to take place between July 1963 and June 1964.54 with the opening of 
these new markets the scene was set for a third and even greater 
expansion of the Australian sugar Industry. 
The new markets were, however, by no means assured as permanent, long-
term markets. This uncertainty presented the Australian industry with 
some major problems. Firstly, it needed to try to determine just how long 
the newly opened markets were likely to persist. Secondly, it was aware 
that expansion was essential to meet the demand of the new markets, but, 
if the markets should contract or dry up then the livelihoods of many 
growers would be at risk. In an attempt to resolve these problems. In June 
1963 the Queensland government appointed a Committee of Inquiry under 
the chairmanship of Justice Gibbs with N. J. King and 0. Wolfensberger 
assisting.55 
The response in Bundaberg was immediate, at least among the political 
community. Within days of the announcement the local member of 
parliament, E. J. Walsh (MLA), was suggesting in the newspaper. The 
Bundaherg Newsman, V(\^'^ the Inquiry committee should visit the various 
cane growing districts to enable grower's organisations and individuals to 
present their cases, and allovv' the committee members to see first hand 
the differences which existed in different parts of the state. Since 
committees of inquiry In the past had always made such visits to cane 
growing areas,56 Mr Walsh's suggestion seemed somewhat superfluous. 
Perhaps he was just engaging in the time honoured practice of political 
band-standing. Some things never seem to change! 
54 Bufl^ib^-yI^\x-^Mi}, 1 /12 /62 
55 CT Wood, Op Cit, p.52 
Whatever the reason might have been the cornrnitteG did indeed proceed to 
hear evidence in each of the sugar districts. Public hearings of the inquiry 
began in Brisbane on 18 July , 1963, and were held at Bundaberg on 6 
August, the beginning of the Bundaberg cane harvest. Vv'hile canegrowers 
were struggling with the problems of harvesting and battling the vagaries 
of the weather, their representatives began to gather their forces to meet 
with the Committee of Inquiry. Representatives of the growers interests 
included T. Baker, Chairman of the Bingera Mill Supplier's Committee, C. 
Campbell, liaison officer with the Queensland Cane Grower's Council, Ben 
Anderson, and J. Maughn, secretary of the Qunaba Mill Supplier's 
Committee.5"? 
The committee met in the Civic Centre in Bundaberg on 6 August, and heard 
submissions from growers and millers representatives. Three mills, 
Fairymead, Millaquin and Qunaba, and the mill supplier's committees of two 
of them, Fairymead and Qunaba, joined forces to present their case to the 
Inquiry. Ben Anderson submitted a separate statement for the Millaquin 
Mill Suppliers' vv'hile Bingera mill and the Mill Supplier's Committee made 
joint and separate submissions. The Gin Gin Mill, which was a co-
operative, presented a joint case in conjunction with Its mill supplier's 
comrnittee.58 
All, it appears, urged a cautious expansion of the industry because of the 
nature of the new markets. Growers, however, were much more 
conservative than the mills vv'ith regard to expansion. In particular 
growers were concerned about the granting of extra assignments - that is, 
the admission of new growers to the industry. In its submission, the 
Bingera Mill Supplier's Committee summed up their concerns thus: 
Therefore we request that extreme caution be exercised in 
the granting of new assignments. 
5"? £k«wi;ft5y/V.%ii-OTw;7^ 7/8/63 
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It is not our policy that the door should be closed 
to newcomers. V^e welcome them if there is enough 
room for them. At the same time we do not wish to see 
a future position where the economy of all growers both 
present and new is jeopardised because our production 
out-runs our economic market.59 
The caution of the growers contrasted sharply with the attitudes of the 
millowners who were much more enthusiastic about expansion. Fairymead 
and Millaquin clearly ennunciated their readiness to expand in a statement 
issued to the news media on 3 August ,1963. It stated that 
the two mills had laid down excellent plans for 
providing opportunities for new settlement, by 
undertaking the guarantee of necessary funding 
arrangements up to £1 million ($2,000,000) for 
suitable practical farmers to develop the large tract of 
excellent canegrowing lands within the close ambit 
of existing tramlines. 
The statement went on to state that ample water resources were 
available, while low cost transport to bulk loading facilities and the 
'efficient ingress' of mechanical harvesters would all contribute to the 
economic viability of an expanded area. The comment about 'ample water 
resources' is an interesting one in that it clearly contradicted the views of 
the grovv'ers who were continually lobbying the government for an 
irrigation scheme. The difference in attitudes toward expansion was, 
however, indicative of the differing characteristics of the mills and the 
growers wherein the mills were more entrepreneurial in their approach, 
while the grovv'ers were conservative and more inclined to opt for the 
'status quo'. 
The findings and recommendations of the Gibbs Committee of Inquiry were 
published later that year. In short, it recommended a major expansion of 
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the industry on the basis of anticipated markets for Australian sugar, 
which were expected to total in the order of 2.5 million tons (2,550,000 
tonnes) by 1970-71. To meet the expected additional demand the 
committee's report envisaged that 150,400 acres (60,912 ha) of nevv' sugar 
land encompassing 1,000 new farms would be needed and that mill peaks 
would have to be doubled by 1971.^ 0 Expanding the industry meant that a 
range of other areas such as storage and shipping and research facilities 
would also have to be enlarged and modernised. 
The views and recommendations of the Inquiry were not entirely welcomed 
by the cane growers. The Queensland Cane Growers' Council sent a 
delegation led by F. J. McAvoy to ask the Premier, 6. F. R. Nicklin to have 
the recommendations modified. The position of the Queensland Cane 
Growers Council was that they felt that the mills were well protected and 
well catered for by the proposals, but that the growers were not. In line 
with the submission presented to the Inquiry by Bundaberg growers, the 
main concern expressed by the Queensland Cane Growers Council was that 
the proposed expansion was too rapid, that the assignment of 150,400 
acres (60,912 ha) of new lands to 1,000 new growers would place the 
economy of existing grovv'ers In Jeopardy, and that the position of all 
growers, whether old or nevv', would be at risk if sugar prices declined.^i 
They were, nevertheless, in favour of expansion to meet new market 
demands but their conservatism demanded the kind of orderly development 
that had occurred in the past. The growers did not approve of the kind of 
expansion proposed by the Inquiry, which they believed was too dependent 
on overseas markets which had a tendency to fluctuate wildly. Premier 
Nicklin assured the deputation that their views would be conveyed to the 
Central Sugar Cane Prices Board, but he made It quite clear that It (the 
Board) would make the final decisions about the timing and size of the 
proposed expansion.62 
The Queensland Cane Grower's Association was not the only organisation to 
be concerned about the proposed expansion. The Director of the Sugar 
60 P^poit-f of Cojfinjrft^ ofhqaify C1965), p .24 
SI /^iPJ^/Zol 23,(1964),p.41 
^ 1bid,p41 
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Experiment Stations, Norman King, warned that one result of the expansion 
could be the extension of cane grov/ing onto new lands which in some cases 
might be unsuitable for cane.^ 3 while his warning might have been timely 
and no doubt valid, i t is somewhat puzzling since he was a member of the 
Committee of Inquiry. Surely such factors as these would have (and if 
they were not, should have) been considered by the Inquiry! 
One of the major cnticlsms at the local level v/as highlighted by Ben 
Anderson, chairman of the Bundaberg Canegrowers' Executive. Anderson 
claimed that the distribution of the expansion plan was "lopsided'. The 
canegrowers, having expressed their concern about the rapidity of the 
proposed expansion, now wanted their fair share of it. The Committee had 
recommended the following acreage increases among the state's four main 
producing areas: 
North 68,110 acres (27,585 ha) to 267,000 acres( 108,135 ha) 
Burdekin 19,514 acres ( 7,903 ha) to 89,000 acres( 36,045 ha) 
Mackay 30,912 acres (12,519 ha) to 223,000 acres( 90,315 ha) 
South 31,871 acres (12,908 ha) to 163,000 acres (66,015 ha) 4^ 
Anderson said that as a result of the distribution of acreage increases, the 
expansion in the south where there were nine mills would not be so great 
as expected when compared with what had been recommended for the ten 
mills in the far north area.^ s He was, quite naturally, concerned about 
expansion in the Bundaberg district. His fear, and the concern of 
established growers was that since 42^ of the new acreages had to be 
allocated to new growers and that each new grower should have at least 
1000 tons (1020 tonnes) of cane peak, there would be an insufficient 
amount of nevv' acreage left over to cater for the expansion needs of 
existing growers. The concerns about the apparent 'lopsidedness" of the 
allocation of acreages for expansion were eventually relayed to the 
Queensland government and in November the Primary Industries Minister 
Row issued a statement in vv'hich he claimed to demonstrate that the 
6^ Ibid, p43 
64 P^oj-f ofCormjFm^ 0 t'liygn/ivy. Op Ci+, (1963), p .24 
65 £^«;&^'v-<?"-"»!^'^.31/10/63 
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increased area of gross assignments recommended for the north did no 
more than permit the north to maintain its share of the aggregate of mill 
peaks.66 The Bundaberg Cane Growers Executive was not satisfied by the 
explanation but there was l i t t le that could be done about It. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the worries over the adequacy of the area 
allowed for expansion in the Bundaberg district, keen speculation about 
Bundaberg cane farms and land suitable for canegrowing followed the 
publication of the Committee of Inquiry's report. Real estate agents 
reported that many potential buyers had been inquiring about cane farms 
but that none was available at that time.6"? There was also a significant 
demand for uncleared land. Most interest came from existing farmers vv'ho 
were seeking to extend their holdings and whenever land did come on to the 
market it was "snapped-up" very quickly. 
By the middle of the 1960s the recommendations of the Gibbs Inquiry had 
been, in the main, accepted and implemented throughout Queensland and 
150,000 acres (60,750 ha) of additional assigned land had been put into 
production. Unlike the 1951-53 expansion, during which relatively large 
numbers of new growers entered the sugar Industry, the 1963-4 episode 
was more a time of consolidation and expansion of growing areas 
previously owned or recently purchased by existing growers. In the 
Bundaberg district this is demonstrated by the following table for the 
years 1963 and 1970 which shows that while the amount of cane grown 
and sugar produced increased significantly, the numbers of growers 
supplying the cane did not. 
66 eiA^jiwyM?h-^iJT7,12/11 /63 
^ £JiH**a'/V l^rOT.W7,31 /10 /63 
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Table 2.3: 
The amounts of cane crushed and sugar made together with the 
number of suppliers to each mil l for the years 1963 and 1970.63 
Mill Cane Crushed Sugar Made No.Suppliers 
1963 (1970) 1963 (1970) 1963 (1970) 
Mniaquln 356,913(526,570) 52,286(76,192) 334(343) 
Fairymead 376,031 (485,855) 55,776(73,760) 179(204) 
Gin Gin 160,661(231,334) 20,299(30,454) 183(191) 
Bingera 380,851(537,526) 52,455(74,805) 301(292) 
Qunaba 174,442(280,807) 25,703(41,184) 117(114) 
On average, the number of suppliers to the five Bundaberg rniils increased 
by only a lITtie over 5%. The actual amount or cane crushed and sugar 
produced, however, increased by 45:1 and 46'I respectively. The area of 
land under cane owned by those grovv'ers increased by about 27:?. 
Despite the optimism expressed in the Gibbs" Report matters did not run as 
smoothly as expected after the expansion and by 1966/67 there were 
clear indications that not all was well in the sugar industry. The main 
problems were several seasons of less than ideal growing conditions and a 
decline In price of sugar on the vv'orld market. Even though the volati l i ty 
of the free market prices had been considered by the Inquiry, i t vv-as the 
source of major concern vv'hen the price of sugar sold on that market began 
to fall. Between 1963 and 1965 the world price for sugar fel l sharply, but, 
claimed many observers, this was from a unrealistically high 1evel.69 
V^hether or not this vv'as true, expansion had cost a considerable amount of 
money and by 1965 many growers who had invested heavily in expansion 
were beginning to feel the pinch. In December 1965 the Queensland Cane 
Grovv'ers' Council produced a report on the economic position of the ravv 
68 Dierived from Ab^VP, Vol 23,(1964) and V ol 32, (1973) 
6^ ASrP, Vol 24, (1965), i^ .47 
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sugar industry. The main purpose of the report was to convince the State 
government that the state of the industry warranted an increase in the 
home consumption price of sugar, or some other form of economic relief.''^ 
They were unsuccessful. 
In 1967 the price for sugar on the Vv'orld market continued to be depressed 
and the Queensland Cane Growers' Council again found itself having to 
lobby the government for assistance. The situation for some growers was 
so bad that the Council sought funds to provide sustenance and working 
expenses to enable growers to carry on. Even though the Council did its 
best to ameliorate growers' circumstances, their efforts did not satisfy 
everyone. 'Growers' Action Groups' as they came to be called, began to 
agitate on their own behalf. These groups were severely castigated by the 
official growers' organisations as being disruptive and their actions were 
condemned as being unlikely to achieve "anything for the good of cane 
growers"7i The actions of these groups were, nevertheless, the 
forenjnners of other groups who also found themselves at odds with their 
official representatives, frequently in the grip of an economic downturn. 
It is also a reflection of the antagonism which appears to exist fom time 
to time between the growers and their elected representatives. All too 
often it seems the actions of the representative organisations were not 
and are not in accordance with the wishes of the canegrowers. It has been 
suggested that in many cases the growers did not take a great deal of 
Interest in the activities of their organisations until something went 
wrong. Consequently few actually took the time to attend meetings or vote 
on issues. In times of crisis, however, the organisations were expected 
to shoulder the lion's share of the blame."'2 jhis attitude was by no means 
unique to Bundaberg. At their annual meeting In 1968 the Hambledon Mill 
Supplier's Committee passed a unanimous vote of no confidence in the 
Queensland Cane Grower's Council. The resolution was immediately 
70 (Queensland canegrower's Coun*fl, Pi>^-tM fh^t?0M0fi}i^^i:srition af ifi<^ Ai/^tf'jfiin 
/•jii''j!j(yuyfflufcy*y^CD*o 1965), p2 
^^ Pmijiwy ^h-CTu/;/ 9 /12 /67 
^2 Inforrnatioft derived from inter vie vs v/lth tanegrcv '^ers 
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followed by another calling for the resignation of the Council."^ ^ jhe 
Council, however, did not resign. 
As well as initiating an expansion of the area of land under cane in the 
Bundaberg district the recommendations of the Gibbs Committee of Inquiry 
had other implications for the local community, one of which was 
committee's recommendations for further development of the Bundaberg 
port. The nevv' port development was Inaugurated in October 1956 when 
the State Treasurer, the Hon E. J. V^alsh, unveiled a commemorative 
plaque,"^ 4 145 |<rn downstream from the original wharves which could only 
service small vessels up to 1000 tons (1020 tonnes). As well as providing 
new port accommodation, the development included bulk sugar loading 
facilities which could handle up to 100,000 tons (102,000 tonnes) of sugar 
a year. The construction of the new port and bulk terminal was undertaken 
by two different companies. A Sydney firm, N. H. Bowers Pty Ltd, was 
responsible for the 3.22 kilometres long sea wall and the 183 metres long 
wharves while an Italian firm. Electric Power Transmission, constructed 
the bulk terminal."'5 j ^a t particular stage of the new port development 
was completed in eighteen months and officially opened on 20 September , 
1958 by Premier F. R. Nicklin."?6 
In 1963 the Gibbs Commiittee of Inquiry noted that trends in ship building 
were moving rapidly towards the construction of more and larger bulk 
carrying vessels. As a consequence It suggested that sugar ports would 
have to be expanded not only to handle the expected increases in sugar 
exports but also to accommodate larger ships. In this regard Bundaberg 
was singled out as being in most urgent need of attention and the the 
report recommended that deeper dredging of the Bundaberg new port be 
given first priority.^"? 
"^ 2 Pmfyf>^^y /i^h-i.vi}ji7, 22/1 /68 
^4 ASTP, Vol 16, (1957), p.569 
75 AS^^p^ Vol 17,(1958), p.542 
•^6 AS^'P^ Vol 18, Cl 959), p.501 
"^ "^  P^^"fo/Ci>nv!iifii^ ofS^^y^ Op Cit, (1963), p.24 
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Plans for the additional development vv'orks at the port were revealed by 
Robert Gibson, Chairman of the Bundaberg Harbour Board, in November 
1963. They included a deepening of the channel by 1.83 metres and a 
proposal to Increase the capacity of the bulk terminal to 200,000 tons 
(204,000 tonnes). Long before the announcement of Justice Gibbs' 
recommendations, however, the Bundaberg Harbour Board had been 
expanding its facilities. A new bulk oil terminal had been officially opened 
on 6 October 1962, and a molasses tank had also been erected. Its first 
shipment had taken place in October 1963, when a consignment of 2057 
tons (2100 tonnes) of molasses were transferred on to the carrier 
Tamhua^^ 
Another matter mentioned only briefly in the report, but one which was to 
impact significantly on the Bundaberg sugar industry as the decade 
progressed, v/as irrigation. To the middle of the 1960s at least, by dint of 
hard work, innovation and efficiency, Bundaberg growers were able to 
expand and develop in a manner that was similar to the rest of the State. 
Without the establishedment of a major irrigation scheme, however, it is 
doubtful that further major expansion in the area would have been possible. 
Irrigation became and remains a major issue which Is taken up In Chapter 
Five. 
To summarise then, between 1950 and 1969 there were two major 
expanionary periods. The first, which incorporated the minor episode 
prompted by the Soldier Settlement Scheme was from 1951 to 1953, the 
second during the years 1963 and 1964. Following the 1951/3 episode 
there was a period of consolidation which in the Bundaberg district 
included a series of rezonings. Despite these changes the years following 
this expansion were essentially stable. The years following the second 
episode, however, were more unstable. Initially growers attempted again 
to consolidate their positions but a sharp drop in the world market price 
for sugar caused severe problems which were compounded by a prolonged 
drought. 
'^^ Btrnd^b^-g^sx'-^iiil 8/10/63 
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As the 1960s drew to a close the sugar industry Vv'as sti l l beset by a 
number of problems but there were some indications of improvement and 
the industry was beginning to look forward to a period of consolidation and 
stabilisation. The price of sugar on the free market was again on the rise 
and a new International Sugar Agreement had been negotiated in 1968."^ ^ 
While this Agreement imposed major restrictions on the size of Austalian 
exports and set other conditions with which growers did not necessarily 
concur. It was hoped that it would provide a greater measure of stability 
for the industry. It certainly restored a higher level of confidence than had 
been apparent in the previous three years. As the Premier J. Bjelke 
Petersen noted on opening the 1969 Australian Sugar Producers' 
Association Conference, there was an atmosphere of confident hope and 
optimism which had been absent the year before.8o By the end of the year, 
however, it vv'as patently clear that for many grovv'ers 1969 had been very 
unsatisfactory. Drought conditions throughout the state greatly retarded 
the sugar crop, and Bundaberg's crop in particular was significantly 
reduced. In 1968 2,157,561 tonnes of cane were crushed from which 
322,815 tonnes of sugar was manufactured, in 1969 the figures were 
1,474,311 tonnes and 199,030 tonnes, respectively.8i 
The period had also witnessed several changes in the production of sugar 
cane as growers made the transition from manual harvesting to mechanical 
harvesting, and year after year mills throughout the country broke crushing 
rate records, a feat which could not have been accomplished without the 
use of mechanical cane-cutting equipment. The best news for Bundaberg 
grovv'ers, however, was the approval in principle of the construction of a 
major irrigation scheme in 1969.82 A small but serious blemish on the 
optimism appeared in May 1969 when Fiji disease (a viral disease) 
reappeared on two Bundaberg farms. It was thought that the disease had 
been eradicated in 1952. Despite efforts to contain it the disease was 
•^ 9 4irJ«',Vol2S,(1969),p.6 
«3 lbid,p.21 
*1 Canegrovyers - Bundaberg [>istric"t, Gen*r-al Statistic File, Sections 6 & 7. 
MB. Canegrowers - Bundaberg Distritt vas previously known as Bundab*rg District 
Canegrowers' Executive. Name was chari^ jed May 1991 
S2 S^^^/y ^ i=vw wl 23 /4 /69 
41 
located on another six farms by June. The outbreak of the disease, which 
causes severe stunting and malformation of the leaves,83 was deemed to be 
serious enough to increase the number of staff at the Bundaberg Cane Pest 
and Diseases Control Board In order to combat 1t.Q4 f\j\ disease was to be 
an ongoing problem into the 1970s. 
^ M J King, R V Mungomery, C G Hughes, t^i^^N/i/or'CjJ}^'Oh--mg, (Sydney , Angus and 
Robertson, 1953), p.266 
S4 Pm^A>y/^\v),y}iiii 12/6 /69 
Chapter 3: MECHANISATION 
The huge expansion which took place in the sugar Industry between 1945 and 
1969 could not have been contemplated without mechanical harvesting. 
While the introduction of higher-yielding cane varieties and changed 
farming practices would have allowed some expansion to take place, i t 
would not have reached the levels it did without the key ingredient •^  
mechanical harvesting machines. This chapter looks at some of the affects 
of the transition from manual to mechanical cane harvesting, the 
development of cane harvesting technology and the importance of cane 
growers to such development. 
Mechanical harvesting was a topic of interest within the industry long 
before it became a reality. This interest was intensified during the war 
years when a short supplied labour market accentuated manual harvesting 
problems and it was during this period that the practise of pre-harvest 
burning became widespread. Until the early 1940s most cane was cut green 
and the leaves and trash had to be laboriously separated from the stalks by 
the cane cutters. Burning the cane disposed of this extraneous material 
before the cane cutters entered the field and this allowed the harvest to be 
completed much quickeri 
At the end of World War Two the general employment pool was substantially 
replenished as soldiers returned to civilian life; their return, however, did 
l itt le to alleviate labour shortages within the sugar industry. Some ex-
servicemen did avail themselves of the provisions of the War Service 
(Sugar Industry) Land Settlement Act but few were prepared to take on the 
arduous task of cane cutting for someone else. Most labour shortage 
problems were eventually overcome by the industry's own induction of 
immigrant labour, especially displaced persons, primarily from the Baltic 
states. Later other ethnic qroups were recruited and in 1955 a total of 
J G A Vil lis, / ^ ' i - y>-/ffy jAf ^'j/sj^'f o f:^ji'- JAW JW Aiif^'jJif, (Tovnsvil le ^  James Cook 
lJniversityJ972),p.9 
4^ j> 
1500 Ital ians arrived to assist w i t h that year's harvest.2 North Queensland 
became particularly dependent on imported labour and by 1957 more than 
80^ of the seasonal sugar workforce in the area above Townsville had 
arrived since the end of World WarTwo.^ 
V^hile the end of the war and a revitalised immigration programme 
ameliorated the labour problems it did not diminish ideas of mechanising 
the harvesting process. As early as 1947 a number of cane harvesters were 
in various stages of development and many other machines, mainly 
attachments to tractors, were already in common use for such tasks as 
cultivating, fertilising and grubbing4 By 1950 there were implements for 
topping (removing excess leafy material from the top of the plant) but not 
cutting the cane; they were attachments for tractors rather than fully 
developed cane harvesting machines. 
Research Into the development of a viable harvester was taking place 
throughout the sugar producing v/orld. Australia did not spend as much 
money on research as some other countries, and of that given the majority 
was contributed by canegrowers and sugar manufacturers. Only 3% of total 
research expenditure was provided by the government. Nevertheless, 
Australia made some of the most significant developmental contributions 
and in the process became a world leader in the production of cane 
harvesting machinery.5 One of the earliest practical harvesters was 
developed in Queensland in the 1920s. This was the Falklner which went on 
to receive extensive trials in Cuba, Florida and Hawaii until i t was 
eventually modified into a chopper harvester. In this form it proved to be 
very successful in Florida during the 1930s, but unfortunately it was not 
acceptable in Queensland for a variety of reasons.6 Australia had to wait a 
l i tt le longer for the development of a mechanical harvester suitable for its 
conditions. 
2 Department of Labour and N-atioTial Service, M«n and Machines in Sugar Cafke Harvesting,. 
£fi^J^/t}^/ff j f l-/ T^ff.t^h^ S^ri?:?^ No. 7,( Melbourne, 197 0), p. 16 
^ Ibid, p.17 
* Ai&'Sf-j/iM Sagj/- y^^^P^oJi; Vol 6, (1946-7), p.310 (Hereafter .4S)'P) 
5 C-AV &v Ifw S- i^rd^-Mj Suia^f^^ Vo 11, (1957), p .3 (Here afte r CSW) 
6 G A Willis, Op Cit, P.11 
44 
The development of cane harvesting machines in Australia has been very 
much in the hands of the growers. As well as providing a major portion of 
the necessary finance, many were also active participants in the 
development of ideas and the construction of machinery designed to improve 
the efficiency of the industry, and Bundaberg was often at the forefront of 
such activities. This chapter looks at the ways in which Bundaberg grovv'ers 
and businesses assisted in the development of the mechanical harvester and 
how its development affected industrial relations and farming practices. 
While the development of the cane harvesting machine was the most 
significant part of the process which mechanised the cane growing business. 
It was by no means the f irst. Before cane can be grown the land must be 
cleared. Originally, this arduous task had been undertaken by Melanesian 
workers, and in and around Bundaberg there are many legacies to their 
industry in the form of walls. These 'Kanaka walls', as they are called 
locally, were built from basalt rocks ejected by a long extinct volcano and 
which littered the countryside. As the Melanesians were withdrawn from 
the industry their places were taken by white workers who quickly 
developed machines to aid in this backbreacking task. 
One of the most important machines associated with land clearing was the 
grubber. In 1956 a Moore Park grower demonstrated a simple but very 
effective adaptation to the grubber then in use. It consisted of a mesh 
basket f i t ted to the top of the grubber into which disturbed and dislodged 
roots and rocks could be thrown. Especially designed for use on recently 
cleared land i t meant that while the job remained unpleasant, the time spent 
on i t was reduced."^ The same grower also attempted to overcome the 
problem of cultivating advanced cane and he managed to produce a device 
Vv'hich allowed him to work the cane for a considerably longer period (that 
is, with much taller cane) than would normally be possible. 
Other kinds of mechanical equipment were, by the mid 1950s, also In 
common use. Loading and carting implements were needed to take the cut 
cane from the fields to the mil ls and here too Bundaberg growers and cane-
CGVP, Vol XIK, No 3,(1/1 /56), p.81 
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cutters proved to be adept at, i f not inventing then at least improving, 
existing equipment. Loading cut cane was one of the most strenuous 
components of the cane-cutters' work but i t was not only this fact that 
encouraged the development and use of mechanical loaders. Because of the 
shortage of labour mechanical equipment became essential to ensure that 
crops were removed from the canefields within the normal harvesting 
period.8 The f i rst mechanical loaders were mounted on either three ton 
self-propelled truck chassis' or crawler-type tractors but as useful as they 
were, the machines were cumbersome and needed at least three men to 
operate them successfully. Recognising the problems inherent in these 
machines Toft Brothers of Bundaberg set to work and eventually produced a 
one-man hydraulic cane loader. 
Front and rear-end loaders were also eminently useful and vv'idely used in 
cane fields. One such rear-end loader was developed and patented by W. 
Williams of Goodwood. It vv'as a relatively simple Implement which could be 
attached to a three point linkage tractor, and i ts use substantially reduced 
the time taken to load cane onto trucks for transport.^ Once loaded, the cane 
trucks had to be moved to a central collection point and as the trucks were 
f i t ted with wheels designed to allow them to run on tramlines they were not 
easy to move around canefields. One way of solving this problem was to 
load the entire truck onto a specially constructed, rubber-wheeled trai ler 
and this is what two cane farmers. Smart and Ti l l of Calavos did, in 1955.1° 
There were many more such inventions and adaptations devised by Bundaberg 
men, but the 'holy grail' was a reliable mechanical cane harvester. The 
development of a suitable machine for harvesting cane did not eventuate 
until long after other crops, such as cereals, were being successfully 
mechanically harvested. The main reason for the delay in mechanisation 
lies in the characteristics of the sugar cane plant which were such that the 
engineering problems of producing a machine which was powerful enough to 
cut through the thick cane stalk, capable of operating on the damp and wet 
soils required by growing cane, with the ability to handle a wide range of 
i CGOP, Vol >CX, Mo 4, (1 /4 /57), p. 154 
* CSW, Vol XIX, No 4, C1 /4/56) p. 124 
W CS:^, Vol XIX, No 3, Cl / I /56), pp.75-7 
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conditions (ranging from upright cane to sprawed and tangled cane) were 
formidable. 
When development first began there was vigorous competition between the 
proponents of wholestalk and chopper harvesters. Wholestalk machines 
performed the operations of cutting and trimming the cane, leaving bundles 
of long stalks on the ground to be loaded in a second operation. The chopper 
harvester cut and loaded the cane in a single operation. This was achieved 
by chopping it into small billets (lengths of about 35cm) which were then 
'thrown' into containers hauled by tractors or trucks running alongside the 
harvester.i i 
The first experimental chopper harvester that proved to be suitable for 
Australian conditions vv'as built at Fairymead by Clifford Howard and Jim 
Vichie in 1932.12 Early field trials were promising and development 
continued on the chopper harvester until 1939 when the project was 
abandoned because of problems involving quality deterioration in chopped 
cane. This had also been one of the 'stumbling blocks' which had rendered the 
abovementioned Falklner machine unsuitable, so the next phase of 
development at Fairymead concentrated on wholestalk harvesting. In 1940 a 
single-row, wholestalk machine built onto a Farmall tractor emerged from 
the Fairymead workshop.i^ By 1945 this harvester had been converted to a 
two-row machine which was further improved and enlarged and eventually 
five harvesters were constructed for use on the Fairymead plantation. Until 
the late 1950s this was to be the only successful application of mechanical 
harvesting in Australia.i4 
The reason why mechanisation was so slow to be adopted elsewhere can 
partly be explained in terms of farm size. The demise of plantations and the 
evolution of small farms often precluded the use of machines because they 
were too large and cumbersome to manoeuvre on smaller properties. The 
early models also tended to be unreliable and small farmers who could not 
11 Qiueenslahd Csnegrovers, AjMOii A f^ltV-J*, (197 9), p .8 
^2 G Burrows arid C Morton, Op Ci-t, p i 25 
« Ibid, p. 129 
14 Ibid, p. 150 
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afford the expense of a delayed harvest or the necessary machine repair and 
backup facilites, were unable to enjoy the benefits of mechanised 
harvesting. On plantations such as Fairymead the use of mechanical 
harvesters and loaders was economically sound, but for many years 
mechanisation was simply too expensive for the small farms which 
constituted the major portion of the Australian sugar farming community. 
Even the small farms supplying two-thirds of Fairymead's cane could not be 
Integrated In the plantation's early mechanical operations.i5 The success at 
Fairymead did, however, challenge inventive minds to come up with a 
harvester that would have a much wider application. 
One of the names synonymous with the development of cane harvesting 
machinery in Australia is Laurence Mizzi. Born in Ingham in 1924, Mizzi was 
the son of a Maltese immigrant. He shovv'ed an interest in 'things 
mechanical' from an early age and when he was twenty-two years old, 
Laurence with his brother Joe, built the first Mizzi Stubble Shaver. Shortly 
after this he constructed a ripper tool bar vv'hich was stil l in use some 
thirty years later. The first Mizzi harvester, however, had to wait until 
1951 when he built the 'Mizzi Harvester' prototype.i6 
It was to be a further nine years before Mizzi was able to begin field testing 
his harvester when in 1960 he received a grant of £500 from the Sugar 
Industry Mechanical Harvesting Committee.i'^ The 'Mizzi' was initially 
designed as a wholestalk machine and in 1961 It was used to cut 1000 tons 
(1020 tonnes) which were subsequently delivered to the Macnade Mill. In 
1962 the machine was used to harvest a further 3000 tons, news of which 
Vv'as picked up by two potential manufacturers; the Australian subsidiary of 
the International Harvester Corporation (IH) and Wyper Brothers of 
Bundaberg. Rights to manufacture the Mizzi Harvester were assigned to 
Wyper Brothers in October 1962.18 At first sales were relatively slow. Only 
four machines were built in 1963 and fourteen in 1964, most of which were 
sent to the Mackay district. After the machines were redesigned to 
15 Ibid, p. 151 
16 /4i&"*-j/juw i-jflwypyirw. Vol 3, Mo 4, (May 1981), p.74 (Hereafter AO 
17 ^";Vol3,No5,(1982),p.59 
1 ^  G Burrov/s and C Morton, Op Cit, p .72 
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incorporate a chopper configuration in 1965, however, they went on to 
become an outstanding success. After a series of name changes but basically 
the same mechanically, Mizzi harvesters were sti l l very much in demand in 
the 1980S.19 
Another harvester with Bundaberg connections, though not invented in 
Bundaberg, was the Crichton. In 1958 Bundaberg growers (and members of 
the Bundaberg Cane Growers Executive), A.B.C. (Ben) Anderson and E.H. (Ned) 
Churchv-/ard visited Mackay to inspect two locally developed machines 
namely, the Venton and the Crichton. Deciding that the Crichton was the 
most impressive of the two models demonstrated, Churchward later 
returned to Mackay accompanied by representatives of the Bundaberg 
Engineering Company. Bundaberg Engineering subsequently contracted to 
manufacture the Crichton under licence and the first production run of nine 
harvesters in 1961 was all sold to Bundaberg growers.20 Bundaberg 
Engineering was later taken over by Massey Ferguson and hundreds of the 
machines were built for distribution throughout Queensland.21 The Crichton 
machine vv'as, however, a wholestalk harvester and while the mills resisted 
the introduction of chopper harvesters for many years, wholestalk 
harvesters including the Crichton were eventually rendered obsolete. It is 
believed that the last commercially operating machine completed its final 
season at Sarina in 1974.22 
While the names of Mizzi and Crichton are well known within the industry 
the name most commonly associated with cane harvesting machinery is Toft. 
Colin and Harold Toft, cane farmers of Bundaberg, released their first 
wholestalk harvester in 1961. Within four years the brothers were selling 
over 400 machines a year for a turnover of $1.7 million and their company. 
Toft Brothers Industries Limited, vv'as listed on the Brisbane stock exchange. 
Rapid expansion followed and by 1977 total sales exceeded $25 million.23 
1^ ACV0I5, No4,(1981),p.71 
20 G Burrows and C Morton, Op Ci-t, p. 175, and E.H. Churchward , 1 6 / 3 /90 
21 i^^ JS?, Vol 34, (1975), p. 193 
22 A9J-2P, Vol 34, (1 975), p. 193 
23 Toft Brothers Industries Ltd, AmA3[i^->rt,(1977), p.b 
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Toft's initial success was based on the manufacture of loaders and 
wholestalk machines but by the 1970s they too had moved into the 
production of chopper harvesters. In 1972 a Hawiian company, Theo H. 
Davies and Co., acquired a controlling share of Tofts. This move was 
followed in 1973 by their acquisition of the implement division of Wyper 
Brothers, the manufacturer of the Don Mizzi harvesters. 
Other early players In the field of cane harvesting machinery manufacture 
were Innternational Harvester (IH) and a host of smaller companies but by 
the 1970s the industry had been rationalised to just two firms. Toft and 
Massey Ferguson,24 both of which had large manufacturing plants in 
Bundaberg. By that time also, manual harvesting had virtually ceased to be a 
source of employment. 
Mechanisation replaced the arduous and unpleasant task of manual cane 
cutting with jobs requiring considerably more skill, (such as mechanical 
cutter drivers or drivers of mechanical loaders), which resulted in greater 
esteem for the workers. These benefits, however, were not immediately 
apparent to those caught up in the transition. Fearing for their livelihoods 
the cane cutters turned to their union, the Australian Workers Union (AWU) 
for assistance. One of the men charged with the responsibility of protecting 
their interests was Gerry Coding who had begun his vv'orking life as a 
farmhand on a dairy farm at Booyal near Childers. Moving to the Tully sugar 
district In 1926 he became a cane cutter, and so began a lifelong 
involvement with the cane industry.25 By the time Fairymead was 
mechanically harvesting some of its cane in the early 1950s Coding had 
risen through the union ranks to become Central Queensland District 
Secretary of the AWU and was again back in the Bundaberg reglon.26 in 1956 
he was appointed as President of the Queensland branch of the AWU. 
Recognising the inevitability of mechanisation Coding nevertheless sought 
to obtain the best deal possible for his union members. His approach was to 
2^ G; Burrows, Si^onoffikf '^ivjjs.v^ ^^ iww*':*" f?f AWAW^JWJ Jd? i ••^Jopfl^onf « /As* Ji/^' 
jpwfer^^ (Deakin University, School of Management, 1982), p. 10 
^ G Burrows ar^ d C Morton, Op Cit, pp.42-3 
^ Ibid, p. 152 
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delay the introduction of machines Vv'hile at the same t ime covering each 
stage of the transition with Award proyisions.27 one of his first actions in 
Bundaberg involved seeking an Award for 'ground crew', those men who 
followed the Vichie (Fairymead) harvester with cane knives cutting stalks 
the machine had missed. Fairymead countered by taking the cane knives 
away from the men and replacing them with chipping hoes. Their argument 
was that since the workers were using conventional field tools the company 
was Vv'ithin its rights to pay thern according to the award for normal field 
workers. When the matter was taken to the Industrial Court, however, a new 
sub-clause was inserted in the Sugar Industry Award which read: 
Employees assisting in harvesting cane with mechanical 
harvester and/or mechanical loaders shall be paid four 
pence per hour above the rates prescribed for field 
workers.28 
Coding's next move was to seek a new classification specifically for the 
operators of mechanical harvesters and again he was successful. In 
September 1955, not one but three new classifications were added to the 
Sugar Industry Award. They were mechanical cutter driver, mechanical 
cutter driver's assistant and driver of mechanical loader harvesting cane.29 
As mechanical harvesting made greater inroads into cane cutters' 
employment opportunities for conflict between the AWU and the sugar 
industry continued. When the Australian Sugar Producer's Association 
(ASPA) and the Colonial Sugar Refinery Co. Ltd. (CSR) applied to the 
Industrial Court to approve a new Award for the mechical harvesting of 
sugar in 1960, the application vv'as vigorously opposed by the union. ASPA 
and CSR sought the new award on the grounds that the high level of capital 
investment necessary for the purchase and maintenance of the equipment 
required that it should be worked for the maximum possible time. As a 
consequence, the application sought "round-the-clock" harvesting in order to 
maximise machine usage. Predictably the union opposed the proposed change 
27 bid, p. 152 
2S Ibid, p. 153 
29 Ibid, p. 155 
because it attacked ""the hours and conditions which have existed in the 
industry for very many years".30 y/hen the Industrial Court brought dovv'n its 
decision in June 1961 it acceded to the application by granting a new Award 
which specified the extra payment of four shillings daily plus three pence an 
hour for working between the hours of 6 pm and 8am,3i thereby allowing 
for harvesting to be undertaken at night, if and when necessary. 
The next major conflict between the AWU and the Industry began in 
November 1964 when the union petitioned the Industrial Court for 
substantial vv'age rises for sugar workers. The basis of this case was 
increased productivity, and hence prosperity, resulting from the industry's 
1962-3 expansion. Despite the Industry's counterclaim that the since 1962 
several increases had been awarded and that these amounted to as much as 
it could economically bear, i t failed to convince the State Industrial 
Commission and wage rises were granted.22 
Despite the abovementioned disputes between the sugar industry and the 
AWU the transition from manual to mechanical harvesting was generally 
accomplished with relatively l i t t le industrial conflict, especially on the 
farms. Furthermore, Industrial relations improved significantly when the 
mechanisation process was complete. While being by no means conclusive, 
many of the cane farmers intervievv'ed during the course of this study^^ 
reported that before mechanisation disputes between cane growers and cane 
cutters were frequent, and because of acute shortages of labour the cutters 
generally had the upper hand. In their work The Canecutters, Burrows and 
Morton describe a situation during the 1955-6 season wherein growers who 
at the beginning of the season baulked at having to pay cutters 20 shillings 
per ton, were forced to pay 35 shillings by the end.34 Farmers not only had 
^ Bmdi^rg^\,'-in\jil 1/6/61 
^ Smd3b^fyA^\t'-^wl 27/6/61 
^ Australia n Su gar Producer "s Asso ciation, AnjHj^ff^^fof t C1965j, p .3 (Here.af'ter 
ASPA) 
^ Eleven of the gravers supply ing -th* Fairymead, Bingera and Millaquin mills were 
interviewed between July and Decen^ ber 1990. Names of interviewees are listed in 
the Bibligraphy. 
^ G Burrows ar^ d C Morton, Op Cit, pp. 157-8 
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to contend w i th cutters and their union, however, they also often fpund that 
they had to bid against neighbours and friends in a relatively hostile 
environment, in order to secure adequate labour. Mechanical harvesting 
eliminated most of these problems. Instead of dealing vv'ith many different 
people and organisations, after mechanisation they needed to negotiate v/ith 
only one - the cane cutting contractor.35 
Because of the development of the Fairymead harvester the Bundaberg 
district led the way in mechanised cane harvesting for several years. In 
1961 when Queensland as a whole machine harvested less that 3^ of its 
cane, the amount harvested by machine in the Bundaberg district was 
significantly higher at 16%. By 1965 around 60% of Bundaberg's cane was 
being mechanically harvested. Fairymead continued to lead the way in its 
use of mechanical harvesters but the other mills were quickly catching up. 
The following table shows the total crop for each mill and the amount 
machine harvested. 
Table 3.1 Total sugar crop for each Bundaberg mill and the 
amounts machine harvested in 1965^6 
Mill Total crop Machine harvested 
Fairymead 
Qunaba 
Millaquin 
Bingera 
Gin Gin 
418,000 
205,000 
378,725 
280,000 
144,000 
1,425,725 
325,000 
150,000 
180,000 
158,000 
62,500 
875,500 
78% 
1Z% 
41% 
56% 
43% 
61% 
In the rest of Queensland, while the mechanisation of cane harvesting did 
not really get underway until 1962-63, once started i t proceeded quite 
^5 Interviews - Greensill, Searle, Santaluci^, Pitt, Attard and others. 
* iJwTuCfcS v^y^ u-ywuA!: 29/7/65 
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rapidly. During the 1961 season some seventy-five cane harvesting machines 
were used throughout Queensland to harvest a mere 3% of the crop. By 1976 
the transition process was virtually completed when 99.99% of the crop was 
being harvested by machines. 
Table 3 2: Growth of mechanisation of the Queensland harvest37 
Year 
harvested 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
Tonnage machii 
1,067,830 
1,570,104 
3,457,928 
5,387,361 
7,651,073 
9,351,969 
12,673,691 
12,682,930 
15,141,033 
17,861,899 
17,866,627 
18,201,186 
19,383,823 
21,058,476 
22.266,227 
ne % 
8.7 
13.4 
23.8 
39.1 
48.5 
59.2 
71.6 
84.92 
91.96 
97.03 
98.78 
99..56 
99.81 
99.95 
99.99 
The last two manual cutters in Queensland completed their final season In 
the Moreton Mill area in 1978.38 
Throughout the disputes that disrupted the sugar industry during the period 
of transition from manual to mechanical cane harvesting, the one sector of 
the industry that v-/as largely overlooked when decisions were being made 
27 A^i'P^ Vol 38,(1979), p.60 
W At-Jl2P, Vol 37, (1978), p250 
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about wages and other costs, was the emerging group of cane harvesting 
contractors. Farm workers had their union, grovv'ers and millers had 
representative organisations, but contactors were on their own. In an 
attempt to redress this Imbalance they formed themselves Into the 
Queensland Mechanical Cane Harvesters Association in 1964. The 
Association was eventually registered as a Union of Employers in 1974. 
Despite the formation of the Association, however, contractors have 
continued to be regarded as the 'poor cousins' of the Industry, even though 
they perform such a vital role.^^ 
In the years since mechisation was introduced a sizable number of growers 
have purchased harvesting equipment, either as Individuals or in conjunction 
with neighbours, to cut their own cane and in some cases to become 
harvesting contractors. For example, by 1980 over 200 cane harvesting 
machines were operating in the Bundaberg district; of these, 154 were 
owned by cane growers. These growers were responsible for harvesting 
some 63% of the local crop, of which 35.5% (1,251,815 tonnes) was 
harvested on their own properties and 27.5% (946,033 tonnes) was cut for 
other farmers. The balance of the crop was cut by independent cane 
han/esting contractors.4o 
Whether they used their own equipment or employed contractors, all 
growers agreed that while there were some problems associated with 
mechanical harvesting, particularly In the early days, the advantages 
generally outvv'eighed the disadvantages. On the negative side, 
mechanisation sometimes caused soil compaction problems but these were 
overcome by making changes to ploughing and tilling techniques.4i Because 
larger areas (up to 25% of the average size farm) had to be prepared for 
harvesting at a given time, the potential for financial losses due to 
interruptions caused by rain, for example, increased proportionately. On the 
positive side, however, mechanisation not only paved the way for improved 
Industrial relations , i t also enabled growers to implement more efficient 
5 i R Blaok, St.at* Seoretanj _, Queers lard Mechanical Cane Harvesters Association, 
Iriterviov, 21/6/91 
40 Canegrowers, Ch.airman 's and Seer*tary 's Re p&rts, (1982), p. 10 
41 V. Chapp*11, Interviev 8.10.90 
farming practices that gave them more time to themselves and their 
families, and more importantly enabled containment, to a degree, of rapidly 
increasing production costs.42 
During the transition period, while some dislocation occurred, the fears of 
massive and permanent unemployment for cane cutters as expressed by 
Gerry Coding and the AWU in the early 1950s were largely unfounded. While 
cane cutting had ceased to exist as an occupation, a major consequence of 
mechanisation was the creation of other employment opportunities in 
enterprises directly involved with the harvesting of cane and in the 
manufacture, distribution and servicing of mechanical harvesters. By 1974, 
for Instance about 1,100 people were employed In the manufacture of 
harvesters.43 
It has been determined that during the period from 1956 to 1968 the cane 
harvest labour force had three components: resident farm labour; seasonally 
engaged labour for mechanical harvesting (harvester and load operators and 
tractor drivers); and, manual cutters. The following table shows that as the 
number of cutters declined a compensatory number of jobs were created in 
the other two categories. 
Table 3.3: Employment on Queensland cane farms 1956, 62 & 6844 
Category 1956 
Manual cutters 8,700 
Machine workers 400 
Resident farm 
labour 2,900 
12,000 
1962 
7,800 
1,200 
3,800 
12,800 
1968 
2,800 
4,600 
4,000 
11,400 
42 interviews - Greensill, Searle, S^ antaTuoia, Pitt, Atlard. This view is also supported 
by GH Burrows, Foofl^vtyic! ^ on:?i?^iA?jk?^^^f fj^hji'^b^k}-}}^hsfu;^ i9JUJ^'<?M^ 
Ajf\-VJ-tffr^X^*^2'),pU 
« Toft Brothers Indus-tries, A/}Mii7ff^^t09J4), p.5; ASi'P, Vol 37, (1978), p.368 
44 G HBurrows, Op Cit, p.8 
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As the table indicates between 1956 and 1968 the overall number of on-
farm jobs declined. These losses were, hovv'ever, balanced by the creation of 
extra jobs in allied manufacturing and associated industries. As a major 
centre of cane harvester manufacturing Bundaberg benefitted substantially 
in this regard, at least until the slump in the sugar industry which began to 
take effect from around the middle of 1981 and continued until about 1986. 
During that period hundreds of employees were retrenched by Massey 
Ferguson and Versatile Toft. Massey Ferguson eventually closed its 
Bundaberg factory in 1984. The reasons for the slump and its 
consequences for the local economy vv'lll be discussed In Chapter Six. 
Between 1961 and 1973 the area of cane harvested in Queensland increased 
from 150,750 hectares to 215,971 hectares.45 There is l i t t le doubt that 
such a massive Increase could not have been achieved without the aid of 
mechanisation. In the Bundaberg district, disadvantaged as it is by the 
climate, growers sought to ameliorate their handicap by using mechanised 
farming techniques to improve efficency. In so doing they not only gave the 
district a head start In the mechanisation process, they also opened the door 
to a significant manufacturing industry in the area of cane growing and 
harvesting equipment. While growers in the Bundaberg district had to vv'ork 
harder than their northern counterparts in order to compensate for a 
shorter growing season and unreliable precipitation, their response to 
mechanisation showed that they were also capable of working smarter. The 
importance of the cane growers of Bundaberg to the mechanisation process 
should not be underestimated! 
45 jf^a A^tirj/is.'} Ji/^r h-^^y, (Brisbane, Larce Jones and Co, 1975), p78 
Chapter 4: 1970 to 1977: GOOD TIMES - 6AD TIMES! 
Between 1950 and 1953 Australia witnessed its first major expansion of 
the sugar industry since the end of World War Two. That expansion was 
follovv'ed by a period of consolidation until 1963 vv'hen, after the 
recommendations of the Gibbs Committee of Inquiry, a second major 
expansion vv'as undertaken. As well as these changes v/ithin the national 
industry there were significant changes within the international sphere. 
The export quota system that had operated under the terms of the 1953 and 
1958 International Sugar Agreements collapsed in 1961. That year Cuba, the 
main supplier of sugar to the United States of America, had its trade there 
suspended, which in turn opened the door for other countries, including 
Australia, to supply sugar to the American market. In 1962 a new market in 
Japan also opened for Australian sugar. It was the locating of these 
markets which led to the 1963 expansion. 
A major decline in the world market price of sugar occurred between 1965 
and 1968. This decline had not been foreseen by the Gibbs Inquiry, and it 
caused significant difficulties for the Australian industry, involved as it 
was in expansion. Unseasonal weather conditions late in the 1960s also 
caused serious disruptions, yet, as stated at the end of Chapter 2, things 
were beginning to improve. Mechanical harvesting had all but replaced 
manual cane-cutting by 1969 and irrigation vv'as beginning to play an 
increasingly important role in cane production. In the Bundaberg district, 
despite adverse weather conditions, crushing records were being broken 
year after year. And, towards the end of the decade sugar prices again began 
to rise. But even though the 1960s ended on a generally optimistic note, in 
Bundaberg i t was tinged with a l i t t le apprehension caused by the re-
appearance of Fiji disease. The apprehension turned out to be well founded. 
This chapter looks at the period from 1970 to 1977 during which time 
further changes in the industry's marketing arrangements led to another 
expansionary episode in 1975. The main focus of this chapter is, however, 
Bundaberg. As stated earlier because of their geographic disadvantage 
Bundaberg grovv'ers felt that they had had to work just a l i t t le harder than 
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their northern colleagues in order to maintain a similar return. Until this 
time they appear to have been relatively successful but between 1970 and 
1977 escalating production costs added to problems caused by adverse 
weather conditions really began to have a notlcable effect on the economic 
viability of many Bundaberg growers. Declining viability also appears to 
have coincided with the phasing-out of the highly productive cane variety 
NCo310, which was a consequence of its infestation by Fiji disease. 
In 1969 twenty-two Fiji diseased stools of sugar cane were discovered in 
the Bundaberg district. By 1970 the number had risen to over 8,000 and by 
the middle of 1971 over 9,000 had been dug from the crop.i While the 
outbreak appeared to be contained In the Bundaberg district It was a major 
concern for all cane growers even though it had never appeared anywhere 
north of the town. The concern arose because the disease was spread by 
leaf-hoppers {Perkinsiella SaccharicidS}, which were then in plague 
proportions around Bundaberg. One officer of the Bureau of Sugar Experiment 
Stations reported that vv'hile driving at dusk he had driven twenty-two 
kilometres through a swarm so dense that he could barely see the road.2 
The leaf-hoppers carried the disease. In much the same way as mosquitos 
carry malaria. When it initially expresses itself in stalks of cane, it causes 
the formation of galls which, in the case of NCo310, are small and 
relatively hard to detect. The disease eventually causes severe stunting of 
the plant's growth.^ 
When addressing Bundaberg growers at a field day in 1971, Chief Pathologist 
of the Bureau, C. G. Hughes, described the rapidity with which the disease 
had spread and the extent of the infestation. Starting with just eight 
farms in 1969, there were by 1971 183 diseased farms, or 15% of all 
Bundaberg assignments. The greatest concentration of diseased farms was 
in the Gooburrum area where the outbreak had first been noticed. In that 
area 104 farms including the Fairymead Plantation were known to be 
diseased. That was 48% of all Fairymead assignments. In other areas the 
4i^-*-j/uw .iiyw- Vojr Si}^-, Vol 52, (1972), p.109 (Hereafter AS^'P) 
Ibid, p. 109 
ASrP, Vol 34, (1974), p.97 
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infestat ion was not so great. F i f t y -s ix (17%) of Bingera farms were 
infected, while Millaquin had fourteen, Qunaba seven and Gin Gin only two.4 
At the time of his address Hughes stated that about 100 tons (102 tonnes) 
of cane had been destroyed because of Fiji disease, but to use his own 
words, 'This is only a small part of the picture".5 The loss of the cane was 
bad enough but it was the cost of the indirect losses which really hit the 
farmers' bank accounts. Instead of using home-grown plants to replace the 
diseased ones, new plant material had to be purchased from outside. A 
greater penalty was that diseased fields had to be ploughed-out much 
earlier than would be expected. In many cases diseased blocks also had to 
be harvested early, the cost of which was a lower Commercial Cane Sugar 
(cc.s.) value. Growers are paid on the basis of the amount of sugar nnade 
from their cane, not on the amount of cane delivered to the mills and the 
cc.s. figure represents the value of the cane to the production process. All 
in all, an outbreak of Fiji disease was very costly and while In 1971 the 
image painted by Hughes was grim, far worse was to come. 
The threat to the industry as a whole was so great that it warranted 
regulatory action by the State government. In June 1969 Proclamation No 47 
came into force. Its purpose was to control the supply of plants and the 
growing of old ratoons. Proclamation No 48 which followed shortly after 
prevented the transfer of plants from Bundaberg to Isis, while No 49 
prevented the transfer of plants from Fairymead to anywhere else.6 
While the government was acting to stop the transfer of infected plant 
material, the Bundaberg District Cane Pest and Disease Control Board was 
doing Its best to stem the plague of hoppers that was spreading the 
disease.7 One method being tested in 1970 had been developed by the Bureau 
of Sugar Experiment Stations. It involved a mixture of chemicals and light 
^ ASi'P, Vol 52, Cl972), p. 109 
3 Ibid, p. 109 
6 lbid,p.109 
7 AwJlA&A'y ^ ii'iww/i{ 6/4/70 
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kerosene vv'hich was then applied through a fogging machine.^  It did not, 
however, stop the spread of the disease. 
Such was the magnitude of the threat to the industry that the work force of 
the Bundaberg Cane Pest and Disease Control Board was boosted with a 
three-fold increase in the number of inspectors and the Bureau of Sugar 
Experiment Stations seconded a senior advisory officer to direct the 
campaign against the disease. Part of the eradication plan involved roguing 
(removing the infected stools from the cane stands by hand). This was 
believed to be the most effective measure, especially when the infestation 
amounted to only a few stools per acre.^ Heavier infestations were treated 
by the compulsory ploughing-out of whole fields of cane. 
Despite all efforts Fiji disease continued to threaten the Bundaberg sugar 
industry. While the disease had first been detected in the variety Q71, 
research determined that the variety of cane NCo310 was especially 
susceptible to the disease, and since the latter constituted about 90% of the 
crop in the Bundaberg district, authorities felt that the problem would be 
difficult, if not impossible to eradicate unless growers changed cane plant 
varieties. This, however, was an immense problem primarily because of the 
lack of a suitable disease-resistant alternative. The fact that NCo310 was 
also a very productive variety which growers were reluctant to abandon 
further compounded the problem. 
As there was no alternative and NCo310 continued to be the major plant 
stock, it became imperative to grow planting material that was disease 
free. The Pest Board planted approximately fifteen acres (six hectares) of 
clean seed at Toweran, and the Fairymead company did the same at Baffle 
Creek. Both sites were isolated from any commercial cane and it was hoped 
that they would serve as mother-seed plots for a clean-seed scheme for the 
whole of Bundaberg.io 
S Burueau of Sugar Experiment .Station, TOih Amui}R^^'t^ (Brisbane, 1972). p.4& 
Hereaf-ter BSES) 
^ €^n^ Gf'o\v\^"Oujrtoj'Iy Bjii^tifi, (1 /10/70), p.62 (Hereafter CGi)^) 
10 BSES, 7^^Af^miJR^^^'t (Bri3fc.ar.e, 1972), pp.16-7 
The best method for contrQlling the disease continued to be roguing, hut 
Vv'ith such an increase in the number of cases, i t was impossible for official 
inspectors to cover them all. To counter this, the programme was expanded 
by enlisting the farmers themselves to rogue diseased stools from their own 
properties. The incentive offered to farmiers was that compulsory plough-
outs of diseased blocks would be restricted to second year and older ratoon 
blocks in which Board inspectors found more that five stools of Fi|i disease 
per acre. Since the Board inspections did not commence until mid-February, 
there was enough time for at least one inspection by farmers. Before very 
long in badly diseased localities, nearly two-thirds of the farmers were 
actively roguing.n 
1975 brought no relief from the disease; in fact the situation deteriorated 
even further. It made its f i rs t appearance at Maryborough, while at 
Bundaberg 838 of the total of 1045 assignments supplying Fairymead, 
Millaquin, Qunaba and Bingera mills were known to have some Fij i disease on 
their farms. Through 1977 and 1978 the losses caused by the disease 
continued to mount rapidly and i t was estimated that at least 115,000 
tonnes of cane were lost.12 The disease reached i ts peak in 1979 when over 
71 million Infected stools were located.i^ The tide was, hovv'ever, beginning 
to turn. During the latter half of the 1970s the highly susceptible cane 
variety NCo310 began to be replaced by the more resistant Q87 and in 1977 
i t was recommended that the former be removed from the Approved Variety 
Lists for all Bundaberg rn1lls.i4 The Bundaberg Sugar Experiment Station was 
also making notlcable progress in the development of new varieties, with 
three to be available within two years.15 
11 Ibid, p.19 
12 BSES, TSm A^vwj/P^'/ao^t (Brisbane, 1979), p.12 
1 ^  BSES, SJi-^AmisIP^^p^-f, (Brisbane, 1983), p.12 
14 BSES, 77th AmajJP^vt, (Brisbar,e, 1977), p.10 
15 £5OT<jOiy/y.44»h-yy7w.'7; 4/1 ./78 
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Table No.4 1: Fiji diseased stools in Bundaberg mill areas.i6 
Year No. Infected 
(Millions) 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1982 
1983 
1 
3 
10 
39 
56 
71 
49 
14 
5 
By 1980 the number of infected stools had declined to 49 million and in 
1981 the number was further reduced to 14 million. As NCo310 was 
replaced the incidence of Fiji disease began to subside. But while the battle 
was being won In the south, the disease was attacking in the north where 
NCo310 continued to be the main cane variety. In 1983 the disease was 
located in Sarina, Mackay and Plane Creek, all areas which had previously 
been absolutely free of it.i'^ 
At Bundaberg, the last stands of NCo310 were ploughed-out after the 1984 
harvest. Fiji disease was sti l l evident but it was, by and large, confined to 
the variety CP44-101 and the number of cases so small that they were of no 
significant concern. After a period of approximately sixteen years, i t 
looked as though Fiji disease was under control; but why did it take so long? 
It would appear that the industry was totally unprepared for the onslaught 
of problems resulting from the disease. Research by the Bureau of Sugar 
Experiment Stations In the development of alternative cane varieties was 
sadly lacking. Even though the disease had caused major problems earlier, in 
16 BSES, PJm Anfm}R?fDO<'-f, (Brisbarie, 1983), p.12 
1 ^  BSES, P4^ Amu}}P^^% (Brisbane, 1984), p .13-4 
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the 1930s, there were no varieties of a suitable calibre to replace the 
disease susceptible NCo310 which was the major variety grown throughout 
the State.18 As early as 1974, Director of Sugar Experiment Stations 0. W. 
Sturgess, Indicated that the cane variety NCo310 was the main reason why 
the disease was able to proliferate as rapidly and as extensively as it did. 
He did not, however, advocate the removal of the variety from the Approved 
Varieties Lists. Instead he felt that the provision of clean-seed plant 
material would eradicate the disease.i^ Part of the blame must also lie 
with the growers who were reluctant to plough-out infected areas. Their 
conservatism and concern for short-term protection of their economic 
interests precluded radical measures. 
The Fiji disease saga was, however, only one of the problems facing the 
Bundaberg sugar industry during this period. The uncertainty of the weather 
was always of concern but during the 1973/4 season it caused even greater 
problems than usual. The season vv'as punctuated with periods of heavy rain 
and high winds. The rain was so persistent that it forced the cessation of 
crushing operations on several occasions, severely disrupting mill 
schedules. Weekly crush figures for July showed that the throughput of 
Bundaberg and Isis sugar mills for 1973 was less that half the quantity 
handled at the same period of the crush in 1972.20 High winds in July caused 
lodging in much of the cane in the Millaquin area. Lodging refers to a 
condition wherein the cane is no longer rising vertically into the air 
Because In many cases the lodged cane was also 'tangled' It made mechanical 
harvesting very difficult. Cyclonic activity in January 1974 also brought 
flood rains yet paradoxically, irrigation was required from February to June 
at Bundaberg and Childers and where irrigation was not available, many 
crops, particularly those on dry sandy soils, suffered severe stress and 
produced very poor stands.2i 
The weather began to clear early in August and crushing rates increased 
significantly, but the season was sti l l a long time behind schedule. One way 
18 BS-ES, 69tS Annual Report, (Brisbane, 1968). p45 
19 ASrP^ Vol 34, (1974), p.119 
20 £fc™(*Jwy^i..ywM4 27/7/73 
21 BSES, 74ffi Anjm?P^ort, (Brisbane ,1974), p.8 
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of catching up was to harvest cane on week-ends. Farmers were in favour, 
even though there were extra costs involved for the payment of the 
harvesting machine operators' overtime.22 As the fine weather continued to 
hold crushing records again began to fall.23 6y mid-December, only about 
200,000 tonnes of cane were stil l in the field, and the season was 
effectively at an end. The total crush for the Bundaberg/lsis district was 
3.2 million tonnes.24 But, on the same day that this announcement was 
made, growers were stunned to learn that the Gin Gin mill was to be closed 
down at the end of the 1974 season.25 
In 1973 this mill had a gross assigned area of 7,022 hectares and a mill 
peak of 36,500 which was supplied by 160 growers.26 The mill's closure 
came as a shock to its cane suppliers, but it should have been expected. The 
story of the mill's closure in 1974 had its origins in 1965 when the mill 
found itself in severe financial difficulties. 
The Gin Gin mill, situated on the Burnett River at Wallaville about sixty-
five kilometres from Bundaberg, v/as originally built by Walkers Limited in 
1896 for the Queensland government treasury. Ownership later passed to 
the local farmers as a co-operative association. It was taken over by the 
owners of the Bingera mill, Gibson and Howes Pty. Ltd., in 1966. This take-
over was not without problems and it left a bitter taste in the mouths of 
many. In his annual report to the members of the Gin Gin Co-operative Sugar 
Milling Association Limited In May 1965, chairman of directors, H. H. Jones, 
said that the 1964 season had been very unsatisfactory for the Association. 
There had been a loss of £104,465 ($208,930) in 1964 compared with a final 
net profit of £89,366 ($178,732) for 1963.27 jones blamed reduced 
production caused by the severity of the drought, low world market prices 
and the cost of new plant and equipment. The new machinery had been 
purchased as a consequence of the expansion programme recommended by the 
22 Bmiitf^rg M'\v)mifil^zn JlZ 
25 £5w'jrfj(^y .%ii-»?nj/;{ 24/10/73 
^ Bui'hi}lwyM?h^^y}}Ji/,^9/U/lZ 
25 a«w«ji&vy ^h- iMU/; /19/12/73 
^' /*!.-}«?, Vol 33, (1974),p.345 
^ Pun^j^/yM'h-^iri/^ 5/5/65 
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1961 lnquiry.28 Many of the growers, hov-zever, pointed to poor management 
and even hinted at collusion between the mill's management and Gibson and 
Howes. They felt that their co-operative was deliberately being driven into 
debt to enable Gibson and Howes to take-over the mill at a price that was 
considerabley less than its real value.29 
The annual report to shareholders in 1965 revealed that the mill owed the 
Bank of New South Wales more than £400,000 ($800,000). The bank told the 
mill that unless certain action was taken to improve its financial position, 
its assistance to the Association would cease on 31 August 1965. One of 
the measures requested by the bank v/as the raising of the levy on growers 
from two shillings to four shillings per ton. The measure was not 
implemented because a majority of growers vvould not agree to it.^o As a 
result, the bank did not authorise a payment to cane suppliers on 18 
August, but it did allow the payment of mill employees' wages, to enable the 
mill to continue operating. When the State government was advised of the 
situation it offered assistance through the Treasury Department. The 
injection of funds provided by the Treasury saved the Gin Gin mill from 
closure at that time, but only just.-^i 
A short time later in early September, Messrs. Angus Thomas Rees and Lloyd 
George Rees vyere appointed as receivers of the assets of the Gin Gin mill. 
In November the receivers invited tenders for the purchase of the mill "as a 
going concern". In an editorial a fevv' days before, the Bundaherg Newsman 
produced a cutting statement about the state of affairs surrounding the Gin 
Gin mill. It questioned the manner in which the mill had been allowed to 
slide into such a sorry condition, when the industry as a whole was so highly 
regulated. It also questioned the v-/isdom of providing government assistance 
and asked why the mill suppliers' committee itself had been so secretive 
28 £!i«!^A^/v^iriWw7,. 5/5/65 
29 Interviews witheariegrovers. 
30 £SM7j0^vy/^i..ywu;7, 7/9/65 
31 Canegrowers - Bundaberg District, Annual Rep&rt 1966, Secretary "s and Chairman's 
Annu-al Reporls, File No. 1 (Hereafter Canegrov*rs) 
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committee itself had been so secretive about its situation Vv'hen the welfare 
of the whole community was a stake.22 fsio answers were forthcoming. 
Before any company could take over the mill, government legislation was 
required amending the Primary Producers Co-operative Associations Act. 
This would allow the Gin Gin Mill Co-operative to convert itself into a 
company that could then be legally taken over by another.^ ^ While all this 
was going on the receivers, Rees and Rees, were seeking exemption from 
operating the mill for the 1966 season. Those who vv'anted to retain the mill 
sought an urgent hearing before the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board. The 
reason given for the urgency was the necessity to retain vital personnel.--4 
The case was heard on 22 December 1965. 
As stated above, there was already considerable ill-feeling over the Gin Gin 
mill situation. At the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board hearing M. B. Hoare, 
Q.C. (acting on behalf of the Gin Gin Mill Suppliers' Committee) articulated 
the growers' restiveness when he claimed that the only people likely to 
benefit from the closure of the mill vv'ould be "those vv'aiting like vultures to 
attend the picking of the remains".35 
The case, however, became superfluous and was withdrawn when it was 
announced that Gibson and Howes had successfully negotiated with the Bank 
of New South Wales for the purchase of the Gin Gin mill. The transaction 
stil l required the consent of the growers, but when asked for their decision 
regarding the matter only six growers out of approximately 200 dissented. 
To ensure that the take-over vv'ould proceed, growers had to agree to the 
deduction of a four shillings per ton levy for a three year period, to clear 
outstanding debts.36 Many felt, and continue to feel to this day, that they 
were held to ransom.^ "? if they did not agree to Gibson and Howes' terms. 
32 £toi6Avy ^ ii -ywu;/, 5/11 /65 
33 £5iMdG*tvy/ i^.-iW!J/;^ 8/12/75 and 10/12/73 
^ Central S u^ar Cane Prices Board, Secti ort 45 Hearings. Brisbane, 22 /12 / 65, p. 7 
(Hereafter CSCPB) 
^ CSCPB, Section 45 H«a ring s, p .6 
^6 £5tfw;ft5wv/«?i,.OTW/7,24/12/65 
^ ' Interviews with ta^e growers, .snonymi-ty requested 
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then in all probability the mill would have been closed and they would have 
been left with nowhere to crush their cane. 
In 1972 the ownership of the three Bundaberg mills, Bingera (ovv'ned by 
Gibson and Howes Pty. Ltd.), Millaquin and Fairymead, amalgamated to form 
the Bundaberg Sugar Company. Two years later Bundaberg Sugar applied to 
the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board for the rezoning of cane assignments 
from the Gin Gin mill to Fairymead and Bingera.38 it was claimed that the 
only way to ensure the continued viability of Gin Gin was a significant 
injection of capital to improve milling capacity, but this the company was 
not prepared to do.39 Upon Gin Gin's closure employees were to be offered 
alternative employment at either Bingera or Fairymead.4o 
The proposed closure of the mill resulted in criticism and condemnation 
from many quarters: residents of Wallaville and Gin Gin were worried about 
the effects of the the closure on their tovv'ns;4i cane grovv'ers vv'ere 
concerned that their production costs would increase; and, the suppliers of 
the Bingera mill expressed doubts about the capacity of their mill to 
process the additional cane.42 Public meetings were held and a Committee of 
Inquiry was called for,43 but to no avail. The closure also raised doubts 
about the continued existence of the Qunaba mill which was much better 
equipped than Gin Gin but, like it , was a small mill.44 The Qunaba mill was 
eventually closed in 1985. 
The Central Sugar Cane Prices Board met at Bundaberg in April 1974. 
Officially its task was to consider an application by Gibson and Howes Pty 
Ltd for the re-zoning of sugar cane lands from the Gin Gin mill to the 
Bingera mill. Because, however, so much of the evidence presented 
38 CSCPB, Settion 33 Hearings, Bundaberg, 22 /5/74. pp .1 -3 
39 Canegrowers, Minutes^ 21 /12 /73 
40 Pundit^'y ^ h- iwjj;/^ 19/12 /73; Ca ne growers, Cha iririan 's Annua 1 Report, File F^o. 1, 
(1974) 
41 Pm^]f3S^yM?b-^ifi/,22/unz 
42 BiTigera Mill Suppliers Coprimittee, Minutes, 7/11 /74 (Here^ af-ter BMSC) 
43 £5»w«j^/y mr^yf}ji7, 12/2 /?4 
44 £5!«JlA*A'yji5^iriWJj;7^2/5/74: Canegrowers, Chairm.an"s Annual Rep&rt. File No. 1, 
(1974) 
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pertained directly to the mill's closure it became, de facto, an investigation 
of the possible results accruing from such action; and it resulted in an 
attempt being made to save the mill.45 As usual at Central Sugar Cane Board 
hearings, there were the expected protagonists, the mill owners and the 
mill suppliers' committee, but at these proceedings a third party was 
allowed to participate. C. W. Pincus was given permission to present a 
submission on behalf of the Gin Gin and Wallaville "Save the Mill" 
Committee. Pincus' presence, however, did not save the mill and in 
December the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board announced its approval of the 
rezoning proposals for the Gin Gin mill.46 The Gin Gin sugar mill had come to 
the end of Its life. 
Fiji disease, bad weather and the Gin Gin mill closure notwithstanding, cane 
and sugar production in the Bundaberg district continued to rise as shown in 
the following table. 
Table 4 2: Total yields of cane crushed and sugar produced in the 
Bundaberg district 1965 -197447 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
45 
46 
47 
CSCPB. 
Tonnes cane 
crushed 
1,398,754 
2,086,447 
2,083,385 
2,157,501 
1.474,311 
2,042,672 
2,203,152 
2,640,462 
2,677,410 
2,489,513 
Section 53 Hearing, 2 2 / 4 ^ 4 , pp.1 -4 
•OTw7, 24/12/74 
Tonnes sugar 
produced 
176,145 
276,300 
280,643 
323,815 
199,303 
295,111 
330,607 
380,849 
356,849 
349,470 
C. I 1 
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The low figures for 1969 and 1974 were the results of severe drought in the 
former and abnormally wet conditions in the latter, however, overall a 
steady rise Is observable. 
Although there were no major expansions betvv'een 1965 and 1975 the 
productivity gains illustrated above also encouraged a gradual increase in 
mill peaks. While mill peaks generally remain static between expansionary 
episodes millers can apply to the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board on an 
annual basis, for variations to their peaks. Between 1972 and 1975 
Bundaberg mills had had their mill peaks adjusted upwards in each 
successive year, (see Table 4.3). 
Table 43: Aggregate of Bundaberg district* mill peaks 
1971 - 197748 
Vear Aggregate 
mill peaks 
1971 275,844 
1972 285,496 
1973 285,520 
1974 304,000 
1975 312,500) 1975-6 
1976 352,000) expansion 
1977 352,000 
* in 1971 the Bundaberg district mills included the Bingera, Fairymead, 
Millaquin, Qunaba and Gin Gin mills. While the Gin Gin mill closed in 1974 
the aggregate of mill peaks for the district remained unchanged. 
A similar pattern of increasing production was also evident in the figures 
for Queensland as a v^hole. As illustrated by the follov^ing table, (Table 
48 Canegrovyers, Secr*t^r y' s and Ch airman's Annual Rep«r ts, (1970 - 1979) 
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4.4) the production of sugar had risen steadily, except when adverse weather 
conditions affected the harvest, such as in 1969. The reasons for the 
increased production included bringing new lands into full production, 
increased irrigation, control of diseases and Improved farming practices, 
all of which was aided and abetted by mechanical harvesting. 
Table 4.4:Total yields of cane crushed and sugar produced 
1965-744^ 
Crop Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Tonnes cane 
crushed 
13,766,544 
15,762,683 
15,969,790 
17,693,605 
14,934,982 
16,465,323 
18,409,405 
18,086,315 
18,278,504 
19,421,069 
Tonnes sugar 
produced 
1,913,498 . 
2,238,054 
2,249,231 
2,645,987 
2,114,333 
2,375,426 
2,669,489 
2,713,986 
2,405,792 
2,727,533 
Increased productivity was not the only change to have occurred in the 
Australian sugar industry by 1975; there had also been some major changes 
in i ts markets. Despite the restrictions imposed on the Australian harvest 
by the 1968 International Sugar Agreement the Industry has continued to 
seek and vv'in new markets for i ts sugar, and before the end of the 1971-2 
financial year had been able to announce that i t had secured a contract 
worth about $1,600,000 to supply sugar to China. In itself the contract was 
not a large one, but It was significant because It opened the door to a 
potentially gigantic market. During 1971 and 1972 long-term contracts had 
also been negotiated with Malaysia and Singapore. A contract with Korea 
49 .4i?3S?, Vol 55, (1976), P.96 
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was signed in 1974, but th9 jewel in thQ crown" vv^ as a nQw contract w i t h 
Japan. Negotiations in 1974 and 1975 had culminated in an order for the 
supply of three million long tons of raw sugar over the five seasons 1975 to 
1979.50 With the addition of this contract the Australian Industry had export 
markets totalling about 1.2 million tonnes annually covered by contracts 
with stable price arrangements.5i 
It was fortuitous for the Australian Industry that i t was able to secure 
these contracts because in 1974 two important markets v-^ ere lost. The 
first Vv'as America when the United States Congress failed to pass 
legislation that would have extended the operation of the United States 
Sugar Act. This terminated the quota arrangements for supply to the United 
States market.52 A much more serious loss, hovv'ever, was the British 
market when the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community.53 
This was a body-blow for the Australian industry because it meant the end 
of Its contract vv'ith the United Kingdom under the terms of the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreennent. Upon entering the Community Britain 
proposed that after 1974 Australia's negotiated price quota Vi^ ould be 
phased-out. The immediate concern was, therefore, to find new markets for 
the 335,000 tons (341,700 tonnes) of sugar that had previously been 
supplied to Britain. 
It appeared that finding new markets for such a large quantity of sugar was 
to be a major task. Doug Anthony, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for 
Trade and industry, succinctly described the issues as follow: 
From the expiration of the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement at the end of 1974, Australia would lose 
her current assured access for 335,000 tons of 
negotiated price sugar quota to the British market. 
50 Australian Sugar Producer's Association, AMtAsft^ortA^l^, p.3 (Hereafter ASPA) 
•"^ ASPA, Anm37P^poft{\911),^.^ 
52 A.^3«!,Vol55,ri976:i, p.3 
53 ASP A, AfijmfRi^pof % C1974), p .8: iJiA?M^-Un^ P-jf'Jiifii^ fjjy t}^t^^, V*l 255, 
(1970-1), pp .1728-9 (Hereafter iJm 
7: 
The International Sugar Agreement has provisions 
for a complementary rise in ISA quotas in these 
circumstances. 
However, I do not think this would be practical if 
this quantity of sugar had to be accommodated 
overnight in the ISA. 
This would put the continued viability of the ISA at 
risk. 
But I see no reason why this would not be 
manageable if Australia were to be phased out of 
the British market over a period of years. 
Our aim In the talks beginning soon with the British 
government is how the matter should be handled - a 
staged phasing out instead of an abrupt cut-off.54 
As Anthony pointed out, the proposal had ramifications which extended 
beyond Australian borders. As described above the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement (CSA) operated within the framework of the International Sugar 
Agreement (ISA). Since Australia was to lose its British contract after 
1974, i t was within the power of the ISA to adjust quotas of member 
countries in order to compensate Australia, but i t would be of necessity, at 
the expense of other members. The action of Britain to exclude Australia, 
was in fact, not merely a blow to the Australian industry. It had the 
potential to jeopardise the entire operation of the ISA.55 That potential, 
however, was not realised. Instead of the expected glut of sugar on the 
world market the reverse occurred and a sugar shortage, caused by increased 
consumption and poor seasons in some producing countries, became evident. 
54 -4irJ^Vol32, (1973),p.69 
55 4;!fii>y«1255,Cl970-l), p. 1729 
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As a consequence, the free market sugar price began to cl imb, reaching an 
unprecedented $650 ster l ing per ton in November 1974.56 
On the basis of these changed marketing conditions. Increased productivi ty 
and the emergence of a sugar shortage the Queensland government decided 
that i t was t ime for another expansion of the industry and in November 
1975 i t asked the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board to begin planning an 
Increase in the capacity of the industry "suff ic ient to produce, on average, 
an additional 300,000 tonnes of sugar per year".57 The Board's deliberations 
resulted in a decision to al low an increase of 38,202 ha. (about ]2%) in the 
gross area assigned to canegrowing in Queensland and i t increased the 
aggregate of mi l l peaks by the requested 300,000 tonnes. Because of the 
need for quick production to supply the new Japanese market, additional 
assigned areas were granted to existing growers only.58 
No sooner had the expansion programme commenced v^hen problems began to 
set in. Consumers reacted adversely to the sudden and unreal ist ic price 
increases and as the prices of sugar on the supermarket shelves continued to 
rise they were met w i t h strong buyer resistance from housewives in the 
developed countries. As we l l , manufacturers of sugar-based products began 
a concerted search for less expensive sweeteners, and there was a major 
reduction in across-the-board usage of sugar in developing countries.59 
There was a very real danger that the sugar industry would price i tse l f out 
of the supermarket and this is indeed what happened. A short t ime later the 
the wor ld market price for sugar as ref lected by the London Daily Price 
(LDP) again began to fa l l . 
The lower price was a serious concern for the global industry but In 
Austral ia, where in f la t ion was having an unprecedented influence on wage 
rates and the cost of goods and services, i t was especially worrying. While 
overseas consumers were paying an increasingly high price for their sugar, 
ref ining costs in part icular vv'ere r ising so rapidly that the real value of the 
"7 
56 ASPA, AMiAifP^^-t(1976), p.11 
5"? £iTO&^y/i^ii-yyju/7,24/14/74 
58 ^ i^TJ '^, Vol 35, C1976), p.3 
59 ^JT}©, Vol 35, Cl976), p.119 
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increased export price was quickly being eroded. The public perception, 
hovv'ever, was that the sugar industry 'had never had it so good'. Much had 
been made of the windfall gains which the industry had miade from export 
sales in the 1974 season when the price had been £650 sterling per ton; in 
those buoyant times, the sugar industry in general, and the cane growing 
community in particular, had become the target for demands that the 
industry must 'pay its own way' in areas where government finance had 
traditionally been provided.6o Not so much vv'as said when the price slumped 
to a low of around £150 sterling per ton in 1975. Few people envisioned 
that within a very short period of time the Australian sugar industry, 
including Bundaberg, would find itself in serious financial difficulties. 
The LDP for the 1975 season, though stil l lucrative at a high of £470 and a 
seasonal average of £216.44,61 was substantially ]ov^er than it had been in 
1974. While this resulted in lower returns for the industry generally, in 
Bundaberg it was combined with a drop in the overall average cc.s figure 
for the district vv'hich resulted in a substantial reduction in the tonnages of 
sugar made in the area. In other words, the grovv'ers received a much lower 
price for a smaller tonnage of sugar. Thus, many growers, already locked 
into expansion programmes, found their incomes severely curtailed.62 The 
reason for the lower cc.s. was unclear, but it was suggested that excessive 
use of nitrogenous fertilizer was a contributing factor.63 
Added to the problem of lower prices was the fact that by January 1976 the 
much vaunted Japanese contract was in jeopardy. The contract had been 
concluded vv'hen the world price for sugar was at an unusually high level. 
When the price fell, the Japanese refiners tried to renege on the 
agreement,64 an action with potentially devastating conseqences for the 
Australian industry. The Japanese refiners, vv'ho were also faced with a 
sharp downturn in domestic consumption, sent a delegation to Australia to 
discuss their problems in late January 1976. 
60 A^^'Si Vol 35, C1976), p.122 
6 i ASPA, A^'VAiJPi?fljri (1976), p.11 
62 aA'kfi^yM?h-)fnifii 14 / I /76 
^ Pmfj^^fy M? ii -OTW/if 1/6/76 
6* AS^VP, Vol 37, (1978), p. 189 
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Initially the Australian industry insisted that the Japanese must honour the 
basic terms, conditions and price agreements of the contact.65 The dispute 
became increasingly bitter and in June 1977 Japan intimated that i t would 
stop buying Australian sugar unless certain concessions were offered. By 
August the Japanese and Australian Federal governments' had become 
embroiled in the argument.66 Eventually, however, a compromise was 
reached wherein the Japanese agreed to take the 1.8 million tonnes of sugar 
remaining to be shipped under the original contract, but over four years 
instead of three and at a slightly lower price. According to the Queensland 
Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen, all things considered the settlement 
represented a sensible compromise. The industry had been given a reprieve. 
It was, however, another reminder of just how vulnerable the Australian 
sugar industry was to international influences and yet another instance of 
expansion plans going awry. 
Canegrowers enjoyed another reprieve in February 1976 when the 
superphosphate bounty, which had been abolished by the Labor government 
in 1974,67 ,^Yas reinstated. It was however, only to remain in force until 30 
June 1977.6S While the bounty's reintroduction was welcomed, as the year 
continued i t became increasingly obvious that farmers' incomes were being 
substantially reduced. The 1975/6 season had not been a good one and 
inflation was adding considerably to the costs of wages, farm chemicals, 
plant and equiprnent.69 To add to these problems, in 1976 cane growers were 
also faced Vv'ith the prospect of having to pay significantly higher charges 
in order to have their crops harvested by contractors. Subjected to the same 
inflationary pressures as everyone else, harvesting contractors were forced 
to increase their charges by 20% to cover the increased costs of harvesting 
machines (25%), diesel fuel (28%), tyres (15%), and batteries {8%)!^ 
65 i;}fli>Vo1273,1977,p.178 
66 i;!fy>V*1275, 1977,p.1210 
67 Bt/i^-iif^y ^ If OTW/7,. 16 / 2 /76. 
68 AiJ^'^^}i^fxnJMij}P^\''mv;^M2n^ 
69 Queensland Can«grower's Association, S9fh Mnu^JP^port, V^ll, p.6 (Hereafter 
OCA) 
"^ 0 Sm^'jd^fy.^\v':y,niil 1 /4 /76 
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in an attempt to regain some parity Vv'ith costs, one solution was to seek an 
increase in the domestic price of sugar, and this was done following the 
Queensland Cane Growers Annual Conference in March 1976.'^ i The price rise 
proposed by the cane growers was between M and 5(1; per kilogram, a rise of 
approximately 20%. They presented evidence to show that the domestic 
price of sugar had risen by only 8% since 1967, while the consumer price 
index for food products generally had risen by 70%."^ The proposal, 
however, was not well received by the public, the media, and long-time 
prices watch-dog, V'ilma Ward, all of whom expressed 'shock' at the size of 
the claimed rise.^^ jhe Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations 
(AFCO) also added its weight to this opposition by urging the Federal 
government to reject the sugar industry's application because, claimed the 
Chairman of AFCO, Ovv'en Sperling,: 
Sugar Is one of the most protected and government assisted 
industries in Australia.74 
What Sperling failed to articulate, however, was the fact that these same 
protective and regulatory mechanisms also effectively divorced the cane 
growers from any control of the price setting process, and left them highly 
vulnerable to wild price fluctuations. Furthermore, the sugar industry has 
received relatively l i t t le financial assistance over the years. Far from 
being a gift, as Implied by Sperling, an Increase In the domestic sugar price 
(apart from being long overdue) could only be viewed as being a temporary, 
'band-aid" measure in the context of the cane growers' existing financial 
difficulties. 
The Queensland government supported the industry's application for a rise of 
4(t per kilogram, an increase of 16%, but the Federal cabinet split on this 
issue. Primary Industries Minister Ian Sinclair held urgent talks with his 
Queensland counterpart, Sullivan, and with Sir Joseph McAvoy, chairman of 
^1 BrndiSj^y^w^yfijil S/3/76 
^2 £3MTjXii^yj4^ii'yyjjj/7, 19/5 /7& 
Smi^ii^SmJA/zn^ 73 
"^ 4 Bm^jb^fy A^ ii-yw ml 17 / 5 /76 
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the Austral ian Canegrowers AssQciatiQn.75 borne six months after the 
application was filed the Federal government finally agreed to an increase 
of 3(t (12%). 
By the end of 1976 there were clear signs of a tightening cost/price 
squeeze on incomes which required increasingly complex financial 
decisions. Some growers were not equipped to deal with such problems and 
they began to leave the Industry. In the period 1969 to 1977 the number of 
growers in the Bundaberg district dropped from approximately 1,200 to less 
than 1,000.'76 AS shown in Figure 4.5'?'' belovv', this downward trend was to 
be an ongoing one as more and more growers were either forced out of the 
industry altogether or they began to diversify Into other agricultural 
products such as tomatoes and zucchinis. Many more grovv'ers vv'ere to take 
this course of action in the first half of the 1980s when the sugar industry 
found itself in an even more critical condition. 
Despite these problems the period included two or three very good years for 
the Bundaberg district. In terms of the dollar value of sugar produced, the 
high rate of inflation during the period makes accurate analysis difficult, 
but, some general observations can be made. Table 4.6 shows the value of 
sugar production in the Bundaberg district in the years from 1970 to 1977. 
'^ 5 Com'^'f^tsjl 28/7/76. 
^6 Canegrowers^ Statistits generated by Caneigrovers computerised data barik. 
^^ Compiled and gen*rat*d by Canegrovers - Bundaberg District, Statistics. 
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Table 4 6: Dol lar value of Bundaberg sugar 1Q70 to 197778 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Value of product 
$28,897,532 
$33,957,486 
$44,512,865 
$46,623,294 
$93,590,400 
$83,709,359 
$96,710,084 
$78,199,859 
% Inc. or Dec 
17% Inc. 
31% Inc. 
4% Inc. 
100% Inc. 
10% Dec. 
16% Inc. 
19% Dec. 
The table indicates that in the 1970 the value of sugar produced in 
Bundaberg's five mills Vv'as $28,897,532. There was a steady increase until 
1974 when there was a huge leap from $46,623,294 in 1973 to 
$93,590,400 in 1974 resulting from the exceptionally high LDP which at 
one point reached $650 sterling. In Australia this meant that the price paid 
to growers almost doubled from $130 per tonne to $252 per tonne.'^ ^ jhe 
value of production dropped by around 10% in the following year because of 
declining world prices and a reduction in the size of the crop as the result 
of too much rain.80 Overall, the value of sugar production in the Bundaberg 
district increased by more than three times during the seven years from 
1970 to 1976. As stated, however, there were signs that the upward profit 
trend would not continue and they were reflected In the decrease of 19% in 
1977. This drop was attributed to another fall in the world market price 
when the average LDP was a mere £115 sterling. 
^ Canegrovers, Secretary "s and Chairman's Annual Reports, (varioius dates:). Files K&s. 1 
^.2 
Canegrovers^ Statistics. 
PfV^A'^-^-'P^\--^h-:. (Feb 1976), p.2 
Ji 
80 
There were also indications that despite the fact that Bundaberg growers 
were continually increasing their levels of production, they were 
discernably falling behind their counterparts in other districts. Figure 4.7^^ 
below Illustrates tonnages per grower for Bundaberg and Queensland, 1969 
to 1977. Bundaberg growers consistently produced less cane than the state 
average, but the real concern is the regression line which suggests a trend 
wherein, with each passing year the gap widens. 
Of even greater and more immediate concern to the cane growers was the 
increasing level of production costs. In the years up to 1973 about 50% of 
the money growers received was spent on production and about 50% 
represented gross profit. In the excellent year of 1974 production costs 
accounted for only a l i t t le over 25%, but from that year onwards production 
costs consumed an increasing portion of the grov/ers income, as 
demonstrated by Figure 4.8.^ 2 
The years from 1970 to 1977 sav-/ 'the best of times, the v^orst of times'. 
The value of sugar production rose steadily until the dramatic increase of 
1974 when the price virtually doubled. The euphoria that accompanied this 
rise did not last, however, tempered as It was by the pollferatlon of Fiji 
disease and less than twelve month later by a fall in the world price. 
Meanwhile, encouraged by increased productivity, an apparent sugar shortage 
and the high prices of 1974, the government decided on yet another 
expansion In 1975 and again they misread the nature of the market. By 
1977 cane growers were facing serious financial problems and as 
speakers at that year's Queensland Cane Growers' Association Annual 
Conference compared the rapid escalation of production costs with the 
diminishing returns from sugar they concluded that a recession within the 
sugar industry was highly probable.^* 
^' Compiled and generated by Canegrowers - Bundaberg Dis:thct, s-tatistiics 
^2 Compiled and generated by Canegrowers - Bundaberg District, S-tati5ti<:S 
S3 ^iTi^y^l 37,(1978), p.243 
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Chapters IRRIGATION 
Shortly after the introduction of sugar cane grov/ing in the Bundaberg 
district it became apparent that somie form of irrigation would be needed if 
the industry v/as to develop successfully. Various irrigation efforts were 
introduced over the years leading up to 1945, but, it is the Bundaberg-isis 
Irrigation Scheme that is the focus of this chapter. In Queensland, the 
primary responsibility for assessment and allocation of available water 
resources lies vvith the Commissioner for Irrigation and Vv'ater Supply under 
the direction of the Minister for Water Resources. The vv'ork of the 
Irrigation and Water Supply Commission is governed by a number of statutes 
including The Water Resources Administration Act which provides for the 
basic assessment of the State's surface and groundwater supplies, for the 
development of plans for the utilisation of such supplies and for the 
necessary construction works. The V/ater Act sets out the principle of 
Crovv'n ownership of water supplies and provides for a system of licensing. 
The other major Act is the Irrigation Act under vvtilch the Bundaberg-lsis 
Irrigation Scheme was established.^ After the initial grant of $8.3 million 
State funding for the scheme had to be derived from consolidated revenue. 
Irrigation and Water Supply Commission loans or the occasional special 
grant. 
As well as State funding, the project has also been the recipient of grants 
from the Federal government.; these funding arrangements, however, have 
been a major source of contention betv/een the governments, and between 
the governments and the local community. The reasons for this contention 
will be discussed in the final portion of this chapter, vv'hen the water 
conservation and irrigation policies of the State and Federal governments 
are examined. This is preceded by a brief overview of the district's climate 
from 1945 onwards, and a discussion of the origins and early developmental 
stages of the Bundaberg-lsis Irrigation Scheme. 
V/aler Research Foundation of Australia, ¥if>?vPiijkmfw-offt}^PL9y}^f^Pi?^m / i ¥ 7 
fo ?9.^lj.'i.dPoi/^'id, (Bundaberg, 1985) p.23 
Map 5.1: Bundaberg Irrigation Area 
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The average annual precipi tat ion in the Bundaberg-lsis region is about 1000 
mm (between 1118 mm in the eastern sector in and around Bundaberg and 
965 mm in the western sector which extends to the Munduberra area). It is 
characterised by a high annual variability with frequent occurrences of tv/o 
or more successive years below average. Relatively poor distribution during 
the growing season resulting in moisture deficiencies further impedes sugar 
cane growing and for most growers, prior to the introduction of irrigation, 
significant crop losses due to insufficient rainfall became an accepted part 
of the industry.2 
From 1950 to 1956 weather conditions in the Bundaberg area were almost 
perfect for cane growing and easily the best of the century, to that time, 
averaging a l i t t le over 1370 rnrn per annum, but, in 1957 drought struck 
when only 580 mm of rain fell.3 The years 1958 and 1959 were favourable, 
but, during most of the 1960s the climate proved to be a source of constant 
concern for cane growers. In 1961 the si.ze of the harvest vv'as reduced by 
conditions that vv'ere much colder and drier than usual, although the effect 
on the crop State-wide was by no means uniform. In the Cairns area, for 
example, Babinda had a record crush while the Hambledon crush that year 
was its lowest tonnage since 1956. 
Closer to home at Childers K. Livingston, general manager of the Isis Central 
Mill, reported that in his mill district the prospects for the season were 
far from encouraging as the the crop had been seriously affected first by the 
dry and later by frost.^ When the harvest ended the amount of cane cut had 
not reached the mill peak of 39,5000 tons (40,290 tonnes)^ and in areas 
such as Booyal (between Childers and Gin Gin), the situation had been so 
bad that no cane-cutters were engaged during the season as there was 
litt le cane to cut.^ The situation in Bundaberg was very similar. Adverse 
vv'eather conditions resulted in a reduced drop which again was reflected in 
2 Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Bundab r^^  Irrigation Schema, Queensland, 
£ooflMmvjr'yj^'Ro:?o^v^£i^\''oA>p/fwnt,^(! Z (Canberra, Australian Goverriimerit 
Publishing Service, 1975), p.3 (Here-sfter BAE) 
5 Ibid, p.96 
* Pm^i^^^Mnv),-n}ji/.. 30/6/61 
^ 4ir}^ Vol 21,(1962),p.45 
^ £5iMyO*!?.'V i^rOT!u//, 29/6./61 
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the smaller number of cane cutters who were engaged.7 The drought 
conditions, which persisted throughout the year, resulted in a resurgence of 
calls for the installation of wide ranging irrigation facilities in the 
Bundaberg district. The calls finally began to bear fruit towards the end of 
the 1960s, but more of that later. 
Conditions improved briefly for the 1962 season which turned out to be a 
good one for the Australian sugar industry, when the size of the crop broke 
all existing records and was estimated to have yielded 1,850,000 tons 
(1,887,000 tonnes) of sugar. During 1963, hovv'ever, the weather again 
turned against the cane growers, in Bundaberg for example, rainfall for the 
month of June was well belovv' the average v/ith only 34.29 mm being 
recorded, which was more than 25 mm belov-/ normal.s That, hovv'ever, was 
not the worst of it. As the month of July progressed, the district Vv'as hit by 
frosts. Initially very l i tt le damage to the sugar crops was reported 
because many growers in the affected areas had been planting cane 
varieties vv'hich were relatively resistant to frost, but those who had not 
were quite badly hit. The variety vv'hich suffered most damage was Q71 
which was killed from the tip to ground level, with Q61 being the second 
most seriously affected.^ 
The frosty weather continued and significant cane losses began to be 
recorded. By the end of the season Millaquin, Fairymead and Gin Gin all 
reported that they have failed to reach the preseason estimates for the 
crush. Qunaba, on the other hand, went close to equalling its 1962 record of 
174,919 tons (178,417 tonnes) of cane. While crushing rates were dovv'n on 
previous years, it is worth noting that all the mills had, nevertheless, 
either reached their peaks or were approaching thern.^ o 
The following two seasons were 'normal', but in 1965/6 drought conditions 
again prevailed. Conditions were so bad that increased drought relief 
assistance was granted to graziers, dairy farmers and canegrowers early in 
^ Si^^db^^yM?b--j-mjil 10-17/6./61 
8 Sm^i}^r^Jif^\v-j'n}jil ^Jl/Gl 
* PiMiitwyM'h'^-mjil 9/7/63 
' 0 a«jOAJ.' V .^ I. -iMJj;;-^  7/11 /63 
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January 1966. In the case of canefarrners, they were given up to £500 for 
planting material and fertiliser and £500 for sustenance and if necessary a 
further £500 would be made available to assist with the purchase of 
planting material fori967.^1 The extent of the drought is best illustrated by 
the 1965 crushing figures when the Bundaberg district crush was 1 million 
tonnes of cane short of the aggregate of mill peaks. That meant a loss of 
sugar revenue totalling £6,000,000 ($12,000,000). Furthermore, the 
prospects for the 1966 crush were also grim, unless the grovv'ing cane had 
the benefit of some rain.12 
The year 1969 proved to be yet another when dry conditions caused problems 
for the Bundaberg sugar industry but the next serious drought began in 1976. 
As a dry spell turned into a drought the v/hole issue of vv-ater supply became 
the source of great concern, and not only to cane farmers. Heavy pumping 
from the Bundaberg artesian basin from about September the year before 
depleted the district's underground water reserves and resulted in increased 
salt intrusion especially in coastal areas.1* The rapid decline in water 
levels also caused problems for the district's dairy farmers vv'ho began to 
experience serious supplementary feed shortages resulting in cattle 
deaths.'-^ 
By the end of October 1977 the drought was being reported as the vv/orst in 
thirty years.^^ Eventually the entire period from 1976 to 1983 proved to be 
one of prolonged drought. While there were some falls of rain during that 
time they were not of sufficient quantity or duration to be considered either 
as drought-breaking or a 'proper' wet season. For example, thunderstorms in 
mid January 1978 gave Bundaberg and the surrounding regions their first 
rain in months,^^ but vv'hile the falls continued for the rest of the month it 
was nowhere near enough to render the area drought-free. Again in 1979 
M Bm^^fyM?\v'jf}r}il9f\ /66 
t^ ABC Anderson, Th^ hfjtory ofifri^fron JH iWy SmJijifA'y J/VU, (Brisbane, 
Straftd PublisMng, 1978), p J15 
^^ EH Churchward, Press Release for Bundaberg and Dis"triot Irrig-ation Commi-ttee, 
Correspondence File Wo 4^ 9/3/78 CH«reaft*r B&DIC) 
^ * S^GjA^y /i^ i,.y}7 u/l 29 /9 /77 
'^ Pinii£t^/y/^\v^-f}Tjil 20/10/77 
^ fi S^ntfj^/y M? irbw nil 14/1 /78 
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Vv'hile the northern part of the State 'vvas being inundated by Cyclone Peter 
the south remained virtually dry.i"? By the beginning of 1980 the Bundaberg-
lsis sugar industry was estimated to have incurred losses of at least $14 
million because the harvests had failed to meet mill peaks. 
Throughout 1981 and 1982 there were intermittent periods of heavy rain 
'vvhich brought a measure of relief to cane farmers, but the domestic water 
supply continued to be a serious concern for the various local government 
councils and restrictions were imposed on rriany occasions. At coastal 
hamlets like Bargara, which depended on bores, 'vvater quality became 
increasingly poor. Further, the many growers without access to irrigation 
water had a very poor year and by year's end major drought relief 
assistance •v'v'as being directed into the district, stock losses were serious 
and many cane farmers were suffering significant hardship. Even those on 
irrigation suffered after November when the Queensland Water Resources 
Commission was forced to impose quotas which limited farmers to half 
their normal summer surface -vvater usage in each thirty day period. 
The drought was finally broken in April 1983 when, as if to mock the 
farmers, there was a deluge. Across the State flooded roads created havoc, 
leaving tourists stranded and halting the flovy of supplies. Pastoralists lost 
thousands of head of stock and cane growers could do nothing but "v'v'atch as 
their properties were inundated. By the end of June Bundaberg had received 
98% of its average annual rainfall,!^ but ironically vv'hen the rain stopped 
residents found that the longstanding water restrictions sti l l had to be 
maintained. This short examination of the region's climate clearly indicates 
that irrigation was essential to the sugar industry in the Wide Bay area. 
Irrigation from extensive ground'vYater reserves had commenced in the early 
1900s, but as the result of rapid expansion in the 1950s and 1960s, by 1969 
the aquifer was in danger of depletion. Local efforts in sinking bores had 
significantly expanded the area of cane irrigated by groundwater from 7300 
hectares in 1961 to around 20,000 hectares in 1972.^ ^ V '^ater for the 
balance of irrigated areas in the region was obtained largely by private 
*7 BUf-i^i&Ofy m\v'jfl\iH 1 3 - 1 7 / 1 /79 
*9 Bj>Tfii^y M? ii ••i,yjTJi/, 2 / 7 /83 
19 BAE, Op Cit , p.4 
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pumping from the Kolan and Burnett Rivers. In the areas •v'-/here adequate 
supplies of Vvater were not available, primarily the Isis, Gin Gin and Bingera 
Mill areas, cane yields were dependent on natural precipitation. 
The region covered by the irrigation scheme also includes the Isis distr ict 
where, despite extensive investigations, underground water storages of 
sufficient quantity to allow irrigation had not been discovered.20 Like 
Bundaberg, the Isis was prone to regular periods of drought and v^ithout 
underground vvfater resources, many felt that an irrigation scheme was 
crucial to the continuation of cane growing in the region. It was, however, 
to take considerable effort on the part of the local communities of the isis 
and Bundaberg to ensure that an irrigation scheme was established and at 
the centre of lobbying activities was the Bundaberg and District Irrigation 
Committee. 
The Bundaberg and District Irrigation Committee had its origin in 1946; this 
v-/as a disastrous year for canegrowers in the region because of drought 
•when a mere 580 mm of rain vv'as recorded21 On 1 July a public meeting was 
held in the City Council Chambers. It was presided over by the Mayor, 
Alderman F. H. Buss, and attended by about 200 people. Its purpose was to 
establish the Bundaberg and District Irrigation Committee which would 
lobby the government for the construction of a major irrigation scheme.22 
The prime-mover of the committee vv'as A. B. C. (Ben) Anderson but the man 
elected to chair i t Init ial ly was Lawrence Scotney. Scotney was a 
canegrower and a long serving member of the Bundaberg Cane Grovv'ers 
Executive Committee and he remained as chairman until his accidental death 
In 1959, after VY'hich Anderson took over the reins of leadership for the next 
seventeen years. 
The committee's f i rs t action was to prepare a submission proposing the 
impounding of 60,000 acre feet (74 million cubic metres) of water in the 
three local rivers, the Kolan, the Burnett and the Elliot. The submission was 
duly presented to the State government whose reply was negative because 
Ol 0 Ibid, p. 173 
21 ABC Ariderson, Op Cit, p.S5 
22 lbid,p.91 
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there were no funds available.23 Despite this early setback the Committee 
continued to function and it '^ 'ent on to become an important conduit 
between the local community and the State and Federal governments in the 
eventual development of the Bundaberg-lsis Irrigation Scheme. 
Talks between the Bundaberg and District Irrigation Committee and the 
Irrigation Commission continued throughout 1960 and 1961, during which 
time various proposals were submitted and rejected, again, usually on the 
grounds of insufficient funds. After the expansion of the sugar industry 
following the Gibbs Committee of Inquiry in 1963 the need for irrigation 
became even more critical. The Irrigation Committee was forced to step-up 
its lobbying campaign when it became apparent that the rapid expansion so 
intensified the use of underground water that the safe annual yield of 
aquifers, estimated to be 55,500 megalitres per annum, was being regularly 
exceeded.24 
Starting in 1965 and continuing into 1966 a series of investigations to 
determine the feasibility of surface and groundwater conservation to 
provide adequate supplies for Irrigation, was undertaken jointly by the 
Irrigation and Water Supply Commission and the Queensland Department of 
Primary industries. Much rnodifed, their resultant report was later to form 
the basis of the proposed Bundaberg-lsis Irrigation Scheme.25 
While the final report was not published until 1967 some aspects of its 
proposals for the Lo'vver Burnett region were revealed to the local 
community as early as April 1966. At a meeting of the Bundaberg Mercantile 
Association the Commissioner for Irrigation and Water Supply, F. B. Haigh, 
announced that the proposed scheme vv'as divided into two sections. The 
first section. Stage 1, of the plan involved the construction of reservoirs, 
channel systems and a single dam on the Kolan River about seven kilometres 
upstream from the Monduran Station. It was expected to cost approximately 
^ Ibid, pp.82-4 
** BAE, Op Cit, p4 
29 BAE, Op Cit, p4 
$19 million and Stage 2, the southern section covering the isis district, 
considerably more.26 
The official report by the Irrigation and V/ater Supply Commission, covering 
vvater conservation and irrigation for the Kolan/Burnett part of the plan was 
finally released by Local Governmient and Conservation Minister Richter on 4 
January 1967. The release of the plan, however, did not mean that the 
government vv'as about to begin construction of the project. Instead, It 
commissioned a further series of investigations. These studies were 
designed to demionstrate the technical and economic feasibility of a scheme 
to provide vv-ater storage from two major dam storages, one each on the 
Kolan and Burnett Rivers, instead of the single dam on the Kolan River as 
proposed in the earlier report. The two dams -would be supplemented by 
several barrages and weirs on the two rivers and the use of aquifers. The 
findings of these investigations were published in a report dated March 
1969.27 
As stated above, the year 1969 proved to be one during which drought caused 
problems for the Bundaberg sugar industry; so the long awaited report was 
of great interest to the community. While it completely superseded the 
proposals submitted in 1966-7 it was similar in many respects. Again it 
was divided into t'vvo stages and like the earlier proposal the major 
components of Stage 1 involved conservation projects on the Kolan and 
Burnett Rivers. On the Kolan a dam, which subsequently became known as 
the Monduran Dam, was to be constructed together with a 'vveir at Bucca and 
a tidal barrage further downstream. The estimated cost of the revised plan 
for Stage 1 of the scheme vvas $47 million,28 and it was expected to take 
around t'welve years to complete.29 The Burnett River works included 
construction of the Kalliwa dam, a weir at Gayndah and a tidal barrage at 
Bundaberg. Additional "vvorks such a pumping stations, diversion and 
reticulation channels also formed part of the plan. 
26 SLV}JU3or^ .^ u ••:?.--i\ji7, 10 /5 /66 
27 BAE, Op Cit, p 4 
2« i?iA?Mj-/jjf>yPjr/u/}W}fj/y /Wi jA ' j ' , Vol 254, (1970/71), p.90 (Hereafter i)f^ 
29 ABC Anderson, Op Cit, pJ 43 
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The State government approved the plan in principle in April 1969, and a 
short time later placed the init ial development phase of the project on its 
'vvorks programme. This move was backed by the approval of an allocation of 
$8.3 million to build tidal barrages and other major Irrigation works to 
serve the Gooburrum and V /^oongarra areas. It was also to cover the 
completion of the Avondale barrage on the Kolan River, the Burnett River 
barrage upstream of Bundaberg City, and the reticulation system of the 
Fairymead, Millaquin and Qunaba areas.^o The State government also sent 
copies of the report to the Prime Minister together with a request for 
financial assistance. In February 1970, the Federal governmient agreed to 
provide $12.8 million to the Queensland State government as a non-
repayable grant for the construction of the Monduran Dam and its associated 
works.31 it was made available by the enactment of the Queensland Grant 
(Bundaberg Irrigation Works) 1970 and -was the f i rst grant to be made 
under The National Water Resources Development Programme, an initiative 
of the Gorton government of 1969.^2 The purpose of the programme 'was to 
make $100 million available to the States over a five year period for rural 
water conservation and flood mitigation Vv'orks. The funds provided by the 
programme were to be in addition to those provided by the States 
At last progress was being made, but even as most people in the region were 
applauding the approval of funding for the project, there were some 
murmurings of dissent. In May 1971 a group calling itself the Bundaberg 
Water Rights Association was formed v-/ith the express purpose of 
protecting the interests of farmers in the Kalkie and Barolin areas. Very 
quickly the Association boasted a membership of more than f i f ty farmers 
representing about 2500 acres of assigned cane land. The Association did 
not oppose the scheme per se; indeed i t fel t that for the industry in general, 
regional irrigation was essential. It did, however, object to the requirement 
that all growers in the distr ict must be a party to it. The Association 
argued that since the area in which i ts members farmed had a very reliable 
source of underground vv'ater, they should not be forced to take surface 
water from the irrigation scheme. The group claimed that they did not need 
30 ABC Anderson, Op Cit, p. 151 
^ i?P<^,''f^] 254,0970-1V}, p.90 
^ CA-^vf}<?.'} iv-^m Pj.'-iiinh?.'itj.*y £i^jf^:r, V*l H of R 6 b, (1969 /70) , p .482 CHer^ a ft*r LWO 
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the water, they did not want it, and that the transition from underground 
water to surface water supplies would be a very expensive exercise for 
individual farmers.^^ 
The Association had a series of meetings with Commissioner Haigh to 
discuss its claims but while he was prepared to negotiate with individual 
farmers, essentially, Haigh held the view that if the scheme was to be 
effective and efficient then all farmers would have to participate. This did 
not satisfy the Association and it continued to agitate, albeit 
unsuccessfully, for their cause. 
Work on the Bundaberg-lsis Irrigation Scheme finally commenced in 1970. 
The scheme's construction started with "a dramatic explosion" at a 
ceremony that was attended by some 500 guests and officials, including 
Minister for National Development Swartz, Commissioner Haigh, State 
Minister for Conservation He'witt, and Ben Anderson.^ '^  After the initial 
injection of funds, however, both the State and Commonwealth governments 
seemed reluctant to contribute further monies for the project and it became 
a constant struggle to maintain progress. Despite the funding problems, 
hovv'ever, vv'ork did proceed. The Monduran Dam, built 'within what was the 
area of Monduran Station taken up by the Landsborough brothers in 1848, 
took three years to construct and a further two years to f 111.^ 5 in April 1979 
it was re-narned the Fred Haigh Darn to commemorate the leading role played 
by the late Fred Haigh, Queendsland's longest serving irrigation and Water 
Supply Commissioner.^ V^hile everyone in the district acknowledged the 
contribution made by Haigh the decision to change the dam's name was not 
popular and locally it continues to be known as the Monduran Dam . 
Grants made under the terms of the National Vvater Resources Development 
Programme -were avv'arded as the result of recommendations submitted by 
State governments, apparently with l i t t le investigation being conducted by 
the Cornmonv'/ealth. With the change of government in 1972 there came a 
55 SundiffAfyM^h-^ftwl 16/9/71 
3« StJ»J^ofyM>\v'J^1^il^5/^ 1 /71 
3S ABC Anderson, Op Cit, pJ68 
86 ai«dO^.'V.4S?irOT?A'/,20/4/79 
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change in policy regarding rural vv'ater development proposals such as the 
Bundaberg-lsis irrigation Scheme. The National Water Resources 
Development Programme was suspended-"^  and before any further financial 
assistance could be given such schemes as Monduran were to be subjected to 
close evaluation, it was subsequently agreed, in September 1973, that the 
Department of Northern Development would co-ordinate the Australian 
government studies of such proposals and that the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics vv'ould report on the agricultural economic aspects of the 
project.^s 
The resultant report on the Bundaberg scheme found that because of 
unforeseen construction problems, shortfalls In cost estimates and the 
ravages of inflation, the cost of the works being, financed by the 
Commonvyealth government -would considerably exceed the funds made 
available by the 1970 Act and it recommended continued support by both the 
Common'vYealth and State governments to expedite work on the project, in 
order to allow further funds to be committed by the Common-wealth, the 
Queensland Grant (Bundaberg Irrigation Vv'orks) Bill 1974 'was presented by 
Dr. Patterson ,Minister for Northern Development, in October 1974. This 
provided an additional allocation of $4.4 to the Queensland government 
tovv'ards the cost of completing specified works in Stage 1 of the scheme.^ ? 
When the funds from this and earlier Federal and State grants had been 
expended it became the sole responsibility of the Queensland government to 
provide ongoing finance for the project. 
By the end of June 1977 it vv'as evident that progress on the Scheme was 
slowing do'vvn. Despite the combined State and Federal expenditure of 
around $31 million, sti l l only 60% of Stage 1 was completed six years 
after-work had commenced. The two barrages were operational, as was the 
Gooburrum distribution system, even though it was not fully completed 
according to the original plans, but the Woongarra distribution system was 
unstarted. Cornmonvv'ealth government funds had enabled the completion of 
the Monduran Dam, however, the main pumping station was sti l l only partly 
87 i7Pii> v^i 271, Cl976/7), p480 
* BAE, Op Cit, p.(iii) 
*9 €P[>, Vol H & R 91 , (1974), p .2509 
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constructed, and the connecting channel from the dam to the Burnett River 
was usable only as far as Gin Gin Creek.'^ o Additional funding was required 
to finalise the works included in Stage 1, while Stage 2 - the Isis, Bingera 
and Gin Gin sections - had yet to be started, and there was no indication 
sYhatsoever when that funding for might become available. The great irony 
for many local farmers was that despite the huge expenditure of money, the 
water impounded in the Monduran Dam and the Burnett River Barrage was 
sti l l inaccessible. Some farms had, by 1976, been connected to the 
irrigation scheme but until a considerably larger portion of the irrigation 
'vvorks were completed the majority of farms were beyond its reach. Until 
farmers could use the water provided by the Scheme they could not be 
charged for it. This meant that l i t t le water revenue vv'as being generated by 
the installations, further impeding the government's ability to provide the 
finance necessary to complete the project. 
Frustration caused by the slowing of progress lead to many bitter debates in 
the State and Federal parliaments, and -while vv'ork on various parts of the 
scheme progressed, by 1977 it had become a major political football. 
Unfortunately, as the politicians kicked it around the money supply began to 
dry up and so did Bundaberg. As stated above, a dry spell that began in 1976 
had become a drought in 1977, and the problems it caused were exacerbated 
by a do'wnturn in the world sugar price, seriously affecting the region's 
economy which 'was almost entirely dependent on sugar. Job opportunities 
were eroded and unemployment rates rose as businesses throughout the 
region began to reduce their labour forces. 
A conservative government was reelected in 1977 and in the following year 
the Cornmonvv'ealth announced plans to implement a ne'w five year national 
water resources programme, to which it would contribute $200 million.'^' 
Bundaberg held high hopes for a significant funding boost as a result of this 
initiative, but the funding allocation in the subsequent Federal budget was 
•^Q Bundaberg an^ District Irrigation Ccn-imittee, iivMJ&v^?/: to m^ S.^^3f^ Standing 
VofVmiftt^ on /^^fim3/Pt?j^i9VA% ffi?: 7?}^ Vo^y}}<?/}\i-^j7i^ > AIJ.4» M tA^ .-^ A.vj»7J.:»/?.fi.. 
Pl3nnii747J/fd£'^\-vk->pnjMtofAiA-trj/ij':? yjtAi-Pojo^nv:?.. (Bundaberg^ Gibion and 
Hov/es Pty Ltd, 1977) 
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disappointing and despite many overtures and much letter writing neither 
the Bundaberg and District Irrigation Committee nor the Queensland 
government could elicit any further commitment of funds from the 
Commonwealth. The Minister for National Development did, hovv'ever, offer 
one solution to the funding problem. He suggested the implementation of the 
"user pays" principle wherein the farmers using the water supplied by the 
scheme would meet a substantially higher portion of the capital costs. This 
suggestion vvas immediately rejected on the grounds that the Bundaberg 
scheme had originally been founded on the basis of straight-out government 
funding;'*2 in any case, growers in the area felt that they were already 
contributing a fair share of the costs, paying as they did for the operational 
costs of the Irrigation scheme plus \% per annum of capital spent on the 
schemie.'^ * 
And so the battle for funding for the Bundaberg-lsis Irrigation Scheme 
raged. Between 1977 and 1980 a further $24.4 million was devoted to the 
project, bringing total expenditure to $55.4 million, with $33.3 million 
being derived from the State and $22.1 million from the Cornmonvv'ealth.'^ '^  
Ten years and $55.4 million after the project had commenced, however, 
the scheme was sti l l only about half complete, and the region -was in the 
grip of a drought. 
As the 1980s commenced drought was not the only problem plaguing the 
Bundaberg and isis districts. Reduced harvests and declining world sugar 
prices -were eroding cane grovv'ers incomes and this in turn vv'as flowing onto 
the local communities -where unemployment vv'as beginning to cause 
significant difficulties. The Queensland State budget for 1980/81 
allocated $2.5 million to the Bundaberg-lsis Irrigation Scheme but because 
of the effects of inflation it -was not considered to be enough to ensure 
that -workers already engaged on various parts of the project would be 
retained, indeed, only a week before the budget announcement, nine men had 
been retrenched and at a time of high unemployment the possibility of 
4^ EHChurchwarjj. Letter toC. Millar. MHR Vide 9ay,Bli.DIC Correspondence File No4, 
3:0/11/78 
*3 Bmd-iii^n; /%> h •^•?u;r; 15 /8 /78 
^ C Cspftpbellj Cane^rov/ers Executive Secretary, Memc tc E H Church-'.v'ard, 8/1 /80 
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another thirty to forty men joining the dole queue v/as unthinkable.'^ s Such 
•was the level of discontent and uproar folio-wing the budget that a fevv' days 
later the Minister for Works and Housing advised that the government had 
decided to release a further $1 million for the project to maintain its 
workers job security, at least during the following year.46 Unemployment 
rates continued their upward climb through 1981 and 1982 when even 
apprentices were in danger of having their indentures cancelled as 
companies like the Bundaberg Foundry sought to 'rationalise' their 
operations. Numerous other businesses ranging from light industry to 
vehicle dealerships also retrenched staff.'^ '^  it looked as though the sugar 
industry bubble had well and truly burst in 1982. 
For Bundaberg the acquisition of finance to accel&rate the irrigation 
scheme's progress vv'as becomiing critical in 1983, as much for the jobs it 
would create as for the water it would supply. One of the advantages of 
funding the project -was the possibility of employing a further 460 people. 
At that time it v/as estimated that more than 2,500 people out of a 
population of around 48,000 -were receiving unemployment benefits as 
everywhere businesses continued to contract their operations.'*^ Obtaining 
such finance, however, continued to be a difficult as it had always been. 
Even when funds -were made available questions about the their adequacy 
continued to be a major issue for the Bundaberg-lsis district. As part of 
the 1980/81 Federal budget an amount of $29.4 million was allocated to 
the National V/ater Resources Programme and it was hoped that a 
substantial part of i t would be directed to the Bundaberg project. When the 
allocations -were made, hov^ever, Bundaberg received only $2.5 million.'*^ 
The total State and Federal allocations of $6 million was sufficient to keep 
the project moving but not to accelerate its progress in any vi^ ay. According 
to the the Bundaberg District Canegrowers Executive the entire district Vv'as 
suffering economically because of the "grossly inadequate" rate of funding. 
"^5 Sii-7d(iSi^y M?ii-'^-nui7, 5 0 / S / 8 0 
^ £5tyjj(jAA'y .-^ II-'J:<J J J / / 2 / 9 /SO 
^^ £5i™Cj^^y..^i.- ' j5'j j. j. ' / 1 4 / 1 / 8 3 
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Crops were sti l l being affected by poor v/ater supplies and rniils -were not 
reaching their peaks, it was the contention of the Executive that sufficient 
finance was not being returned to the district in spite of the fact that 
government's excise and sales tax revenue from the Millaquin Distillery 
alone was around $28 million a year.^ o 
The situation within the Federal sphere was similar. With an election due at 
the end of October politicians from all parties, once again, began to make 
promises regarding the irrigation scheme. During the weeks leading up to 
the election Bundaberg was visited by a host of politicians and a tew days 
before it the government approved a funding plan for completing the scheme 
In time for the bicentenary. In It the Cornmon'vvealth agreed to provide $4 
million a year if the Queensland government 'would contribute $6 million a 
year.51 Vv'ith the apparent fate of the schemie hanging on the State's reponse 
to the Federal plan, the district waited anxiously for a decision. After 
much debate and many meetings bet'ween the State and Federal ministers the 
local community was greeted with the following headline in the Bundaherg 
Newsman dated 30 October 1980: 
JOH PLEDGES COALITION ON WATER FUNDS 
Upon closer inspection, ho'wever, the Premier -was not promising to provide 
the $6 million asked for by the plan, only that his government would 
continue to maintain the annual commitment of $5.6 million that it had made 
over the previous five years. Work on the scheme continued as before but by 
the middle of 1981 there vyas sti l l no ratification of the Federal 
government's 40-60 funding plan. The stumbling block was the State which 
was seeking a continuation of the existing 50-50 agreement.52 
Negotiations between the ministers continued until 15 September when the 
State budget was tabled in Vv'hich the Treasurer, Dr L. Edwards, confirmed 
that the State would honour the 40-60 plan. The announcement was 
^^ Canegr*v/ers - Bunda berg Ois tr i d , M inut^s, An nual R eport ,4/10 /80 (He r eafter 
Carvegrovers) 
5* B^.DICMinutes. .Correspondence Fil*No.5, 17/12/SO: iW', Vol 287,( 81 /2:i, 
p4529 
^ m> V2e7, (1981 /2), p.4529 
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particularly welcome in the Isis district where irrigation v/orks had yet to 
be commenced, but as the Bundaberg and District Irrigation Comimittee 
pointed out, unless the $10 million funding was indexed its value would be 
quickly eroded.^ ^ Worries -were also expressed about the fate of the Scheme 
after 30 June 1989 -when the 60-40 Common-wealth/State funding 
arrangement was due to expire since there 'was no certainty of funding after 
that date. 
By the beginning of 1984, ho-vvever, more than $85 million had been spent 
and most of the work designated in Stage 1 of the scheme had been finished. 
The works sti l l to be undertaken were primarily in the Upper Burnett region 
with the Gayndah Vv'eir being the most urgently required construction.54 
Citrus fruits are the main crop in that region and the prolonged drought 
leading up to 1983 had caused such serious damage to plants that many 
growers were in danger of loosing large numbers of fruit trees. The other 
major-vvater storage area sti l l avv'aiting construction v^ as the Bucca Vveir.ss 
With Stage 1 nearing completion attention was turned to Stage 2 of the 
scheme which involved the construction of Kallivv'a Dam and the extension 
of reticulation systems in the Isis District. 
Obtaining financial assistance from the Federal government for the second 
stage of the scheme -was not going to be an easy task since the ne-w Labor 
Minister for Resources and Energy, Senator Peter Walsh, was unsympathetic 
to the idea of providing finance for Irrigation.^^ The degree of Senator 
Walsh's antipathy -was given voice in the 1984/5 Budget. The project vv'as to 
receive $4 million from the $64.3 million allocation to national vv'ater 
resources as it had in previous years, but there was to be no additional 
allowance for inflation. The most significant change in the financing of 
water conservation -was Senator Walsh's proposal that from 1985 onwards 
Common-wealth assistance would only be given in the form of loans for 
53 B&DIC Minutes, Executive Report ,16/12/81 
W E H C hijrchvard, Rep«r t to Q&D IC 20 /12 /83 
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revenue producing projects rather than as grants, as had been the practice of 
the previous Liberal/National Party government.57 while the nev^  policy vv'as 
not to be implemented until 1985/6, it put a major question mark over the 
future of Stage 2 of the irrigation scheme. The community's worst fears 
were confirmed in October after a visit to the region by the Federal Minister 
for Finance John Da-wkins, when it was made clear that the Labor 
governmient would not grant any more funds to the Bundaberg-lsis irrigation 
Scheme.5° 
At the State level things were much more promising and -when the budget 
was handed down the scheme found itself to be the beneficiary of a $13 95 
million allocation. The Minister for Water Resources Goleby also Indicated 
that in the 1985/6 and 1986/7 years an additional $24.85 'would be diverted 
to the project, it was expected that the additional funds Vv'ould enable the 
Vvater Resources Commisision to call tenders early in 1985 for construction 
of the Gayndah Weir on the Burnett River and the Bucca Weir on the Kolan 
River.5'3 At the December meeting of the Bundaberg and District Irrigation 
Committee in 1985 a report was tabled -which stated that the scheme -vvas 
in fact to receive $28.45 million in addition to its usual $10 million. As a 
result of the funding i t was expected that all channel reticulation works in 
the area betv^een the Burnett and Kolan Rivers would be finished by mid 
1986 and by mid 1987 the Gayndah and Bucca Weirs would also be completed. 
Work on the isis section of the scheme was then to be accelerated and from 
1987/8 the -whole of annual fund allocations would be committed to that 
secti on.60 
This then, was the situation at the end of 1985. It was hoped that the 
project would be finished in time for Australia's Bicentenial celebrations 
but 1988 passed and the Scheme was sti l l incomplete. Stage 1 vvas fully 
operational but for Stage 2, vv'hich covered the Isis area vv'here drought had 
caused losses estimated to be around $15 million for the 1987-8 season. 
Sen P Walsh, Min Resources and En^rigy, Budget Statement, The Goverrime^fs nev 
wa-ter policy arid progran'inws, BDIC Fil* No 7 
Pt^d^d^f-g ,%?\x'-^uii 1 /10/84 
39 Bmiiit^fy t^ u •^•^}ji7, 21 /9 /84 
B&DIC Minutes, 11/12/85 m 
01 
the situation was critical. After the withdrawal of Common-wealth funding 
in 1989 additional finance was made available by the State vv'ith a total of 
$16.8 million being spent by mid 1990. In a letter to the Bundaberg and 
District irrigation Committee, the Minister for Primary industries gave a 
committment to complete the Scheme by Decemiber 1991.t-i At the time of 
writing it appears that the Bundaberg-lsis irrigation Scheme may indeed be 
finished by year's end. 
The uncertaintly of a completion date for the project is syrntomatic of the 
problems which have, since its inception, beset the Bundaberg-lsis 
Irrigation Scheme. Even though the need for irrigation became apparent 
early in the development of the Bundaberg sugar industry, it was not until 
1965 that the government of Queensland began to seriously consider the 
construction of a major irrigation scheme. Earlier irrigation solutions 
depended on groundwater reserves which were unable to cope with a rapidly 
expanding iagricultural industry. After five years of investigations, planning 
and replanning, the Scheme eventually commenced, but, even as the farmers 
of the Bundaberg and isis Districts rejoiced difficulties began to arise. The 
most significant of these was money. V/hen the project began it was to be a 
totally government funded enterprise, however, as the original funding 
commitments -were expended, and with them the political kudos gained by 
initiating such a popular development, both State and Federal governments 
baulked at providing the necessary finance to complete the project. As a 
consequence, progress on the scheme vvas extremely protracted. And, even 
as the scheme nears completion, serious concerns about its adequacy are 
being voiced.^ -2 
As an example of cooperation between the State and Federal governments 
the development of the Bundaberg-lsis irrigation Scheme fails miserably, 
regardless of the composition of the governments concerned. Contention 
might be expected when parties on opposite sides of the political fence are 
in po'wer, but, even 'when philosophies have been essentially the same, they 
^^  E Casey, Min Primary Industries, Let-ter to B&DIC, 13.8.90 
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have rarely been able to agree about 'vvho should fund the scheme and to -what 
In spite of the problems that have been associated Vv'ith the construction of 
the Bundaberg-lsis Irrigation Scheme it has, nevertheless, taken some of the 
risk out of cane growing in the Vv'ide Bay-Burnett region, and for that most 
cane farmers are very grateful. 
Chapter 6: 1978 to 1985: A TURNING POINT! 
The period from 1978 to 1985 was essentially one of ever Increasing 
struggle. It included further expansion "which again proved to be disastrous 
for many gro'wers, devastating droughts and industrial unrest, to vv'hich were 
added problems with inflation and escalating costs. Australian cane 
grovv'ers also had to contend 'with uncertain International marketing 
conditions and as they commenced their 1978 planting programme they had 
to take into consideration the ramifications of the ne'w International Sugar 
Agreement (ISA). 
The existing Agreement -was due to expire in 1978 so late in 1977 delegates 
from the sugar exporting nations of the -world met in Geneva to thrash out a 
new one. The conference turned into a particularly long and bitter conflict 
In Vv'hich Australia did not fare 'well. Like the conference In 1961 when Cuba 
had been the source of much contention, the 1977 conference also focussed 
on Cuba, 'vvhich again was demanding an increased share of the export market 
and changes to its marketing arrangements.^ The Brazilian delegation was 
also insisting on changes and, if acceded to, their demands, combined vv'ith 
those of Cuba, would result in a reduction in the size of quotas granted to 
Australia and the other member countries. Both Cuba and Brazil 'were 
eventually given some concessions and when the 1978 Agreement was 
flnallu concluded Australia's quota had Indeed been cut back, by 250,000 
tonnes.2 Despite this, the mere fact that some accord had been reached vv'as 
•welcomed by Austral lain the hope that the new Agreement would produce a 
significant upward movement in the long depressed world market price and 
return some stability to the industry 
In addition to the reduced quota, however, there was another provision in the 
ISA which caused almost as much concern. This was the requirement to 
establish a stockpile of about 400,000 tonnes of sugar over the ensuing 
three years. The industry 'was already under considerable financial strain as 
Ai/jtr-iHan FihiSkHiiPo\'i^\\'; 3/11/77 
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the result of a prolonged period of lov/ prices-^ so producing extra sugar 
that could not be sold, and providing additional storage areas in -which to 
keep i t was a burden the industry could i l l -afford at that time. As a 
signatory to the International Sugar Agreement, hov/ever, Australia was 
bound by its decisions. The final outcome of the Agreement was that the 
level of Australian sugar production for 1978 'was limited to around 2.8 
million tonnes (including the stockpile requirements and domestic 
consumption needs); this 'was a substantial drop on the 3.2 million produced 
in 1977.'^  The quota reduction, coming as i t did on top of the reduced 
Japanese contract, did not augur well for the 1978 season. 
Despite the misgivings produced by the 1979 ISA it appeared to have had the 
desired effect when, vvithin twelve months, a more stable supply and 
demand situation started to become evident-' and the -world market price 
began to rise. The cost to Australian growers had been, however, quite 
substantial. Growers had been forced to leave millions of tonnes of cane in 
the fields, but since the improved vyorld situation seemed to vindicate their 
sacrifice, the industry as a -whole vv'as relatively pleased. R. Dei eke. 
Chairman of the Proprietary Sugar Millers' Association, summed up the 
feelings (and the hopes) of the Industry vv'ith these -words: 
After a most dif f icult period spanning 1976, 1977 and 1978, 
the fortunes of the sugar industry relative to price seem to 
have 'bottomed out' and have tended back to more buoyant 
conditions.^ 
The year 1980 did indeed prove to be a good one. Sugar prices continued to 
rise and the average price for all Queensland production was $285.25 per 
tonne, and v-/ith the total payments amounting to $848 mill ion, some $288 
million higher than the 1978 figure."? The -world price remained strong 
throughout 1979 and then began to rise very sharply eariy in 1980. In an 
5 Ai/^-tf-fiiifl ^ ii/jr y^j." Pj<?.i-, Vol 28, (1979), p.197 (Hereafter .4Sm 
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attempt to curb the rising price, caused by increased demand, the 
international Sugar Agreement 'was (temporarily) suspended but the l i f t ing 
of the quota restrictions failed to dampen the market and it became 
necessary to release the special stocks v/hich had been built up over 1978 
and 1979. For Australia this meant the release of the entire stockpile 
totalling almost 326,000 tonnes; an act -which provided gro'wers with a 
windfall profit since the stocks realised considerably higher prices than 
their value 'when put into store.^ 
Despite the release of accumulated stocks prices continued to f i rm, fuelled 
by speculation that a big shortfall in production relative to consumption 
'v^ 'as expected In 1980. When adverse vv'eather conditions and disease 
problems in several producing countries (India, Thailand, the Phillipines, 
Cuba and South Africa) resulted in a reduction in the size of their harvests, 
the free price was pushed even higher. While this caused major problems for 
those charged vv'ith the responsibility of regulating the Industry, cane 
gro'wers everywhere were extremely pleased 'vvith the situation since i t 
meant exceptionally good returns for their efforts, at least in the short 
term. 
As well as rising prices there -were other favourable developments for the 
Australian industry during 1979 and 1980 in terms of export sales. A new 
contract was signed with Korea late in 1979, in June 1980 a long term 
agreement 'was negotiated 'with New Zealand and in July ne-w contracts 'were 
signed with Singapore and Malaysia. In the same month agreement •v'^ as 
reached 'with the Peoples" Republic of China for the f i rst long termi contract 
'With that country. Together vvith the contract vv'ith Japan, which was due 
for re-negotiation in 1981, approximately 45% of Australia's product was, 
by mid 1980, covered by long term contracts. 
The excellent results achieved in 1980 prompted the industry to embark on 
another expansion In order to capitalise on rising prices. At a special 
inquiry conducted by the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board in August 1980 an 
expansion of 5S, about 16,500 hectares, 'was authorised on a pro-rata basis 
8 ASYP, Vol30, (1981), p.1.i2 
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to all existing grov/ers 'who had land available. Gro'wers 'were given only 
t'wo -weeks in -which to accept offers; nevertheless, the response 'was 
overwhelming and a large proportion of the 5% allocation was planted in 
time for the 1981 harvest. A second inquiry was held In December to 
consider further expansion. Many advocates from both gro'wing and, 
unusually, milling interests urged caution but after a short deliberation the 
Board announced a further expansion of 3% to take effect from 1982.^ 
The the extent of the expansion is illustrated by Table 6.1. vv'hich shovv's the 
areas of land harvested between 1979 and 1984. The result of the 1980 
decision to expand is clearly seen in the increase between 1980 and 1981 
when the area harvested Increased from 274,000 hectares to 302,000 
hectares. 
Table 6 1 Area of cane harvested for crushing: 
Queensland 1979-1983^0 
Vear Area ('000 hectares) 
1979 255 
1980 274 
1981 302 
1982 303 
1983 292 
A similar pattern of expansion is evident in the Bundaberg region. Table 6.2 
provides Information about the areas of cane harvested and supplied to the 
Fairymead, Qunaba, Millaquin and Bingera mills. Again there is a significant 
increase in the area harvested from 1980 to 1981. The additional 3% 
expansion is also evident in the 1982 total. 
^ ASrU Vol 30, (1980, p. 156 
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Table 5.2. Area of cane harvestod fo r crushing: 
Bundaberg D i s t r i c t , 1979-198311 
Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Fairymead 
10,327 
10,473 
12,730 
13,179 
12,177 
Qunaba 
3,306 
3,235 
3,538 
3,740 
3,51 1 
Millaquin 
7,203 
7,085 
8,201 
8,687 
6,337 
Bingera 
11,622 
12,080 
13,432 
13,760 
12,792 
Total 
32,458 
32,873 
37,901 
39,366 
36,817 
Despite the volatility of world market prices those who could had rushed 
to expand their holdings, and, in April 1981 sugar prices began to fall. A 
recovery in production in those countries whose sugar crops had been 
severely reduced In i960 caused a relatively sudden drop in the world 
market price, such that the price at the end of the year 'was to almost half 
the level it had been at the beginning.12 For a country such as Australia 
where export sales accounted for around 75^ of annual production, this was 
bad ne'ws indeed. 
At the end of 1980, however, the only 'fly-in-the-sugarbo-vvl' had been the 
intransigence of the European Economic Community (EEC) with regard to its 
marketing policies, which continued to cause problems for the signatories 
of the International Sugar Agreement. In 1980 even this dilemma seemed as 
though it might be close to resolution -when the Community announced that 
it had finally succeeded in convincing its members to discuss the question 
of limiting sugar export subsidies, and to consider joining the International 
Sugar Agreement. This -was -welcome information for the Australian 
industry which had lodged a formal complaint against the EEC under the 
provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1978, 
when It was estimated that almost four million tonnes of EEC sugar had 
found its -way to traditional Australian markets.13 Supported by a number of 
* l Compiled and gerierated by Caneoro-vi/ers - Bundaberg District, S1atistii'5 
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other countries Austral ia had pursued the matter through ly79 and 1QS0, 
and Vv'ith this announcement it appeared as though its persistence vv'as 
finally bearing fruit. 
in the following tv/elve months, however, it became evident that the EEC 
-was not going to change its policies. Instead, as -well as continuing to 
export heavily subsidised sugar, its member countries expanded their level 
of production even further, which resulted In the emergence of the 
Community as a sugar exporter second only to Cuba. The EEC was not the 
only exporter to have introduced protectionist policies 'which mitigated 
against producing countries which did not, such as Australia. For example, 
in the United States of America a domestic price support schemie for sugar 
v/as in operation and in Japan high and discriminatory taxes were imposed 
on imported sugar.i"^ Despite these policies the Australian industry had been 
able to cope, and even expand during times of high prices; when prices 
began to fal l , hovv'ever, they became a serious Impediment, particularly in 
Bundaberg where productivity and profitability had been belo'vv the State 
average for the previous tvv^ o decades i-' 
As a result of the 1980/61 expansion and excellent grovv'ing conditions 
Bundaberg gro'wers produced an even larger crop in 1981 than it had in the 
record breaking 1980 season, but by the time it reached the market, the 
sugar price was so low that it did not realise as much as the 1980 crop. For 
example, the four mills in the district had in 1960 produced a total of 
354,537 tonnes of sugar for a value of $132,043,574. 1981 production was 
458,948 tonnes but it only returned $125,289,316.1^ The do'wn'ward 
movement continued until it reached a low of less than £89 sterling per 
tonne during September 1962.1"^  While there were some rises In the price of 
sugar between 1982 and 1985 generally it remained relatively low, but 
whatever the price, the result for gro-wers -was al-ways the same -
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constantly diminishing returns. Throughout this period the local scene 
remained bleak and international events did l i t t le to l i f t the spirits of 
canegrowers. By August 1984 the world market price had dropped even 
further to £Stg 86.5 per tonne - far belo-w the costs of production for even 
the most efficient v/orid producers, of vv'hich Australia -was but one of a 
very few. 
Negotiations for a renewed International Sugar Agreement also took place in 
1984 but the talks proved to be even more difficult than those of 1979 and 
eventually, despite intensive efforts no agreement could be reached and the 
talks col lapsed.IS The collapse meant that the ISA ceased to have any 
regulatory powers, retaining only Its administrative functions as a 
statistics-gathering and co-ordinating body, and caused the already lew 
'world price to sink even furtheri^ in Australia the collapse 'was described 
as "a tragedy" and provided yet another clear reminder that the well-being 
of the Australian sugar Industry was (and stil l Is) intimately linked with 
the happenings in the vi^ orld sugar market. 
While the collapse of the ISA was a serious blow for the Australian sugar 
Industry In Bundaberg It vv'as disastrous. Table 6.3 belo'w, shows the value 
of sugar production to Bundaberg bet'ween 1978 and 1985. The huge 
bounties of 1980 and 1981, 'when the vv'orld price Vv'as extremely high, are 
clearly illustrated by the figures. So too is the slide into crisis between 
1962 and 1965, especially from the 1981 season to the 1982 season when 
more than $25 million were shaved fromi the value of local production. The 
lovv' prices of 1983 were also accompanied by drought, 'which produced the 
lowest cc.s. in thirty years, and heavy competition from non-sucrose 
s-weeteners.2C" 
» AS^IP, Vol 44, (1985), p. 102 
t * /^iTJ^ Vol 44, (1985), p.112 
^ Canegrowers, Chairmar^  's and S ec retary 's Report, (1984) 
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Table 6 3 Value of Sugar Production to Bundaberg 1978-198521 
Vear I 
1978 71,541,275 
1979 96,861,747 
1980 132,043,574 
1981 125,289,316 
1982 99,300,561 
1983 91,695,067 
1984 89,520,068 
1985 90.976.118 
In Australia generally, the effects of falling prices were exacerbated by 
the fact that a very high percentage of the sugar produced was exported, 
which by 1985 had risen to around 80^.22 The balance was sold on the 
domestic market and there too, the industry was having problems. One of the 
major concerns was the domestic sugar price, which over the years had 
failed to keep pace with the costs of production. From the end of 1967 
until February 1975 there were no increases in the price. There were 
successive rises in August 1976 and June 1977, but, as much as these rises 
were welcomed they sti l l did not allow for the maintenance of the real 
money value of the 1967 return.23 Representatives of sugar industry 
associations submitted a further case for an increase in the domestic price 
to the Queensland Mininster of Primary Industries, V. B. Sullivan, in January 
1978. The State cabinet approved the claim and passed it on to the 
Commonwealth for discussion and approval. The industry was seeking an 
increase of $80 per tonne which would bring the wholesale refined sugar 
price to $340 per tonne, and it was proposed that it would be implemented 
In two stages, each of $40. The two earlier price claims in 1976 and 1977 
had been reduced by the Commonwealth government and the 1978 claim 
2t Canegrovers, Ch.airrrian'5 and Secretary's Reports, (1979-86) 
2t A^W, Vol 44, (1985),p.102; CP[>, H of R Vol 135, (1983-4), p.1271 
^ ASU, Vol 70, fJo 1, (1978), p .3 
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suffered the same fate, but this time the Common-wealth's offer of $18 vv'as 
so far belo-w the industry's claim that the State government rejected it out 
of hand. After a period of intense negotiation, however, the Queensland 
government reluctantly accepted an Interim rise of $30 per tonne on 
condition that a full-scale inquiry was held to determine the validity (or 
otherwise) of the original claim.24 The Committee of Inquiry, held under 
the auspices of the Industries Assistance Committee, was convened in June 
1976 and headed by I AC chairman, W. A. McPannon. 25 
The inquiry investigated all aspects of the sugar industry including 
structure, costs, domestic pricing, marketing and distribution arrangements. 
After taking evidence In Brisbane, Cairns, Tov-/nsville, Mackay and Sydney 
the Committee of inquiry released its report in March 1979. The Report 
recommended that the price of refined sugar in Australia should indeed be 
increased by $80 per tonne. 26 Other recommendations related to the 
provisions of the Sugar Agreement (between the Federal and State 
governments and the industry) v/hich covered the basis of pricing sugar for 
the domestic market and the frequency and method of price adjustment. 
Theoretically, the end result meant that growers could expect a more 
equitable return for their efforts In relation to domestic sugar sales. 
The domestic market -was also experiencing problems as the result of 
competition from artificial and grain-based sweeteners. An increasingly 
health conscious general public began to perceive cane sugar as an unhealthy 
product and in response many mianufacturers of processed food and 
beverages began to sustitute grain-derived products such as glucose for 
sucrose - the natural product widely referred to as sugar. Such was the 
level of concern that the Sugar Board attempted to counter the poor image 
of sugar by mounting a major publicity campaign aimed at promoting nrmre 
responsible and informed attitudes.27 
24 Co:^jnhX)iv^7i^ Pjj-fijn^fjfy £<^jt^j; Hcf R Vol 109, (1978), p.272S (Hereafter CP£i 
25 ASJ, Vol 70 , Wo 2 , (1978) , p .67 
26 ffls. Sifijjr P^jf-d AmuiIP^^'f, (1 979 /9), p .8 
2"? ASYB, Vol 4 4 J 985, p.108 
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AS w e l l as being a f fec ted by t h i s erosion of the value of t h e i r domest ic 
sugar market and the volatility of the world market -which had seen more 
downs than ups in the previous eight years, many growers had been forced 
to contend vv'ith a series of local problems which had eroded not only 
incomes, but also confidence. 
Even during the very buoyant year of 1980 the industry had suffered a major 
setback when It was hit by a State-wide Industrial dispute v/hich resulted 
in a series of rolling t'wenty-four hour strikes. The dispute 'was over a log 
of claims which included a thirty-five hour 'week and an extra 'week's annual 
ho1idays.2y Bundaberg was hit by its first round of strikes in mid 
September, first at Millaquin, then at Fairymead. These strikes, ho'wever, 
•were sparked by a different argument relating to mill staffing levels. For 
the gro'vvers the cause 'was irrelevant. Their concern 'was the result of such 
stoppages - disruption and financial losses. Because growers had been given 
assurances that they 'would receive adequate notice of any stoppages they 
continued to burn their cane in preparation for harvesting in the usual 
manner. When the mill vv'orkers met on the morning of 15 September, 
however, they voted to walk off the job and they refused to allow crushing 
to commence. As a consequence the 7000 tonnes of cane due to be crushed 
that day were left, either standing in the fields or chopped in bins, in both 
cases the cane deteriorated rapidly and the loss vv'as borne by the gro'wer. 29 
The local dispute was quickly resolved but almost as soon as crushing re-
commenced It was halted again, this time by the State-wide dispute. It 
was finally resolved after a series of protracted conferences before the 
Industrial Cornrni ssi on.^ o 
Another serious dispute erupted just before the beginning of the 1981 
season, bet'ween employers and mill and field unions over vvages and 
conditions. A hearing of the State Arbitration Commission 'vvas called 
immediately in an attempt to deflect the threat before crushing commenced. 
The Commission qranted an increase of $15 per week for all mill and field 
* Bund^tiOf-y /iS? h- -^m^il 16 /9 /SO 
2t B/,•ui}^yM?lv'^•n}JiI,^b 19/90 
m ^irj^-,. Vol 40, (1981), p. 149 
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Vv'orkers with an extra $8.10 allo'wance for tradesmen- i^ but the President of 
the Bundaberg branch of the AWU, Gerry Coding, criticised the offer as 
"lousy" and it was rejected by the unionists. So began the 1981 crushing 
season amid the uncertainty of vv'ork stoppages and overtime bans. 
The dispute and negotiations continued well into the season but before it 
was settled, an incident at Qunaba became the focus of union attention. The 
Arbitration Act Included a provision whereby employees could be "stood 
down' if they could not be gainfully employed. During a machinery 
breakdown the management of Qunaba invoked the provision and nine 
workers were stood down. This 'was the first time such an action had 
occurred In the industry and the unions retaliated by 'blacking' the Qunaba 
plantation cane.52 j ^e incident led to an application by the unions for an 
amendment to the Act in vv'hich employers first had to prove their case 
before such action could be taken. With matters apparently reeling from bad 
to 'worse the Commission imposed a cooling-off period during 'v'v'hich normal 
crushing was to resume. 
Significant losses were incurred by growers and mills during this dispute 
and crushing rates were severely retarded. At the heart of the argument 
bet'ween the industry and the unions vv'as the apparent prosperity of the 
sugar industry. The t'wo previous years (1979 and 1980) had been very 
buoyant and the unions wanted a share of the profits for its members. The 
grounds accompanying the unions' log of claims Included a $30 per vv'eek 
increase on the ground of prosperity in the industry; $20 per week on the 
ground of lost earnings resulting from partial wage indexation decisions; 
and $30 per v/eek on the ground of experience achieved by employees within 
the Indus try .33 
The Queensland Cane Gro'wers' Association agreed that 1980 had indeed been 
an exceptional year and it looked as though the financial condition of the 
Industry 'was good In 1981, but It pointed out that many growers were sti l l 
recoverinq from the poor years of 1976, 1977 and 1978, others had 
^ Bmiitf.^rg M? ir iwjj;/^ 10 /b /S1 
^ Pmtii£!A*y M^u'^y}ui7, ]Z/l/9\ 
^ Stitennent by W"ie OCGA dated May 1 "981, Canegrovers, ln.iustri-5l Situation File No 
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increased t h e i r indebtedness as they undertook expansion -works, and s t i l l 
others, particularly those around the Bundaberg/lsis district, had not shared 
in the full bounty of the record 1980 season because drought had curtailed 
their crop. Furthermore, costs of production were continuing to soar and 
price prospects were uncertain. 
In order to demonstrate the increase in production costs the Queensland 
Cane Grower's Executive (QCGE) produced figures vv'hich shov/ed that the 
costs of operating requirements (labour, fertilisers, fuel, etc.) had risen by 
33.9.? between September 1978 and March 1981. The most dramatic 
increase was the cost of fuel which jumped by 81.1;^. During the same 
period capital requirements Increased by 31.81. The QCGE did not Include 
figures showing the percentage increase in growers' incomes; Figure 4.6 
above (page number 80) shews that gross profits in 1981 were considerably 
less than they had been in 1980, with production costs taking a 
proportionately larger share. The dispute 'was finally settled by the 
Arbitration Commission in late August 'when it a'warded further increases 
whereby mill -workers vv-e.^ e to receive an extra $12 and field workers $10. 
The Award was backdated to 20 July,34 and cane growers were not amused! 
Throughout 1982 there 'was increasing concern about the deteriorating 
economic situation of the Australian sugar industry and fears for the future 
were evident within the Bundaberg community. There were fewer entries in 
the cane section of the Bundaberg Sho'w^^  and a series of seminars to assist 
canegro'wers -with planning and taxation matters was organised by the Rural 
Management information Centre in June^^ with a follow-up course in 
September.37 On the employment scene the situation began to worsen quite 
rapidly from the middle of the year, beginning -with the Massey Ferguson 
plant retrenching six men in July; later the same month they were followed 
by eight of the most senior personnel at the Bundaberg Foundary.^ s The 
reasons given on both occasions related to the depression in the sugar 
34 ASVP, Vol 41,(1982), p J -37 
35 SmAiiw y Mi u •y:«7JJ/]^  21 .-'05 JQ2 
36 Pmfy^ty M> \p 'J'miil 14/05/82 
" Pmdjb^r-y f^k'-^niiil 03/09 .•'82 
38 Sa^^-dJ^A^y .^ h •)^y7Jji7^ 50 /07 /82 
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industry. By mid year, ho-wever, it 'vvas clear that it -was not only the sugar 
industry that wa.s in trouble; the entire Australian economy 'was in 
recession. 
In January 1983 it was revealed that the number of people receiving 
unemployment benefits from the Cornmonvv'ealth Social Security Department 
in Bundaberg had nearly doubled in the previous year from 1258 in 1982 to 
2206 in 1983.39 As the recession tightened its grip conditions became 
considerably worse especially when one of Bundaberg's largest employers, 
S^ersatile Toft Limited, sacked 104 v-zorkers in August 1983.'^ o Massey-
Ferguson also shed further staff and by years end Versatile Toft and 
Massey-Ferquson had between them dismissed over 400 rnen.^ i The effect 
on the local community 'was horrendous, and there did not appear to be any 
chance of improvement in the short term. 
The Bundaberg community Is, ho'wever, a relatively close-knit one and people 
quickly organised themselves into self-help and support groups as they tried 
to cope 'With increasingly difficult circumstances. One of the earliest 
examples occurred at Versatile Toft where production workers decided on an 
overtime ban so that others 'vvithout jobs could at least be given temporary 
•work.'*2 Retrenchments continued, ho'wever, and Bundaberg's unemployment 
rate soared to the highest in the State.43 included in the list of unemployed 
workers were about ninety apprentices. Concern about their welfare and 
fear of a shortage of tradesmen in the folio-wing years prompted the 
establishment of a group apprenticeship scheme.'^ ^ Another self-help 
organisation vv'as the Bundaberg Unemployed Support Group -which, though 
created at the instigation of Social Security Social Worker M. McCabe, was 
amply supported by all of the city's s'velfare organisations and a very large 
percentage of the unemployed population.45 what this group actually 
39 &/nif.i3org fi^ li •ywu/;^ 2b /01 /83 
*^ 0 Pi/nOij£>^y ,V^U'^-,vji7, 10/08/83 
41 Pi^<fy£L^.'y M^\rjyfJ.Ji7, 06/12/82 
**2 SmfjB^y M^ i. -yyjjj.'V 1 8 / 0 3 79Z 
"^ 3 -Oii^^Mj-lin'fP.jf'Jifn^^tjjy C'lot^toj, Vcl 291 , (1985), p .159 (Hereafter 4Flf-) 
44 Bufld-i^fy i%?\vjflui7, 50/03/83 
45 Sii^d(}ii^/y M?ir^mji7 26/08/83 
achieved is d i f f i cu l t to determine, but another self-help group, the '^ugar 
Wives Action Group (SWAG) did produce results. 
SVv'AG was the brainchild of a group of cane-farrners" wives from the Clayton 
area of Bundaberg. The convenors of the group were Maree Chappell, Denise 
Maas and Kate Campbell. Their husbands had been vvorking through their 
growers organisations and official channels to try to improve their 
situation but they had been largely unsuccessful. After battling through 
three successively bad years some cane farmers in the Bundaberg area v/ere, 
by 1984, being forced into bankruptcy. Vv'hen a neighbour -was declared 
bankrupt, the normally conservative Clayton women decided that it was time 
they entered the fight to save their farms and their livelihoods, and so in 
September 1984 SWAG v/as formed. While their menfolk had been forced to 
operate 'within very rigid constraints, the 'women in setting up an 
independent organisation were not bound to work through 'official' channels 
and were free to use any means available to venture their ends. They chose 
the media. 
V/ithin a very short period of time the group v/as receiving extensive 
coverage from all over Australia, and through radio, television and printed 
intervie'ws the 'wornen explained 'vvhy they had chosen to publicise their 
plight.46 At the centre of their campaign 'was a submission 'which they sent 
to Commonwealth and State parliamentarians, and to other farming 
organisations in order to canvas support. In the submission the group called 
for a realistic price for sugar, relief from fuel and oil taxes, electricity and 
irrigation charges and in particular, easier access to social security.47 The 
basis of their submission was an article published by the Bureau of 
Agricultural Econonriics In 1984.48 J\•^Q article discussed a survey of 338 
cane farmers throughout Queensland, 'which sought to determine one 
particular measure of farm financial performance - farm cash operating 
surplus. This is defined as total cash receipts less total cash costs. The 
4^ M Ch.ap pell, Interviev 29 /11 /90 
47 SugaK Wives Actioft Group, Submission -to P^rliarftentarians (1984) 
48 H. Lipton., The Queensland sugar cane iridustry: survey results for 1981-82 and 
pr&lections for 1982-83 arid 1983-84; in Bureau of Aqri«ultur.al Econoiriios, Oujrt^f%' 
P^\-'i^\i--<?ftli^Pijif'jI£0'^n^xfv;, Vol 6, Mol ,C Feb 1984), P 3 
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conclusions of the survey indicated that the average cane farm cash 
operating surplus for Queensland had been $24,274 in the 1981-2 financial 
year, $4,193 in 1982-3, and $5,622 in the 1983-4 period. The crucial 
figure for SWAG, however, Vv'as the one which related to canegro'wers in 
Southern Queensland which covers the Bundaberg, isis, Maryborough and 
Brisbane districts. In addition to suffering the affects of the do'wn-turn in 
prices the region had also been severely affected by drought and the 
estimates of their farm cash operating results produced a negative value of 
$9,500 for 1983-4. All other areas indicated a positive result of betvv'een 
$7,000 and $24,000. The report's overall conclusion 'was that the average 
farm financial situation of canefarrners compared unfavourably with other 
rural Industries 4? 
'y/hat this meant for cane farmers in general vv'as that in the 1980-81 
season they enjoyed a good return for their efforts receiving about $37 per 
tonne for cane against production costs of about $18 per tonne. Because It 
Vv'as predicted that favourable prices -vvould persist for some years, a 
considerable number of cane farmers ploughed most of their 1980-81 
profits straight back into the purchase of equipment, farm improvements 
and expansion. In the Chappell's case this meant the purchase of a bigger 
farm supplying the Millaquin mi l l . In the follo-vving years, ho'wever, sugar 
prices fell and many canefarmers, including the Chappells, experienced 
serious financial diff iculties. By the end of 1984 one in every three cane 
farms in the Clayton area was for sale, but i t was a market -without buyers. 
So many farms were on the market that real estate agents began to refuse 
to handle the listings.so 
While the cane farmers were faced 'with the problem of finding money to 
service loans their wives' were faced with the problem of feeding and 
clothing their families. Their problems lay in the fact that vyhen farms had 
reached their equity borrowing l imits there was no legislation to provide 
for the receipt of social security benefits. When banks decided that a farm 
had become unviable and 'working capital could no longer be provided. 
49 Ibid, p . 5 
50 M Ch.appel], Inte^v lev, 29 /11 /90 
fami l ies Vvere lef t v i r tual ly dest i tute as far as day-to-day l iv ing expenses 
'were concerned. As the crisis -worsened more and more families found 
themselves in this position. 
SWAG tackled the immediate problem of providing food for their families by 
applying for the dole. At first their applications were refused because of 
the lack of legislation covering cane farmers wives'. However, when SWAG 
approached Prime Minister Hawke during his visit to Bundaberg in October 
1984, he assured them that if vv'ives registered as being available for fu l l -
time work they 'would indeed be eligible for unemployment benefits.^i The 
government, through Finance Minister John Dawkins, also stated that it 
would look at other options for providing assistance to families affected by 
the sugar industry depression. S'w'AG had succeeded in achieving at least 
one of its stated aims - easier access to social security. The relief of the 
sYornen involved was immense but not all in the community believed that 
their claimis were justified. Letters to the Editor In various ne'wspapers 
condemned thern and even the Leader of the Opposition in Canberra, Ian 
Sinclair, suggested that "It certainly sounds to me that he [Hawke] is 
recommending an abuse of the system."-'2 
The women of Clayton had also succeeded in drawing the nation's attention 
to the seriousness of the crisis -within the sugar industry. The Queensland 
Cane Growers Council (QC6C) had been trying for three years to acheive this 
and had apparently failed. Encouraged by the success of SWAG, the Council 
finally decided that rather than v-/aiting for the government to come to them, 
they 'would go to the government. The result 'was The Cane Train Crisis 
Rally. In the past, when protest groups such as SWAG had formed outside 
official organisations the Council had condemned them for their efforts. 
This time, however, the official grovyers organisation not only backed a 
relatively radical event, they actually organised it. 
During the Federal Election campaign of 1984, Prime Minister Hawke was 
scheduled to visit Brisbane on Thursday 22 November. The cane gro'wers 
51 SanJiid^fy .-5^  i.- OTJJ;7, 25 /10 /84 
52 9m-*}S^^r'; M^ i. •iw.y.'rl 25 .•' 10 .•^ 94 
decided to try to capitalise on the Prime Minister's visit in a -way that 'vvould 
promote their cause; so after consulting a public relations f i rm, Eric White 
and Associates, and with less than one week in which to organise, the 
concept of the 'Cane Train' was born. The concept had t'vvo objectives. The 
f i rst was to attract attention to the cane gro'wers' plight; the second was to 
bring pressure to bear on the government to mieet with QCGC representatives 
to negotiate a package of proposals to resolve the sugar crisis.53 it involved 
transporting more than 1,000 cane growers (approximately 200 of thern 
from Bundaberg) from as far away as Mossman, to Brisbane to attend a rally 
timed to coincide with the Prime Minister's visit. 
It Vv'as a measure of the desperation within the sugar industry that 
approximately one-sixth of the total cane farming population -was prepared 
at short notice to do'vvn tools during such a busy time in the farm calendar. 
At that time of the year farmers are s t i l l engaged in tasks associated with 
harvesting the current season's cane as 'well as preparing for the following 
year's gro'wth. The question that must be asked is, did they achieve 
anything or 'would they have been better off attending to their farm chores? 
They certainly succeeded in capturing national media and community 
attention. They also succeeded in obtaining a meeting vv'ith the Prime 
Minister during 'which he agreed to initate international trade talks 
involving sugar exporting countries, and the provision of financial 
assistance to cane growers.54 with the benefit of hindsight, however, at 
least one grovvers' representative^ E. H. Churchward of Bundaberg, believes 
that the second objective 'would have been achieved 'without the Cane Train. 
While organisations like SVv'AG and events such as the Cane Train attracted 
public attention and put pressure on governments, generally they did l i t t le 
to resolve the immediate problems of making a living in an economically 
hostile environment; their requests for financial assistance from the 
Commonwealth met VYith only minimal success. In 1983 there was a Federal 
grant of $11 million for debt reconstruction and this was follo'wed by 
another $5.5 million assistance packaqe to help suqar qro'v'vers in 1984. The 
53 Aii-L-frjiiJii Cm^ .d^yirw- (J.iri 85), p .25 (Hereafter AlT) 
^ ACtl. (Jan 85), p.25 
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industry felt that this level of aid was 'paltry' when it was considered how 
much the country had benefitted from the income generated by sugar 
exports. The Prime Minister was unmoved by such arguments, however, and 
when pressed, instead of promising further aid, he suggested that the 
growers "could turn to vegetable crops and horticultural production".55 
Despite the initial ridicule with vv'hich this suggestion was greeted, many 
cane farmers did, indeed, decide to grow vegetables. 
Small crops had long been grown as an adjunct to cane and Bundaberg had 
acquired a good reputation for the production of tomatoes in particular. As 
conditions within the sugar industry declined diversification into crops 
such as melons and beans became increasingly attractive as a means of 
survival. By way of illustration the following table shovv's the increasing 
tonnages of some of the more important fruit and vegetable crops in the 
Wide Bay region for the years 1980 to 1984. 
Table 6.4. Crop Production in the Wide Bay Statistical 
Division 1980-1984 (Tonnes)56 
Field Crops: 
Peanuts 
Fruit: 
Citrus 
Pineapples 
Vegetables: 
Pumpkins 
Tomatoes 
Green Beans 
55 €oi/f'i^ 
5 6 All-?tKA' 
1980 
27,425 
26,322 
30,520 
2,385 
3,719 
4,205 
1981 
30,611 
31,042 
31,897 
2,222 
7,536 
7,499 
'•T^il 26/1 yo/84 
1982 
41,622 
28,846 
32,381 
2,803 
12,608 
6,557 
lAXA^liAii f ji,ri} 
1983 
14,025 
23,564 
29,393 
3,472 
26,515 
6,587 
'^w5i.iWTnw5iafl> At") 
1984 
31,544 
35,950 
31,394 
3,134 
27,416 
6,626 
i j iC/j/K-^ii'^- C' 
Table 2 - Production of CKops, Wi^ Bay Statistical Division, 1980-1984, Cat. No 
1306.3 
With the exception of the year 1983, during vv'hich fruit and field crops 
were ravaged first by drought and then by floods, production increased 
steadily. 
In the immediate Bundaberg district (vv'hich included Gooburrum, Kolan and 
Woongarra) vegetable crops dominated, with tomatoes proving to be the 
most popular. The amount grown in the district soared from a mere 2,366 
tonnes in 1979 to 26,215 tonnes in 1983.57 The scale of individual 
diversification and the crops grown, however, varied considerably from 
grovv'er to grower. For example, in the case of the Greensill family, who 
since 1945 had been suppliers for first the Qunaba and later the Millaquin 
mills, small crops had nearly always provided at least a portion of the 
farm's income. The father of the current o'vvner had primarily gro'wn peas 
and pumpkins but generally only as a side-line to canegrovv'ing. In the tight 
economic conditions of the early 1980s Lloyd Greensill turned his attention 
to rockrnelons, v/aterrnelons and beans for processing, in a relatively major 
way. At harvest times Greensill had as many as 400 pickers 'working on his 
property. Small crop growing enabled the Greensills to service existing 
debts and to maintain their viability as cane growers.5s Another Millaquin 
supplier v/ho started to grovv' small crops in a big way as the result of the 
down-turn in sugar was Giovanni Santalucia. He concentrated on 
watermelons, with plantings of forty to f ifty acres which produced between 
500 and 600 tonnes of watermelons annually. Santalucia, one of the largest 
non-plantation grovv'ers in the district -with an assignment of 358.7 
hectares,59 also diversified into cattle production and land sub-division. 
Unfortunately, the economic slump of 1982-3 affected land sales as well as 
sugar, and it was to be several years before Santalucia was able to recoup 
his expenses.^ o 
5"? Oeri'v/ed frorfi Australian Bureau of Statistics^ i)i/^Of}-iindlJOj/€vj){-'^rA'iJont .4^yj 
Sfjfr-jtio:?Smwi^jf'y, Table 2 - Production of Crops, Vide Bay Statistical Division, 
1979-19SS, Cit Ho 1306.3 
^ L Greensill, InteKviev 20/4/90 
^ i7(A?onj-iin^Soi-wmrA7tSj^^tt?, Vol CCXCI No 4, C6/7/90) p.29 
€0 G Sant.alucia, Intervie'vi^  23/4/90 
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sound found the going very tough. One such fami ly, also supplying Millaquin, 
did not grow any sugar whatsoever 'when the slump -was at its peak. Instead 
they grew cucumbers, capsicums, zucchinis and button squash. They had to 
buy addltonal equipment in order to plant and harvest the vegetables and the 
purchases were financed by slewing dovv'n the payment of other bills. They 
also received substantial assistance from local suppliers of seeds and other 
farm merchandise who were prepared to wait for much longer periods than 
usual for their money. Eventually, the situation became so bad that the 
canegrovv'er's wife vv'as forced to apply for the dole. The family survived as 
cane gro'vvers but at the cost of severe marital strain and a deterioration in 
the health of both partners.^i 
Similar tales are told by many cane gro'wers throughout the district. Some 
turned a'vvay from cane grovv'ing entirely and have since concentrated solely 
on the production of small crops.^- Between 1970 and 1990 the average 
annual rate of gro'v'v'ers leaving the industry 1n the Bundaberg district 'was 
1.36%, while the rate for Queensland 'v'vas slightly lo-wer at 1.15 .^^ 3 jt is 
not known ho'w many of these turned to small crops, however, nearly all of 
the farmers who remained in the sugar industry increased their levels of 
debt and were forced to cut back significantly on expenditure. Including the 
purchase of ne-zv plant and equipment; it is not unusual to hear of gro-vvers 
retaining the same tractor for up to fifteen years. Whether growers 
remained loyal to sugar or diversified into small crops many held the belief 
that neither the State government nor the Federal government Vv'as 
concerned about the sugar industry's situation, even though both had been 
attempting to ameliorate some of the industry's difficulties for at least 
the previous two years. While the industry felt that the governments' 
response that had been totally inadequate, the crisis within the sugar 
industry was, in fact, the source of much parliamentary debate especially 
from around mid 1982. At the State level issues such as the Domestic Suqar 
•^1 L Asnitar, Interview 23/4/90 
^2 Interviews v.'ith ex-car^grovers 'v.'ho diJ no-t vant to be nan-ied, 24/4/90 arbd 3/5/90 
^3 EH Churohvard, N J Poulsen^ Managen-^ ent strategies for Bundaberg Canegro'w'ers for the 
19905, Au^tf'j/ijn Sioo^^j of'SiJ^'CiJ}^? TiVAoj^ir^- (Brisbane, Watson Ferguson ar^ d 
Compariy^  1991), pJ32 
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Price,t'4 employment projects,^-' the effects of the thirty-eight hour 
•working 'week.t-fc' drought relief^-7 and financial assistance for the embattled 
sugar industry^^ dominated. In the Federal Parliament discussion generally 
centred on the matter of International marketing arrangements 'with 
particular regard to the International Sugar Agreements. By 1983, ho'wever. 
Federal attention was also more and more frequently dra'wn to the plight of 
the industry. For instance, in September 1982 member for the Federal 
Member for Dawson, Ray Braithwaite, drew parliament's attention to the 
"current disastrous vv'orld sugar prices and the oversupply position" in a 
question about the vv'isdom of providing funds for the development of a 
sugar industry on the Ord.^ '^  in October of the following year Braithwaite 
again pointed to the crisis 'when he asked about the Labor government's 
promised undervvriting scheme for the sugar industry."^o 
By 1985 the Australian sugar industry appeared to be on the verge of 
disintegration. The Implementation of various assistance measures had 
failed to attack the source of the problems and had merely postponed the 
inevitable day 'when some gro'wers vv'ould be forced out of the industry. Vet 
another approach to the Federal government for financial assistance early on 
1965 lead to the establishment of the "100 Day Sugar Industry Working 
Party". Under the direction of Russell Savage the 'working party v/as 
instructed to assess the needs of the industry for short-term assistance, 
as VYell as to examine the opportunities for industry restructuring in the 
10ng-1errn.The prlmary purpose of the Savage Comm 111ee^  however, 'vvas tn 
develop a plan that would enable the industry to "cope more efficiently and 
more competitively 'with changing -world market conditions".^i 
The recommendations that emanated from the Commmittee suggested major 
changes to the sugar industry, particularly 'with regard to its regulatory 
6* OP^, Vol 288, C1982/3), p.399 
S3 i J ^ i Vol291,Cl983), p.159 
« i?P£>, Vol 288, C1982 /3 ) , p .499 
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structure. The main thrust of such change -was to he the establishment of a 
Sugar Industry Authority in place of the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board. 
The Committee suggested that the existing Board lacked flexibility and 
accountability; because Its approach to problem-solving "was throuqh 
legislative and administrative action rather than allo'wing market forces, 
changing practices and attitudes to provide resolutions the the Board had 
inhibited rather than inspired the sugar industry."^2 j ^e Vv^ Drking Party 
Report concluded that in the long-term the Industry vv'ould be faced 'with 
average returns that would be considerably lov/er than those experienced in 
the past. For the industry to survive, therefore, it 'vvas necessary to make 
further improvements to its overall level of efficiency.'^3 por a rural 
Industry that was already acknowledged as being one of the most efficient 
in Australia, it not in the 'world, this -would seem to be a verq tall order. 
When the Report was presented to the Federal government in August 1985 
the response was far from satisfactory for the sugar industry in that 'while 
the government announced that it 'was prepared to help it 'vvas insistent that 
lor price support assistance to be made available the industry must modify 
its regulatory structure; in other words, it was demanding deregulation, 
industry leaders agreed that major changes were In order, but, they were 
very feari'ul of complete deregulation. Furthermore, 'when the matter 'vvas 
debated in the Federal parliament the delivery of assistance 'was also made 
dependent upon co-operation from the Queensland governmient. Federal 
Minister for Primary Industry, John Kerin, claimed that the $170 million 
loan assistance that the National Party dominated State government was 
offering to the industry 'vvas completely inappropriate and nothing more than 
a "truck load of hollow logs with tissue paper bark".'^ '* it would appear that 
despite being one of the least assisted industries in Australla'^5 the 
unfortunate sugar industry had become, yet again, a political football. The 
year ended 'with no resolution in sight. 
72 ASyP, Vol 46,(1987), p. 1 08-9 
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At the end of 1985 the Australian sugar industry as a 'whole had much to 
lament. Of the previous seven years only tvv'o had been 'good'. In 1979 the 
price of sugar began to rise after a long period of depression, and 1980 was 
exceptionally bountiful when prices reached unprecedented heights. What 
had ini t ial ly appeared to be a boon, hov/ever, proved to be a bane. The 
unrealistically high prices could not be sustained and they slid into decline, 
the effects of which were s t i l l being acutely felt in 1985. Before the slide 
commenced, ho'wever, the Australian industry had undertaken an expansion 
which had left many gro'wers 'with increased debts 'which, m the succeeding 
years, they were unable to service. 
Other international events had also caused much consternation. The 
protectionist policies of the United States, and expansion of production by 
the EEC together vv'ith their continuation of price support mechanisms, made 
further inroads into Australia's traditional markets. When the 1984 
International Sugar Agreement talks failed to arrive at satisfactory quota 
arrangements, i t left the global industry in a completely "open market' 
condition - a market in 'which Australia 'was ill-equipped to comipete 
because of high production costs and the absence of any kind of price 
support other than for the domestic market. 
In Bundaberg, 'while cane grovv'ers -wrestled vv'ith the complexities of the 
international scene they also had to meet the challenges presented by the 
local environment. The diff icult ies caused by the do-wn-turn In the Industry 
were compounded by industrial unrest, drought and a general economic 
recession. By the end of 1985 many gro'wers 'were facing the prospect of 
bankruptcy and ruin, while the town itself endured the highest 
unemployment rate in the State. 
The condition of the Australian sugar industry -was so bad by the end of 1985 
that even the Chairman of the Queensland Canegrowers Council, Fred Soper, 
felt that the industry might never recover from the depths into -which i t had 
fallen. He expressed his feelings in the follov/ing Vv'ay: 
1985 has been a year which might bear in future the stigma 
of being the final nail in the coffin of the Australian sugar 
industry as Vv'e kno-w it - or be remembered as the turning 
point in efforts to restore confidence and economic 
viability to one of the most important primary industries in 
the country. 
Canegrowers in particular wil l have good reason to 
remember 1985 as a year of hard times and despondency."^ ^ 
Vet even within these words there is a hint of optimism. It was this kind of 
spirit which kept cane growers going throughout many a difficult year and 
which would enable them to survive the crisis of 1985. 
76 ASrp Vol 45, (19 86), p .97 
hapter 7: CONCLUSION 
The sugar industry in Queensland Is a mature industry both by 
virtue of its history, i t having been established for over a 
century and m terms of i ts developed infrastructure and 
potential for e:-:pansion.i 
The maturity of the commercial sugar industry 'vvas achieved in various 
stages beginning in the 1H60S with experiments conducted by Louis Hope at 
Ormiston. From there it developed into a 'plantation' based industry in 
•yvhlch indentured Pacific Island labourers - Kanakas - provided the essential 
manpower. After the termination of this practice at the beginning of the 
t 'TV e n t i e t h c e n t u r y rn a n y tea re d t h a t t h e s u g a r 1 n d u s t ry w o u 1 d 'vv 11 h e r a n d die, 
but instead i t changed its structure and became a industry -which has gro-vvn 
to occupy an important position In Australia's agricultural economy. For 
example, in the rnid 1960s sugar "vvas Australia's seventh most valuable 
rural enterprise, 'vvhile in Queensland i t 'vvas the second most important 
rural industry after beef cattle production. Further, since Australia 
annually exports around 2.8 million tonnes (approximately 80^ of 
production) of ra'vv sugar, i t is amongst the leading sugar exporters in the 
world, along with Brazil, Cuba and the Europesn Economic Community (EEC).-
The sugar Industry's coming of age' has essentially taken place since the 
end of Vv'orld WsrT'vYO, and expansion has been the key. Foiio'vving the decline 
and stagnation caused by the 'war years, the sugar industry embarked on an 
ambitious programme of expansion, the init ial phase of 'vvhich began -with 
the Soldier Settlement Scheme in 1946. Overall this Scheme 'vvas a 
relatively small part of the programme and much larger expansionary events 
took place between 1950-53, 1963-64, 1974-75 and again in 1980. These 
expansions occurred as the result of rising prices, increased consumer 
demand and expanded vvorld markets. The 1950-53 expansion 'was 
essentially a "catch up' exercise during 'vvhich vv'ar induced deficiencies were 
R Po'v/ell_. M MuGo'verri, The econon-iit impact of the sug.ar induslry on the Queenilirid 
State Hfc.norriy , (AhTnililH: University of Nev England. 1987),p.1 5 
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arneliorated. The miuch larger 1963-64 expansion 'vvas precipitated by the 
coUap.se of the quota provisions of the International Sugar Agreement in 
1961. This event caused major changes in global sugar marketing conditions 
and opened the doors to many new destinations for Australia's ra'w sugar 
exports Including the United States of America The euphoria of the 1963-
64 expansion was, however, extinguished rapidly 'when the countryside 'vvas 
plunged into drought in 1965. When a disastrous drop in sugar prices added 
to their problems many grcvvers faced ruin and the government -was lobbied 
for financial assistance. Depressed prices remained the norm for much of 
the rest of the decade but by 1970 the outlook 'was decidedly brighter. 
In the period from 1970 to 1977 the International sugar market agidln 
experienced significant changes, all of 'which had a profound affect on the 
Australian industry. Britain's entry into the European Economic Community 
in 1974 brought to an end the special trading relationship Australia had 
shared 'with Britain as a signatory to the rnmrnonvv'ealth Sugar Agreement. 
I n t h e s a rn e y e a r the A rn e r i c a n m a rk e t w a s a 1 s o lost w h e n t h e U n 11 e d S t a t e s 
Congress failed to pass legislation that would have extended Australia's 
contract 'vvith that country. The damiage that these losses could have caused 
to the Australian sugar industry vv'as averted, hO'wever, -when increased 
consumption and poor seasons in some producing countries resulted in a 
short-fall in supply. As a consequence of this, the free market sugar price 
rose steadily until November 1974 'vvhen i t reached the unprecedented price 
of $550 Sterling per ton. In order to capitalise on the rising market the 
Australian industry again decided to expand, but the high prices proved to be 
a short-lived phenomenon and 'withm a couple of years the sugar industry 
'vvas again in economically dire straits. 
The p.nce of suqar remained los'^  until 1979 when prices began to rise, 
slo'wly at f i rst , then sharply m early 1980. At the government's instigation 
and foil owing an inquiry conducted by the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board 
In August the area of land under cane 'was expanded by 5^.. A second Inquiry 
in December resulted in a further Z% expansion, in order to participate in 
the expansion i t 'vvas necessary for many grovv'ers to increase their level of 
indebtedness, and 'when the 'bottom' aqain dropped out of the market many 
29 
were unable to service their debts. For most growers the slump mieant a 
severe curtailment of expenditure; for some it meant bankruptcy. 
Expansion has been, in many respects, a two-headed monster for the sugar 
industry. Without i t , the industry would not occupy the important place it 
currently holds within the Australian economy, and the growth of those 
towns along the northern Ne'w South V/ales and Queensland coastlines, which 
depend on sugar for their livelihoods, would surely have been retarded. The 
direct consequences of these expansions in the Bundaberg district, for 
example, were manifold; mills were modernised and their efficiency 
improved, and the ne-w Bundaberg port, which included a bulk sugar terminal, 
was constructed. These things in turn lead to more indirect benefits such 
the expansion of business and employment opportunities. 
While expansion has brought prosperity, it has also brought hardship. Each 
of the expansionary episodes discussed above vv'as preceded by a government 
appointed Committee of inquiry. The purpose of the Committees was to 
inquire into the condition of the industry and to ascertain its ability to 
remain viable in the face of all contingencies. Despite the resources at 
their disposal, they were unable to predict that in every case expansion 
would ultimately be followed by a down-turn in the industry, resulting in 
economic problems for growers and the necessity to provide them with 
government assistance. The economic difficulties experienced by gro'wers 
ultimately flowed on to the communities in -vvhich they operated. 
Clearly then, the sugar industry has a significant economic impact, 
especially in the coastal regions of Queensland where the Industry is 
primarily situated. It is the most highly controlled rural industry in 
Australia, with the Queensland government being legislatively responsible 
for the regulation of the production of sugar cane and the sale of raw sugar. 
The Commonwealth's legislative Involvement includes arrangements with 
the Queensland government for the Domestic Sugar Price Agreement.3 
Proceeds from the sale of raw sugar are divided between the growers and 
the millers on the basis of a formula administered by the Central Sugar Cane 
* Su^i^ i^ii^tf y Vof-li-ffi^ / i i ' -^, 1985 ^  p .8 
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Prices Board. Until 1986 farmers could not sell their properties without 
permission from the Board and expansion of the industry cannot occur 
except -with government approval. When government decided that expansion 
was in order, ho'wever, gro'v'v'ers were faced 'vvith i3n unenviable piaradox. if 
they did not increase the size of their holdings at the same time as their 
neighbours they risked losing economic competitiveness. On the other hand, 
the costs involved in expansion were substantial and frequently meant 
increasing levels of indebtedness. V/hen all things are considered it can be 
seem that with the exception of the actual day-to-day management of cane 
farms, cane grovv'ers have very l i tt le control over their industry. 
Government usurped the decision making process in the name of stability; 
yet, the Industry has suffered repeated cycles of depression during 'v'v'hich 
g ro vv e rs i n n a r11 c u 1 a r a p p e a r t o h a v e bee n t h e m o s t v u 1 n e ra h i e. 
In the Bundi3berg district these problems were also combined -vvith the 
effects of a shorter gro'wing season and relatively frequent droughts. The 
end result for local gro'vvers 'vvas that they were slowly, but perceptibly, 
falling behind their northern colleagues in terms of profitability. This 
process 'vvas accelerated by the outbreak of Fiji disease 'vvhich vv'as detected 
in the region in 1969. Despite the Implementation of 'vvide ranging 
measures designed to contain and then eradicate the disease, it proliferated 
and spread, it took in the order of sixteen years to control the disease, and 
its elimination vv'as only achieved by the comiplete removal of the highly 
productive cane variety NCo310. The last stands of NCn310 -were ploughed-
out after the 1984 harvest, and despite heroic efficiency increases, -v¥ith 
them 'vvent Bundaberg's ability to sustain any semblance of production parity 
•vvith the rest of the State."^  Statistical evidence of a continuation of this 
decline 'was given at the 1991 Australian Society of Sugar Cane 
Technologists Conference 'when it 'was revealed that Bundaberg's average 
cc.s level had fallen by 1.45 units (0.01 unit/year) over the previous twenty 
years -while the State average only fell by 1/01 units (0.05 unit/year). 
Further, 'while in Bundaberg during this period cane production per gro'wer 
E H ChurohsvAKd, H J Poulseri, Managerr.ent strateqie-. for BundabeKg Cinegro'w-ers for 
the 19903.. Aj"f/-j/!i^» S^i'^ti/ ofSmJrCjn-? .•TjM-?-i'.4y.'/i'i', (V-stson Ferguson -ind 
Comp-5ny,1991), pJ.IA 
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has only increased from 1,750 to 3,750 tonnes, figures for the State 
indicated an increase from 2,190 to 4,620 tonnes. 
Despite the loss of Nco310, the efficiency of Bundaberg growers enabled 
them to remain relatively viable by miaking significant local productivity 
gains. These gains were achieved by bringing new lands into production, 
improving farming practices, better disease control (Fiji disease excepted). 
Increasing irrigation and full mechanisation of the harvesting process. 
Bundaberg lead the vv'ay in mechanisation, with the Fairymead plantation 
being the first grower in the country to develop and comimercially use cane 
harvesting machines. When the transition from manual cane cutting to 
mechanical harvesting began there were fears of massive unemiployment 
within the cane cutting fraternity and dissent vv'ithin the union movement. 
The transition took about ten years to complete, and employmient losses in 
the area of manual cane cutting were more than compensated for by the 
creation of jobs for cane harvester operators and in the manufacture of cane 
harvesting equipment. In the manufacturing sector Bundaberg again 
displayed a remarkable capacity for innovation and entrepreneurial activity, 
and within a relatively short period of time the region emerged as a world 
leader in the fields of cane harvesting technology and manufacture. 
The other factor in the viability equation was irrigation. Without it there 
is no doubt cane growing in the Bundaberg district would have ceased to be 
an economic propositon years ago. While considerable amounts of irrigation 
water have long been drawn from the regions extensive groundwater 
reserves, since the end of World War Two the focus of irrigation has been 
the Bundaberg-lsis Irrigation Scheme. Despite many years of planning and 
t-wenty years of construction, the Scheme has neither fully insulated the 
region from periodic drought, nor has it enabled the cane growers of the 
region to compete equitably Vv'ith their more abundantly watered northern 
colleagues. Although it allowed growers to ensure the survival of their 
cane during very dry periods, continually rising water charges were by the 
mid 1980s miaking even this a less than sound economic investment. 
Cane gro'vvers in general are extremely efficient farmers. In the Bundaberg 
district, vv'here climatic conditions are less than ideal for cane growing. 
i -r-
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they have had to be evyn bsttur simply to survive. Despite the traditional 
conservatism of farmers, Bundaberg's cane gro'wers 'vvere prepared to 
embrace ne'w technology, to make changes to farming practices and to 
diversify into other crops in times of need. Unfortunately, nothing 'was able 
to halt the steady decline in profitabil ity in the Bundaberg area, that became 
particularly evident bet'ween 1976 and 1985. 
The entire period from 1976 to 1985 was very trying for Bundaberg 
grower's. Duri ng that 11 rne the phasi ng out of the cane variety NCo310,, took 
place, the Bundaberg-lsis Irrigation Scheme was being tortuously 
established, the price of sugar on the 'world market fluctuated wildly, and 
the region 'was subject to severe drought. At the same time rapidly 
escalating costs took an increasingly larger portion of sugar incomes. In 
1985 many gro'vver's were faced 'vVith seemingly insurmountable financial 
problems. Some gave up and left the industry, but many were like the 
pioneer grn'vvers "vvhose livelihoods were devastated by i3 disastrous flood in 
1875 and " ru s t' disease i n t h e f o 11 o 'vv i n g yea r; t h e y f o u g h t o n. M a n y t o o k o n 
outside work 'vvhile at the same time continuing to '-vork their properties and 
'While sharing the essentially conservative characteristics of most farmers, 
'When faced 'with adversity cane gro'wers -were prepared to go outside 
official channels in order to convey their message to those in authority. 
They did not always win, but, pressure groups such as the Bundaberg V/ater 
Rights Association refused to give up -vvithout a fight. The 'vvomen in the 
Industry also played an Important role. They 'worked alongside the men by 
driving tractors and hauling around irrigation equipment. They even formed 
their own pressure group - SWAG - and by using i t to generate national 
attention and government sympathy, vv'hen matters reached crisis stage they 
applied for and obtained the dole. 
Such persistance and dedication is admirable, however, just ho'vv long can 
any industry survive in the face of such odds'? Cane growing is a business 
just like any other, and Inevitably hard business decisions about Its 
continued viability 'vvill have to be made and perhaps in due course 
alternative uses for the land currently under sugar 'vvill be found. It is, 
ho'v^ever, extremely dif f icult to imagine Bundaberg 'without sugar! 
EPILOGUE 
A ne'v'v' era commenced for the sugar Industry on 15 July 1991 when the 
Sugar Industry Act 1991 'vvas proclaimed. The ne'v'v' Act repealed and 
replaced nearly all of the existing la'ws -which pertain to the sugar 
industry (some thirty-seven of them) and established the Queensland Sugar 
Corporation. The Corporation replaced the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board 
and the Sugar Board and is similar to the Sugar Industry Authority that 'was 
recommended by the the Savage Committee in 1965.^  The sugar industry in 
general, however, is not satisfied with the composition of the Board 
because i t l imits direct industry representation to only four of its nine 
members, despite the fact that i t is entirely funded by levies from the 
industry.2 j ^ e effectiveness of the ne'vv Sugar Industry Corporation is yet to 
be tested. 
The other major regulatory change that has occurred since 1985 'was the 
removal of the embargo 'vvhich had prohibited the importation of sugar onto 
the domestic market since 1915. To date imports have been held in check by 
t h e 1 rn p 0 s 11 i o n o f a t a ri f f, h o 'VY e V e r, t h e size of t h e t a ri f f is g ra dually be 1 n g 
reduced and as there is a surplus of sugar on the 'vvorld market at the 
moment, the industry fears wholesale 'dumping' of sugar on the local 
market if the tari f f is reduced much further3 
In its currently precarious condition, 'dumping' could 'well sound the death 
knell for the Australian sugar industry. This is because the industry has 
never fully recovered from the crisis of 1985. Conditions did improve and 
prices did rise, reaching a high of $362.40 per tonne in 1989. Since then, 
hov/ever, prices have again fallen and the price for the 1990 crop was 
approximately $344 per tonne,^ while the estimated price for the 1991 crop 
is even lower at $300 per tonne. In real terms this means that the value of 
the 1991 crop 'will be even less than the value of the 1985 crop. Despite 
^ SugaK Industry 'v/orking Party Report, (1985), p52 
2 .J. Po ijlse n, Inter'..'ie'-^, 2 /7 /91 
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the fact that conditions have remained relat ively d i f f i cu l t , ho'vvever, the 
i ndustry has undergone a thi rteen per cent expans 1 on 1 n the past seven years 
and a further expansion of two and one half per cent is planned over the 
next five years.^ 
The condition of the sugar industry in Bundaberg continues to be somevyhat 
worse than in the other cane crowing areas, primarily because of its 
climatic disadvantage. Drought conditions caused a significant decrease in 
the the size of the 1990 harvest and even dryer conditions in 1991 are 
expected to produce the smallest crop in many years. Vvhile the Bundaberg-
lsis irrigation Scheme is very close to completion i t has not been able to 
keep up with demand and 'v'vater restrictions have been In force for much of 
the 1991 growing season. The problems have stemmed from deficiencies in 
the size of the Burnett River storage area and the channels which carry the 
water from the Fred Haigh (Monduran) Dam. The Dam has more than 
sufficient 'water available but transferring i t to 'where i t is needed has 
proved to be very diff icult. Lobbying action is no'w being undertaken to have 
the capacity of the facil i t ies increased. 
Vvhile all of the above events and changes have had impacts of varying 
degrees on the Bundaberg and district sugar industry, the one that was the 
source of most concern vv'as the takeover of the Bundaberg Sugar Company by 
the British sugar giant, Tate and Lyie. Despite reassurances, the local 
industry -was so vv'orried about the possible consequences of the takeover 
that i t attempted to launch a counter offer of their own.6 
This then was the state of affairs as the 1991 cane harvesting season got 
underway; the regulatory structure of the Industry 'was undergoing major 
change, sugar prices 'were falling, Bundaberg v-/as in the grip of a drought, 
production costs were continuing to rise, and the Bundaberg Sugar Comipany 
was in the hands of overseas interests. The Australian sugar industry in 
general, but the Bundaberg industry in particular, has never faced a miore 
uncertain future. 
5 J. Poulsen, Inter'vie'-.v-, 2/7 /91 
6 EH Churthv-ird, interv-iesv'. 26 .-'6/91 
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Appendix No. 1 
BUNDABERG SUGAR INDUSTRY QUESTIONNAIRE 
No: 
Date: 
FAMILY NAME: 
ADDRESS: PHONE: 
PROPERTV DESCRIPTION: 
MILL DISTRICT: ASSIGNMENT AREA: 
CHANGES IN MILL DISTRICT: WHEN: 
PROPERTY ACQUISITION: 
Purchased: inherited: New Assignment: 
Details: 
F AM ILV HISTORV IN SUGAR INDUSTRY 
How long has family been in sugar industry? 
How did forebear/s acquire property? 
Has holding been increased or decreased in size? 
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In your opinion, whet have been the major issues, problems or highlights 
of the sugar industry since 1945, or since you entered the industry? 
MAJOR ISSUES: 
PROBLEMS: 
HIGHLIGHTS: 
38 
MECHANICAL HARVESTING 
When was mechanical harvesting first used on this property? 
What effect did the use of miechanical harvesters have? 
- work practices/ farming techniques 
- industrial relations 
- size of harvest 
- your control over your business 
Did mechanical harvesting improve the economics of cane gro'wIng for 
you? 
Has your holding been increased in size since the introduction of 
mechanical harvesting? 
Other information re. mechanical harvesting? 
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IRRIGATION 
Is this property irrigated? Yes No 
Nature of irrigation: 
When introduced: 
Size of area irrigated: 
Problems with irrigation: 
Drought 
Which years? 
How did i t effect you? 
How did you cope? 
DIVERSIFICATION INTO SMALL CROPS/OTHER BUSINESSES 
When? 
What kinds of crops? 
How financed? 
40 
SLUMP 
When did it start to effect you? 
How did it effect you? 
Survival strategies? 
Other information re. slump? 
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